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Abstract. 
It is a long established and still respectable claim in the linguistic dmipline that sentences 
containing reference to non-existent objects have no truth-value. This thesis is an attempt to 
provide a richer and more accurate account of the interesting relations which connect the 
existence or non-existence of objects and the expressions by which speakers attempt to refer to 
them with the range of truth-values assigned to sentences containing such expressions. 
After an introductory chapter whch defines the main terms used in the thesis and discusses 
preliminary issues, the second chapter is taken up with a critical review of the history of 
presupposition in linguistics. The important early theoretical contributions are surveyed and 
the relevant later theories discussed, particularly those analyses which acknowledge the 
complexities of the relationshp between failed presuppositions and truth-values . These are 
evaluated with respect to their empirical and theoretical adequacy and the chapter concludes 
with a summary of the outstanding problems. 
Chapter three contains a discussion of determiners focusing on the existential aspects of their 
meaning. An analysis of existential force as a scalar phenomenon is proposed and examples 
of each of the types of determiner distinguished by the proposed existential scale are 
examined. 
h the fourth chapter, questions surroundmg the nature of the existence of objects are 
discussed. It is proposed that different types of existence are viewed in terms of different 
existential locations; and that these existential locations can be modelled as possible worlds. 
Some preliminary questions concerning the nature of possible worlds are addressed and 
arguments from the linguistic and philosophcal literature in favour of viewing possible worlds 
as existent entities or as abstract constructs are reviewed. The chapter concludes by 
defending the modal realistic stance whch maintains that all possible worlds actually exist. 
Chapter five contains a detailed discussion of the members of the set of possible worlds and 
describes a rich structure whch can be imposed on the set in the form of accessibility 
relations of several types: counterpart relations which define inter-world proximity; temporal 
links whch can be used to identifL distinct temporal stages of worlds as chronological 
counterparts; and familiarity relations which connect individuals to sub-sets of worlds via 
epistemic llnks. 
The next chapter presents a theory of how referring expressions are interpreted by means of 
locating their referents in possible worlds. The processes involved in accessing worlds of all 
types are discussed and then a set of rules is laid out which governs the choice of referential 
location on the basis of the relative accessibility of competing potential reference worlds, 
where accessibility is determined by the structure of llnks imposed on the set. The application 
of the rules to a range of increasingly complex sentences is discussed . 
The final chapter of the thesis is concerned with the potential problems and wider implications 
associated with adopting the location theoq o f  reference presented, First, it is shown that two 
related types of sentences, those containing deictic pronouns and names, which were problem 
cases for previous theories, can be accounted for. We then discuss the implications, 
concerning the failure of Leibniz's Law, which arise from treating ail referring expressions as 
picking out their extensions. Finally there is a discussion of the implications of adopting the 
framework set out in the current thesis for the interpretation of a wider range of predicate 
types and further areas of research are suggested. 
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1.1 General Introduction. 
This thesis is concerned with the linguistic relations between reference, existence and truth. 
These three properties usually come together in the linguistic and philosophical literature in 
relation to the concept of presupposition. 
The central tenet of the doctrine of semantic presupposition is that the occurrence in some 
sentence of a de fh te  description whose intended referent does not exist results in truth- 
valuelessness for both the presupposing sentence and its negative counterpart. For example, 
the theory holds that sentence 1.1. is associated with the existential presupposition 1.2. and 
that if 1.2. is false (if there is no gravy) then both 1.1. and its negative counterpart 1.3. are 
neither true nor false. 
1.1. The gravy congealed. 
1.2. The gravy exists. 
1.3. The gravy did not congeal. 
There are many clear examples which seem to bear out the claims of presuppositional theories 
very well. Sentence 1.4., for example, contains a definite description whose referent is easy to 
accept as non-existent, and given a choice between true, false and neither to describe this 
sentence, linguistically naive native speakers do categorise it in the third way. In contrast, 
such sentences as 1.5 are perceived as true by many speakers and those such as 1.6 are 




The King of France is bald. 
The Prince of Wales is married. 
The Queen of Spain is Welsh. 
The problem is that not all apparent instances of presupposition failure behave in the same 
way. It is possible to identify many sentences whch are less clear cut, as well as a number 
which appear to be counter-examples. Sentence 1.7. should be perceived as a truth-valueless 
statement just as 1.4. was, given that dodos no longer exist but it is equally possible to analyse 
sentence 1.7. as true. 
1.7. The dodo is a flightless bird. 
Sentence 1.8. is an even less convincing example of the effect of presuppositional failure. 
1.8. The dodo cannot fly 
It is possible to argue that 1.8. is true simply because 1.7. is true and they are paraphrases of 
each other. More importantly, it is possible to argue that 1.8. is true because 1.9. is false. 
1.9. The dodo exists. 
On presuppositional theories, the falsity of 1.9. should ensure the truth-valuelessness of 1 .8. 
If the falsity of 1.9. allows us to deduce that 1 3.  is true (if we reason that dodos cannot fly 
because they do not exist) then 1.8 is simply an entailment of the negation of 1.9 and there is 
no need to invoke the special category of presupposition. It should be pointed out that 
sentences 1.7 - 1.9 contain a definite description with generic reference. However, since 
generic reference is a common use of such expressions, a theory such as the theory of 
presupposition, whch purports to account for definites, ought to be able to handle generic 
uses. 
Not all apparent counter-examples to presuppositional theories are so straightforwardly 
handled however. In particular, it appears that some non-existent entities are more non- 
existent than others. Further examples containing existentially questionable referents are easy 
to find. For example, 
1.10. 
1.1 1. 
The starship Enterprise is powered by a warp drive. 
The tooth-fairy used to deal in sixpences but now leaves pound coins. 
Our ability to assign truth-values to such sentences indicates the need to recognise a range of 
existential possibilities whch includes ''existence in the real world" and the classical "non- 
existence" of the Kmg of France but also includes such categories as the "fictional existence" 
in 1.10 and the "mythological existence" in 1.1 1. 
There is a further set of problem sentences, of which 1.12 is an example. 
1.12. The Kmg of France is standing next to me. 
1.12, since it contains the archetypal definite description with a failed presupposition, 
"should" be truth-valueless, but it is even more clear in this case that this sentence must be 
analysed as false, since a non-existent entity cannot stand in a spatial relation such as 
proximity to an existent one. It is not at all clear that it is the possibility of arguing for the 
existence of the King of France that allows this analysis. On the contrary it seems that the 
acceptance of the non-existence of this individual along with the acceptance of the existence of 
the referent of me is precisely what forces the assignment of the value-false. 
Clearly there is a connection between non-existent referents and truth-valuelessness. 
However, it appears that not all instances of non-existence cause truth-valuelessness, nor that 
all instances of truth-valuelessness are caused by non-existence. The problems associated 
with presupposition failure are solvable only if they are seen as part of a larger issue 
concerning all means of reference and all types of existence. It is necessary to work from a 
different perspective than that taken by presuppositional analyses, on a variety of parameters, 
to allow a fuller and more accurate account of h s  interesting area. 
For the remainder of t h s  chapter, we will lay out the means by whch we intend to broaden 
the focus away from the traditional concerns covered by presupposition analyses. A detailed 
discussion of presupposition itself appears in the following chapter. 
1.2. Reference 
Presuppositional theories as a means of accounting for the relations between reference, 
existence and truth suffer from a narrowness of focus in that only definite descriptions 
(usually singular), only one type of context, and not even all uses of definite descriptions are 
addressed. 
There does not appear to be any a priori reason to restrict the concept of presupposition to 
only one NP type. We consider existential aspects of the meaning of singular and plural 
definites, the King of France, the MPs on both sides of the House; singular and plural 
indefinites, a bugging device, some -frozen turnips: pronouns; names, Zsa-Zsa Gabor, Mr 
Chekhov; bare plurals, ribbons; and a range of quantified NPs, both Poles. neither Equinox. 
every hamster, any excuse, few authors. no solution. Not all of these expressions refer in 
what is the standard understanding of this term proposed by Lyons (Lyons, 1977). 
"It is a condition of successful reference that the speaker should select 
a referring expression - typically a proper name, a defhte noun-phrase 
or a pronoun - which . . . will enable the hearer . . . to pick out the actual 
referent from the class of potential referents. 
(Lyons, 1977: 180) 
We will follow Lyons in assuming that reference is a feature of expressions when they are 
used in particular discourse contexts, rather than a terminological variant for denotation, but 
we will use "reference" and "location of a referent" in relation to the interpretation of all types 
of NPs, not just definites, pronouns and names, since it appears that non-existence affects the 
interpretation of all of the expressions above. What we are aiming at in this thesis is to 
provide an overarching theory that goes beyond presupposition failure only associated with 
definite descriptions to the existential implications for all NPs from which the particular 
instance of definite descriptions follows. 
A hrther innovation in ths thesis is that we will not only consider the referentially transparent 
contexts such as that in 1.13 which presuppositional theories also address (since it is possible 
to argue that the definite in 1.13 can be associated with the existential presupposition in 1.14) 
but will discuss the occurrence of nominal expressions in a range of "referentiallj. opaque" 
contexts (Russell, 1905), such as the object NPs in 1.15 - 1.19. 
1.13. 
1.14. 
The MPs on both side of the house shook with terror 






I thought I saw a bugging device. 
I dreamed about some frozen turnips last night. 
I do not believe in Zsa-Zsa Gabor. 
I want to marry Mr Chekhov. 
I am looking for ribbons in the toaster. 
Definites in these contexts are assumed to be outside the scope of presuppositional accounts 
since it is argued that the failure of existential presuppositions of expressions in such contexts 
does not regularly result in truth-valuelessness (McCawley, 198 1 ; Cherchia and McConnell- 
Ginet, 1990; Partee, ter Meulen and Wall, 1990). 
The last important way in which the current approach to reference and existential aspects o f  
meaning broadens the focus from that of traditional presuppositional theories is by addressing 
a wide range of the uses of nominal expressions and attempting to relate these uses to each 
other in a unified manner. We consider uses of definites which are anaphoric (Hawkins, 
1978; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Werth, 1993) and uses of definites as 'Ifirst-mentionsls 
(Hawkins 1978): for example 
1.20. 
1.2 1. 
I had a cat and a budgie but the cat died. 
I had a budgie but the cat ate it. 
We compare these (and other) uses of definites to anaphoric and deictic uses of pronouns: for 
example 
1.22. 
1.23. Here she comes now. 
I had a cat but she died. 
We also examine the uses of names, to evaluate their anaphoric potential and their 
appropriateness as first-mentions, compared with definites and pronouns. For example: 
1.24. ?I am fond of my husband;, but Brian; has terrible clothes. 
There are also interesting alternations to be considered between definite descriptions used as 
rigid designators (i.e. as names) and identical definite descriptions used as non-rigid 
designators (i.e. as defhte  descriptions) (Kripke, 1980). For example, it is possible to 
paraphrase 1.25. as 1.26 since the Prince of JVaZes and Prince Charles are synonymous if the 
definite is understood as a rigid designator: 
1.25. 
1.26. 
The Prince of Wales is still married. 
Prince Charles is still married. 
However, it is not possible to paraphrase 1.27. as 1.28 since the Prince qf  Wales in 1.27 is 
not being used as a rigid designator. 
1.27. 
1.28. 
The Prince of Wales is always the heir to the throne. 
?Prince Charles is always the heir to the throne. 





The signing c h p  is a miracle of modem times. 
A signing chimp is wondrous to behold. 
S i p n g  c h p s  make perfect pets. 
We attempt to relate the existential aspects of the meanings of generics to other types of  usage 
and to account for the gap in the generic pattern caused by the impossibility of a generic 
interpretation of a plural defhte, such as that in sentence 1.32. 
1.32. The signing chimps attract large grants. 
A further innovation proposed in t h s  thesis is that NPs do not necessarily entail existence or 
non-existence discretely. The set of quantifiers are traditionall). divided into two discrete 
groups on the basis of a binary split between those with existential force (e.g. both, neither, 
al l ,  many, some) and those with no existential force (e.g.. every, an<v..few, and no). We will 
consider the availability of existential interpretations of some of the supposedly non- 
existential quantifiers. For example, the subject NP of the deepest subordinate clause of 1.33. 
can be interpreted existentially, which allows the interpretation of sentence 1.34 as true, but 





I decided to buy chocolates for everyone who helped. 
I didn't grudge the expense since they had all been very kind. 
T h ~ s  cost me n o h g  as nobody had bothered to help at all. 
We will account for thls range of expressions and uses in a unified way by placing them at 
ordered points on a scale of existential strength. By proposing such a scale we do away with 
the notion that existential force is a property with a pair of binary values. This departure i s  
mirrored in our treatment of the existential properties of entities which, we will argue, consist 
of a richer range of possibilities than just existence or non-existence. 
1.3. Existence. 
The examples given as Nos. 1.04 - 1.1 1 in section 1.1. were intended to indicate that a very 
narrow binary deh t ion  of the existence of entities is not adequate to account for the 
existential possibilities associated with the referents of nominal expressions. If existence is 
defined as existence in the real world, or even in some contextually salient sub-part of the real 
world, then only the first and last of the definite descriptions in 1.36 are clear and reliable 
cases of either existence or non-existence. 
1.36. The highest mountain in Scotland. 
The last day of the miners' strike. 
The children of William the Fifth. 
The Pope's wife. 
The original Baker Street Irregulars. 
The oldest surviving Leprechaun. 
The squared circle. 
The intervening expressions can be seen as examples of other types of "existingness" which 
are neither existence nor non-existence. The first illustrates past existence in the real world, 
and the others, probable future existence in the real world, possible future existence in the real 
world, existence in a fictional world, and existence in a mythological world. 
It is certainly not the case that all sentences containing any of the "existentially questionable" 
expressions in 1.36 are perceived as truth-valueless. For example, it is necessary to interpret 
sentence 1.37 as a true statement, since it is analytic. 
1.37. The oldest surviving Leprechaun is a Leprechaun. 
However, in what does the analyticity lie? The subject NP must be taken as referential and 
not generic because of the use of the superlative. A generic interpretation involving universal 
quantification will necessarily be true, whereas its existential or referential counterpart would 
be truth-valueless on presuppositional theories. 
One way to account for this is to say that although Leprechauns do not exist in the real world, 
in those mythological worlds in which Leprechauns do exist, they are Leprechauns. In the 
same way, we can account for the intuitive truth of such sentences as 1.38. 
1.38. The k n g  of France is a King. 
We can say that sentence 1.38 is true because in every world in which the King of France 
exists he is a lung. Our knowledge that Leprechauns are Leprechauns and kings are kings, 
means that if we can accept the existence of these entities in other possible worlds we can 
assign the value true to the sentences. Similarly if we can accept that the referents of the 
subject NPs in sentences 1.39 and 1.40 exist in other possible worlds, we can use our 
knowledge about these worlds to analyse sentence 1.39 as true and 1.40 as false. 
1.39. 
1.40. 
The starship Enterprise is powered by a warp drive. 
The tooth-fairy comes down the chimney on Christmas Eve. 
However, by taking t h s  route to an explanation of the truth-values of 1.37 - 1.40. we render 
ourselves less able to explain the intuitive truth-valuelessness of sentences such as 1.4 1.  
1.41. The Iong of France had a perm. 
If we allow that the King of France exists somewhere, in some possible world, it is not 
coherent to appeal to the notion of his non-existence to account for the truth-valuelessness of 
the sentence. The problem with employing the notion of possible worlds is that if we 
recoguse the existence of any one world besides the real world we are committed to accepting 
the existence of every possible world. This entails that for any sentence there is at least one 
world (and probably an i h t e  number of worlds) in which that sentence is true and at least 
one world in which that sentence is false. There is no valid argument for allowing worlds 
where the King of France exists but disallowing worlds in whch the King of France exists and 
has a perm. 
The problem we must address is whether we can accept the existence of every possible world, 
by which means we are provided with a potential existential location for the referent of any 
nominal expression, but at the same time constrain the use of possible worlds in interpretation, 
so that all referring expressions are matched with referents at locations around the set in such 
a way as to reflect our intuitions about the truth-values of the sentences in which they occur. 
This task depends on a particular view of truth and truth value assignment, and establishing 
the validity of this view is the final piece of preliminary argument which must be carried out 
before embarking on the development of the argument in detail in the main body of the thesis. 
1.4. Truth. 
If we disregard the need to account for presuppositional effects, it is possible to argue, in 
accordance with classical bivalent logic, that every well-formed sentence is associated with 
one of two truth-values: either true or false [ths being a central tenet of both Montague 
Grammar (Dowty, Wall & Peters, 1981) and DRT (Kamp & Reyle, 1993)] However, only 
DRT sees this as a failing in the theory, as illustrated by the following quotation: 
"It may well be ... [of some sentences] ... that all that can be ascertained of 
them is that they are true in some situations and false in certain others, but 
that there are many other situations in which their truth values are not 
determined. " 
(Kamp & Reyle, 1993, p:469) 
However, if we seek to account for presuppositions in semantic terms, it seems that we cannot 
maintain this ideal state o f  affairs and must choose one of two alternative positions: either 
that there are three truth-values or that there are two truth-values and the possibility exists 
that sentences are associated with truth-value gaps. Burton-Roberts (1 989) discusses these 
alternatives and reviews the opposing arguments to be found in the literature, including 
Keenan's ( 1972; 1973) development of three valued logic, Martin's ( 1975) two-dimensional 
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four-valued logic, and the various suggestions by van Fraassen ( 1969), Rescher ( 1969), 
Herzberger (1970) and Seuren (1989, among others, that a system of two truth values with 
truth value gaps is to be preferred; a view which Burton-Roberts (1 989) supports. He notes 
for example, Rescherls view that: 
the fbrther a system departs from orthodox logic ... the more tenuous 
(Rescher, 1969: p 129) 
its claim to constitute a "logic" will be." 
As well as t h s  general reservation about deviations from classical logic, there is a second 
motivation of a very different lund, for adopting the "2-values with gaps" approach. This 
arises from our desire to reflect intuitions and model as accurately as possible the procedures 
whch occur during discourse. Briefly, if there are three truth-values of equal status it is 
problematical to reflect the notion that one of these, the thrd truth-value, is indicative of a 
problem, possibly a breakdown, in the normal functioning of a discourse. If on the other 
hand, we have truth-value gaps where presuppositions fail, it is a simpler matter to label these 
gaps, like other unfinished interpretation tasks, as evidence of failures in the discourse. 
Furthermore, it is possible keep the notion of a simple bivalent logic under which every well- 
formed sentence must have a truth-value, and at the same time allow the non-assignment of 
truth-values to utterances of sentences in discourse contexts. 
To do this we must accept a particular view of what Strawson called l1aboutnessl1 (Strawson, 
1964). If we accept that statements are about entities and not about worlds as is sometimes 
claimed (McCawley, 198 1) then a sentence such as 1.42. must be about an individual who is 
the King of France and only indirectly about a place (a world) where he exists. 
1.42. The King of France is very light on his feet. 
If this sentence is perceived as truth-valueless (as we assume it is) then it might seem that the 
world where this individual, the King o f  France, exists has very different properties from the 
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real world. In the real world it is either true or false of e v e 5  individual (or at least of every 
human individual) that he or she is light on hs or her feet! This might mean that to accept 
that sentence 1.42 is truth-valueless we must accept that the world in which the King of 
France exists is incomplete2. 
However, if we can accept that truth-value assignment is a firmly pragmatic phenomenon 
there is another possible explanation. By accepting that truth-value assignment is a process 
carried out by real hearers with respect to utterances in real discourse contexts, it becomes 
unremarkable to claim that it is often not possible for truth-value assignment to proceed in an 
ideal fashion.. For example, given the current discourse context, where the current author is 
in the role of speaker and the current reader is in the role of hearer, 1.43. is the representation 
of a sentence for which no truth-value assignment is possible 
1.43. The daughter of my eldest sister has no middle name. 
We do not have to analyse this sentence as a statement about an entity in a non-real world 
with the mysterious property of internal incompleteness to account for the inability of the 
current reader to assign a truth-value to it. We can just as easily argue that nothing prevents 
the assignment of a truth-value except the limits on the epistemic access of the current reader 
to the relevant details of the real world. 
We will argue in chapter 4 that we can quite readily extend this argument to account for 
sentences such as 1.42: it may not be possible for a hearer of 1.42. to assign a truth-value if 
he or she does not have the necessary epistemic access to the world where the referent exists. 
This argument is entirely unconnected to any claim that in any world where the King of 
France exists the individual is in some third state which is impossible in the real world. 
Likewise, the argument is compatible with the claim that truth or falsity are unavoidable 
'The possibility for fuzzy interpretations of "lightness on one's feet" does not contradict this claim. 
If an individual is neither light on their feet nor heavy on their feet all this means is that they have 
the property o f  lightness on their feet to 50% and the opposite property to 50%. The "all-light" and 
the "all-heavy" options are simply two extreme cases. (Russell, 1923; Zimmerman, 1985). 
2For an extended review of the arguments for and against incompleteness see Chapter 4 section 
4.4.2. and Chapter 5 section 5.3.1. 
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entailments of well-fonned sentences. 
In summary, we will claim later in the thesis that truth-valuelessness is a possible relation 
between an utterance, a proposition and a hearer, but that truth-valuelessness is not a possible 
relation between a proposition and a sentence. There is no equivalent distinction which can be 
applied to tokens of written sentences such as the distinction between utterance and sentence 
in spoken contexts. In the present written format therefore, we are forced to talk about the 
truth-values of sentences but this should always be understood as a reference to the truth- 
value of a written sentence token. To place the introductory arguments, which we have 
outlined above, in the context of the thesis as a whole, this chapter concludes with a brief 
outline of the development of the argument in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
1.5.  Chapter Outline. 
Chapter Two contains a review of the history of presupposition in the field of linguistics. 
The important early theoretical contributions (Frege, 198 1; Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950) 
are discussed and there is a brief account of the large literature which followed (e.g. Morgan, 
1969; Fillmore, 1971; &parsky and &parsky, 1971; Gazdar, 1979; Karttunen, 1974). 
Particular attention is paid to three approaches to the area, by Fodor (1 979), Burton-Roberts 
(1 989) and Werth (1993), which provide some of the theoretical basis on which the analysis 
to be presented in this thesis is built. There is a discussion of three perennial problem areas 
associated with presuppositional accounts, namely cancellability, ambiguous negation and the 
influence of context. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the argument put forward 
in Werth ( 1993) for the abandonment of the category o f  presupposition altogether. 
The following chapter is concerned with the existential features o f  the meaning of nominal 
expressions. We attempt to provide a review of the full range of nominal expressions: 
pronouns, names, defhtes, indefinites and quantified NPs and to address all the uses of these: 
anaphoric, assertive, deictic and generic. We also discuss the occurrence of referring 
expressions in opaque contexts. Finally, we propose a scale of existential strength on which 
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all types of nominals can be placed. 
Chapter Four turns from the existential features of linguistic expressions to consider the 
existential possibilities for entities. We propose viewing different types of existence as 
different existential locations and introduce the notion of modelling existential locations using 
a set of possible worlds. We review competing definitions of possible worlds either as 
abstract constructs (Bradley and Swartz, 1979; McCawley, 198 1) or existent entities (Bradley 
and Swartz, 1979; Lewis, 1986). An argument for a modal realistic view of the nature of 
possible worlds is presented. In the later sections of this chapter we introduce the notion of 
the correct choice of reference world as a factor in the proper interpretation of nominal 
expressions and offer a short initial argument which presents evidence in favour of the 
usefulness of the emerging location theory. 
In the fifth chapter we define the members of the set of possible worlds and describe the 
arrangement of the set. We distinguish the current, real world and relate this to its temporal 
counterparts using a type of accessibility relation whch is constrained by a principle of 
consistency. We propose a more general type of accessibility relation which connects other 
counterparts and discuss the question of whether there are any limits to the set of possible 
counterparts to the real world; i.e. whether there are such things as impossible worlds. 
Connected to this question is the matter of the possibility of incomplete or incompletely 
specified worlds. Having defined the arrangement of the set of possible worlds in terms of the 
relative closeness of counterparts, modelled in terms of accessibility relations, we propose a 
final layer of structure which is expressed as a set of familiarity relations which hold between 
individuals in some world and some sub-set of other worlds with which they have epistemic 
links. 
Chapter Six is concerned with the process of interpretation. First we discuss some 
preliminary issues surrounding our view of interpretation; the distinction between the 
interpretation of referring expressions and the interpretation of utterances as a whole, the 
validity of viewing interpretation as truth-value assignment and the question of the type of 
linguistic construct to which truth is assigned. We then propose a set of rules for 
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interpretation using the structured set of possible worlds. This amounts to a group of rules 
and constraints which governs movement around the set and predicts which world is chosen as 
the existential location for each referring expression. By workmg through increasingly 
complex examples in detail we show that the rules predict the correct truth-values for a range 
of sentences. 
The final chapter addresses the wider implications of the theory proposed; both further 
applications and potential problems. We return to particular problems with the interpretation 
o f  pronouns and names identified by Fodor (1 979). The current theory allows the difficulties 
Fodor identified to be stated as one coherent problem: which can be summarised as the fact 
that pronouns and names do not seem to conform to what we argue is the general rule with 
respect to triggering movement around the set of possible worlds. We propose an explanation 
which relies on the acceptance of the scalar ordering of existential force. We also discuss the 
implication of the proposed view of interpretation for sentences with nominal expressions in 
opaque contexts and attempt to reconcile the location theory with the failure of Leibniz's Law. 
Finally, there is a discussion of the need for filrther technical refinements in the expression of 
the structure of the set of possible worlds to allow the model of temporal counterparts to 




2.1. History of Presupposition in Linguistics. 
There is a vast amount of linguistic literature surrounding the areas of presupposition and 
presupposition failure in whch we can identifL three important and enduring landmarks. All 
debate about presupposition in the field of linguistics stems from the phlosopher Frege's 
discussion of referring expressions in "On Sense and Reference'' (Geach and Black, 1980). 
However after Frege, Russell's Theory of Descriptions (Russell, 1905) which did not permit 
the notion of presupposition held sway for almost fifty years until Strawson's famous attack 
(Strawson, 1954) whch led to the modem upsurge of interest. These three works are 
discussed below. However, since much of the subsequent presuppositional analyses * are 
irrelevant from the point of view of the current thesis they will, to a large extent, be ignored 
although we will review the problem areas which led to much of the disagreement; i.e. the 
problem of cancellability and the ambiguity of negation. We will concentrate on three modern 
theories concerning related areas: J.D. Fodor's analysis of cross-world reference (Fodor, 1 979) 
which provides the foundation for a good part of the theory presented here, Burton-Roberts 
proposal for the retention of the category of presupposition as part of semantics rather than 
pragmatics (Burton-Roberts, 1989) and Werth's argument for the abandonment of the 
category of presupposition altogether (Werth, 1993). 
2.1. I. Frege's Theory of Presupposition. 
Frege stated that any proper name used in an assertion has reference. He argued that this 
feature of proper names should be viewed as presupposition, which is constant under 
negation, rather than as part of the meaning of the assertion. 
'in particular, most of the work produced in the 1970's which was concerned with sentence level 
explanations of the cancellability of presuppositions in various contexts, (e.g. Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 
1971; Karttunen, 1973; 1974; Wilson, 1975; Katz & Langendoen, 1976; Gazdar, 1979). This work 
has been reviewed from different perspectives by Kempson (1977) and Levinson (1983) and its 
relevance to the current thesis is discussed in section 2.2.2. 
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"If one . . . asserts 'Kepler died in misery' there is a presupposition that the name 
Kepler designates somethmg. . . . That the name Kepler designates somethmg is 
just as much a presupposition of the assertion 'Kepler died in misery' as for the 
contrary assertion. 
(Frege, 198 1 : 69-70) 
Frege's opinions on the result of presupposition failure are to be found in his discussion of 
temporal phrases which he treats similarly to names. He observes that the "sense" of the 
sentence reproduced here as 2.01 could be rendered in the paraphrase given here as 2.02. 
2.01. After Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark, 
Prussia and Austria quarrelled. 
2.02. After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from 
Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled. 
He states that in 2.02 the proposition that Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark is 
not being asserted but is a necessary presupposition for the subordinate clause to have any 
reference2. In contrast, he proposes that in 2.01 the subordinate clause may constitute either 
an assertion or a presupposition. He argues that if some hearer believes it to be false that 
Schleswig-Holstein was once separated from Denmark he or she will take 2.01 on the first 
reading, where the subordinate clause is an assertion, to contain a thought which is false (the 
subordinate clause) and a part with no reference (the main clause). On the other reading, 
where the subordinate clause is a presupposition, the same hearer, according to Frege, would 
take 2.01 as a whole to be without a truth-value because of a lack of reference for its 
subordinate clause. Lkewise, he argues that a hearer ignorant of the historical facts will take 
2.01 (on either reading) or 2.02 to be wholly without reference. 
The major frustration for any objective discussion of Frege's work is that his style of writing 
and use of terminology leave fus proposals open to many different interpretations. It is all too 
easy to find in hs work whatever you want most to find there. And in relation to 
2on the assumption that stretches of time are logical objects. 
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presupposition t h s  is very much the case since hs discussion is short and somewhat vague. It 
is tempting, given our interest in the area, to speculate that Frege distinguished between the 
lack of a truth-value and lack of reference but we cannot be sure that this inference is justified. 
However, it does seem plausible to infer from Fregels argument that he believed that the 
failure of an assertion or presupposition can be seen as a hnction of the state of knowledge of 
a hearer as well as a function of the inherent truth or falsity of the presupposed or asserted 
proposition given that he takes account of the belief state of the hearer in hs discussion of the 
interpretation of 2.01 and 2.02. Frege states that a hearer who is ignorant of the facts of 
European hstory will take sentences such as 2.01 and 2.02 to be "without reference". We can 
infer from this that he saw no difficulty in the idea that a statement might have a truth-value 
discernible by one hearer but that the same statement in the same context might be perceived 
as truth-valueless by some other hearer. Th~s  view of truth-value assignment, which defines 
truth-valuelessness with respect to individual hearers, has either been ignored (Strawson, 
1950) or rejected (Burton-Roberts. 1989) by later proponents of presupposition. We will 
discuss this approach to questions of truth-valuelessness in detail in section 2.2 of the current 
chapter . 
2.1.2. Russell's Theory of Descriptions. 
Russell's theory of descriptions (Russell 1905), although it constitutes a direct contradiction of 
Frege's approach, was actually born out of Russell's dissatisfaction with other earlier theories 
of the meaning of (in)definite descriptions; e.g. that of Meinong (1904), which treated them as 
simple referring expressions lrectly denoting individuals in the world. The Meinongian 
concept of a referring expression captured naive intuitions about how some such expressions 
might work but could not deal in an adequate way with any but the most simple cases such as 
the sun, or my father which a Russellian account might seem to complicate too much. 
However, a direct denotation account runs into difficulties in the analysis of such expressions 
as fewer cats, or either option since it is unclear what objects such expressions might denote. 
A theory whch takes definites and indefinites to be direct referring expressions would have to 
provide a separate account for quantified NPs, as in DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993). 
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A much more central objection of Russell's was that such a theory could not account for the 
availability of meanings for NPs whch refer to non-existent objects. Russell argued that if the 
meaning of an expression is the object it refers to then an expression such as the King of 
France should be meaningless if France has no Kmg and that since the King of France is 
comprehensible although France has no Gng, then the meaning of a definite description 
cannot be its reference. 
Russell proposed instead that only names or rigid designators actually refer and that definite 
and indefinite descriptions should be analysed instead as expressions of existential 
quantification whch are similar to other quantified expressions and whose semantics, like the 
semantics of other quantified expressions, could be explained in set-theoretical terms. An 
indefinite description such as a cat has the logical form 3 (cat (x)) and its meaning can be 
expressed as a statement that the set of all things which are cats has at least one member. A 
sentence containing h s  indefinite description such as 2.03 has the logical form given in 2.03a. 




A cat yowled. 
3x (cat(x) & yowled(x)) 
the intersection of the set of all things which are cats and the set of all 
things which yowled has at least one member 
The translation and interpretation of a definite, for Russell, is identical to that of an indefinite 
as regards existential quantification, but in addition, Russell argued that a definite carries a 
uniqueness entailment. For example the Pope has the logical form 3 (pope (x) & (@ 
(pope&) -+ y = x))) and the resulting interpretation can be expressed by the statement the set 
of all things which are pope has exactly one member. A sentence such as 2.04 containing a 
definite description has the logical form given in 2.04a and the meaning given in 2.04b. 
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2.04. The Pope wears a funny hat. 
2.04a. 3x (pope (x) & ('dy (pope(y) -+ y = x)) & wears a funny hat (x)). 
2.04b. The intersection of the set of all things which are popes and wear.filnny hats 
has exactly one member 
On a Russellian account, 2.04 is true if and only if there is one pope who wears a funny hat 
and is false if either there is no pope, or there is more than one pope, or the one and only pope 
does not wear a funny hat. 
Russell's account of indehtes  provides a satisfactory account of negated indefinites. Since in 
hs theory an indefinite such as a black cat does not refer to any individual, a sentence such as 
2.05, whch has the logical form given in 2.05a constitutes an assertion, given in 2.05b, that 
nothing that is both a cat and black crossed some path. 
2.05. A black cat didn't cross my path. 
2.05a. - (3x (cat (x) & black (x) & crossed my path (x)) 
2.05b. the intersection of the sets of cats, black things and things that crossed some 
path is empty 
According to this theory, 2.05 is equivalent in logical structure and semantic content with 2.06 
and such an equivalence seems to accord perfectly with our intuitions as native speakers about 
these two sentences. 
206. N o  black cat crossed my path 
The analysis thus accounts for the perceived anomaly of such a sentence as 2.07. 
2.07. A black cat didn't cross my path, but another one did. 
Russell's proposals about the interpretation of negated definites, however, are less 
satisfactory. Sentence 2.08 has the (simplified) logical form given in 2.08a and the meaning 
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given in 2.08b. 
2.08. The Pope's wife does not wear a funny hat. 
2.08a. - (3x (pope's wife (x) & Vy (pope's wife (y) -+ y = x) & (wears a funny hat 
(4)) 
2.08b. It is not the case that the intersection of the set of all things which are the 
pope's wife and the set o f  al l  things which wear-finny hats has exactly one 
member. 
The result of a Russellian analysis of the meaning of 2.08 is that it is predicted to express a 
true proposition about the real world because in the real world there is no such individual as 
the pope's wife. This does not accord with the intuitions of many speakers about such 
sentences, which tend to be perceived as truth-valueless or in some other way unacceptable. 
2.1.3. Strawson's Attack on Russell's Theory of Descriptions. 
The unintuitive interpretations of definites which were the consequence of Russell's theory of 
descriptions were attacked by Strawson in his paper On Referring (Strawson, 1950). Russell 
had argued that the requirements for existence and uniqueness on some singular definite 
expression should be seen as assertions of exactly the same status as the predicate with which 
that expression occurred. Strawson argued that only the proposition expressed by the 
predicate should be seen as an assertion. For example, while Russell claimed that 2.09a, 
2.09b and 2 . 0 9 ~  are all asserted when 2.09 is uttered, Strawson argued that only 2 . 0 9 ~  is 
asserted. 
2.09. 
2.09a. 3x (butler (x) 
2.09b. Vy (butler (y) -+ (y = x)) 
2 . 0 9 ~ .  finished the gin (x)). 
The butler finished the gin. 
page2 1 
Strawson, llke Frege, suggested that the proposition that there is a unique butler should be 
recognised as a presupposition of 2.09, although, unlike Frege, Strawson made it clear that he 
considered presuppositions to be properties of sentence tokens. Strawson proposed, again 
unlike Frege, that the failure of a presupposition, brought about by the falsity of the 
proposition it contained, resulted in the presupposing sentence being without a truth-value. 
Strawson argued that presuppositions were unaffected by negation, so that a sentence and its 
negative counterpart always shared presuppositions. A sentence such as 2.10, on Strawson's 
account, had the logical form given in 2.10a where only the asserted proposition is negated. 
2.10. The butler didn't finish the gin. 
2.1Oa. 3x (butler (x) & Vy (butler (y) + (y = x)) $.. - (finished the gin (x))). 
Strawson's formulation of the theory of presuppositions does better than Russell's theory of 
descriptions in reflecting intuitions about the effect of the non-existence of referents on truth- 
values and the necessary conditions for the truth of a negative statement, but it raises other 
problems of its own. Two of these problems in particular have been the subject of an 
overwhelming amount of interest from linguists in the last forty years. These are the problem 
of presupposition cancellability and the problem of the ambiguity of negation both of which 
can be seen as part of a larger problem concerning context. 
2.2. Problems with Presuppositional Theories 
Strawson's original formulation of the theory of presupposition held that if a presupposition 
fails the presupposing sentence is always neither true nor false. However, there is a range of 
examples of negative sentences which are perceived as true even though they contain 
presuppositions which do not express true propositions. The clearest examples are those 
sentences in whch it is explicitly asserted that the propositions associated with the 
presuppositions do not hold. Sentence 2.11 is an example of this type of sentence which, it 
has been argued3, shows that Strawson's formulation cannot be correct. 
3by Kempson (1977) for example 
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2.1 1. It's not true that my children are monsters because I don't have any children. 
Sentence 2.11 can only be interpreted as true if my children has no reference, which is in 
direct contradiction with Strawson's argument that the Occurrence in any sentence of the 
expression my children without any reference necessarily causes the sentence to be without a 
truth-value. Given the assumption that there is an existential presupposition in 2.1 1, there are 
two possible solutions to this problem. Either presuppositions can be assigned the property 
of cancellability or negation can be argued to be ambiguous. However, neither of these 
possible solutions is entirely satisfactory or without undesirable consequences. 
2.2.1. The Problem of Cancellability. 
Presupposition, as Strawson viewed it, could be seen as a special lund of entailment which 
was associated with a truth-function distinct from that of regular logical entailments but 
equally fixed. So long as this definition of presuppositions held, there was no question but 
that presupposition was a semantic phenomenon. But to account for the possibility of 
assigning a truth-value to sentences with apparent failed presuppositions it became 
increasingly popular to attribute to presuppositions the property of cancellability or 
defeasability (Levinson, 1983); ths allowed potential presuppositions to be cancelled either 
explicitly by part of the preceding or following discourse as in 2.12 or 2.13 where 
presuppositions 2.12a and 2.13a are cancelled, or implicitly as a result of the wider 
background context as in 2.14 where presupposition 2.14a is cancelled. 
2.12. Since I don't have any chldren, I can say that even though I have a career my 
children are not a menace to society. 
2.12a. I have chldren. 
2.13. The family gathering was not so bad t h s  year as most, since we all spent 
Christmas in different places. 
2.13a. There was a family gathering this year. 
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2.14. 
2.14a. Sue h s h e d  her thesis. 
Sue died before she h s h e d  her thesis4. 
However, a truth-conditional semantic system, even one with three values or with systematic 
gaps caused by failed presuppositions, is still a logical system and it is not possible for any 
relation in a logical system to have a non-logical property such as cancellability. To assign 
the property of cancellability to presuppositions it was necessary to move them from the 
bounds of logical, truth-conditional semantics and into the realm of pragmatics5. This 
solution to the problem was widely adopted by linguists and presuppositions came to be seen 
as a kind of conventional implicature rather than as a kind of entailment. Pragmatic 
presuppositions, being outside semantics, could not be defined in terms of their effect on truth- 
values, and presupposition failure came to be recast in terms of appropriateness (Austin, 
1962; Van Dijk, 1976; Lyons, 1977), felicity conditions (Austin, 1962; Furberg, 1971) or 
informativeness (Harnish, 1976; Levinson, 1983). We can say that sentences such as 2.15a. 
and 2.15b. are normally only appropriate, felicitous or informative when the proposition in 
2.16 holds. 
2.15a. The man in the moon melted. 
2.15b. The man in the moon didn't melt. 
2.16. There is a man in the moon. 
We can also say that since appropriateness, mfonnativeness, or felicity (henceforth we will 
use the term appropriateness) are pragmatic concepts without rigorously fixed definitions it is 
sometimes the case that sentence 2.15b is appropriately used when 2.16 does not hold. 
However, such explanations are unsatisfactory. If appropriateness is treated as separate from 
questions of truth or falsity, there is no reason for the cancellability of appropriateness 
conditions to be invoked to account only for such sentences as 2.15b which have fai!ed 
presuppositions and not for such sentences as 2.15a. If 2.16 does not hold, sentence 2.15a 
cannot be true, but it could be used appropriately to trigger some metaphorical inference. It 
~~~~~ 
4This example is taken from Levinson (1983). 
5e.g. Karttunen & Peters (1975), Gazdar (1979). 
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may seem an unreasonable demand to place on a pragmatic theory to be able to account for 
the appropriateness of both 2.1Sa and 2.15b (when 2.16 does not hold) in the same way. 
However, the unreasonableness of such a demand can only be explained if we accept that 
presupposition failure does affect the core truth-values of sentences, not merely their 
appropriateness conhtions. We can then say that, if 2.16 fails, 2.1 Sa cannot be true although 
it may be appropriate if it triggers some metaphorical inference. On the other hand, if 2.16 
fails, 2.15b might be true, and any theory of presupposition must be able to account for this 
possibility. 
2.2.2. The Problem of Ambiguous Negation. 
The problems associated with handling cancellability by characterising presupposition as a 
pragmatic phenomenon can be avoided if presupposition is treated as a semantic relation. It 
was proposed by some linguists in the 1970's that semantic presupposition was possible and 
that the problem of the truth-value of a negated sentence containing a failed presupposition 
could be handled by positing an ambiguous semantics for negation (Wilson, 1975, Gazdar 
1979). On such an account, the first sentences in each of 2.17 and 2.18 are taken to contain 
two different types of negation (if the second sentences are true). 
2.17. The Duke of York is not ugly. However, his clothes are terrible. 
2.18. The King of France is not bald. France is a republic and her President is 
thinning a bit, at most. 
The negation in 2.17 has been described as narrow scope or internal negation (Russell, 1905), 
descriptive negation (Kempson, 1 977), presupposition preserving negation (Kiparsky and 
Kiparsky, 197 1). What is negated in 2.17 is not the proposition that the Duke of York exists, 
but the proposition that he is ugly. In contrast, the negation in 2.18, which has been 
described as wide scope or ex-ternal negation (Russell, 1909,  denial negation (Kempson, 
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1977), or presupposition cancelling negation (&parsky & Kiparsky, 197 1) does not negate 
only the proposition that the King of France is bald, but the entire conjoined proposition that 
there is a unique King of France and that that individual is bald. 
It is now widely accepted that an analysis of negation as ambiguous is not well-motivated. 
Kempson (1977) provides a strong argument against the analysis. She points out that, if 
existential and predicate propositions in sentences llke 2.17 are represented, as they were in 
Russell ( 1905), as a conjunction, then negation is semantically vague rather than ambiguous, 
since the falsity of any of the conjoined propositions is simply one of the cases of the falsity of 
the conjunction as a whole. Kempson goes on to argue that even proposing vagueness is ad 
hoc since there is no cross-linguistic evidence which would support the argument that not, in 
English, happens to be vague between two or three logically distinct readings. Kempson 
(1977) also identifies a problem with defining the distinction between denial and descriptive 
negation. Negation type must be defined independently; i.e. the definition cannot depend on 
the distinction between preserved and cancelled presuppositions, if presupposition failure is to 
be handled in a non-circular way. The narrowest definition of denial negation is as a 
contradiction of an immediately previous explicit statement. On this definition, the negation in 
sentence 2.19b can be defined as denial negation. 
2.19a. Your children are monsters 
2.19b. My children are not monsters. 
If denial definition is defined in this u7ay, then there are many apparent counter-examples 
whch cannot be defined as denial negation but which seem to contain cancelled existential 
presuppositions. Kempson (1977) uses as an example a quotation from Strawson (1 950): 
"Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules gives the exact 
logic of any expression of ordinary language: for 
ordinary language has no exact logic". 
(Kempson, 1977: p. 152) 
She states that the sentence in this quotation cannot be defined as an a example of denial 
negation but is a "descriptive negative statement finalising the previous argument" which 
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nevertheless contains a cancelled presupposition. Kempson argues that if the concept of 
denial negation is extended to embrace such counter-examples as this the distinction between 
descriptive negation and denial negation becomes vague to the point of uselessness and cannot 
be used to support a semantic presuppositional analysis. 
Kempsonls objections, like those of others (Lyons, 1977; Levinson, 1983) who attack the 
notion that negation is ambiguous, are compelling and the problems associated with positing 
ambiguity in negation have led to a large-scale abandonment of the search for a semantic 
theory of presupposition6 in preference for pragmatic theories and the concomitant difficulties 
of cancellability (Lakoff, 1972; Stalnaker, 1974; Kempson, 1975; Wilson, 1975). We will 
now review the problems which arise from attempting to incorporate considerations of context 
into sentence level theories. 
2.2.3, The Problem of Context. 
Most past and current theories of presupposition, like many theories which address other 
semantic and pragmatic phenomena, treat isolated sentences as the basic unit of study. 
Nevertheless, since semantic and pragmatic presuppositional accounts typically make 
reference to such concepts as the distinction between given and new information, 
topic/comment distinctions, and previous statements, to account for presupposition cancelling, 
"the context'' serves an important explanatory function. There is a widespread tendency to 
fill up the "pragmatic waste-basket" with awkward bits of left-over meanings. We could say 
that sentence level semantic theories which appeal to context are raiding the "pragmatic 
toolbox" for useful bits of t h e o ~ . ~  Such theories are often inconsistent in that discourse 
elements such as the context and the background knowledge of the discourse participants are 
ruled out of the framework of the theory and yet are appealed to ad hoc to explain potential 
anomalies. For example take a recent paper by Mercer (1 992): 
6one notable exception being Burton-Roberts (1989) which is cfiscussed in section 2.4 
presupposition by making use of discourse level concepts and his alternative analysis of the area 
covered by existential presuppositions is discussed in section 2.5. 
Werth (1993) has attacked theories which persist in attempting to give sentence-level accounts of 
page27 
"We are not trying to model communication or discourse so the only statement 
assumed to exist in the knowledge base of the speaker is the one just 
communicated. 'I 
p228 
"We consider presuppositions and entailments of a sentence as inferences 
obtained from the logical (or semantic) representation of the sentence 
together with other forms of background knowledge." 
p230 
"Given that the sentence is uttered in a conversational context which assumes 
some background information (for example, the meanings of words and 
knowledge about the world). . . I' 
p23 I 
Another strikmg feature of sentence level accounts which poach discourse level apparatus is 
that such theories tend to characterise the relation between individual sentences and contexts 
back to front. Perhaps inevitably, in theories which are fundamentally concerned with 
isolated sentences, the presupposing sentence is taken to be the trigger for the construction of 
the background context. 
The following two quotations from Van der Sandt's (1988) paper (Context and 
Presupposition) and Heim's (1982) thesis on the semantics of definites and indefinites are 
examples of this view. 
A "The understanding of sentences often requires that 
we construct contexts in which those sentences can 
be interpreted." Van der Sandt (1988) 
B "TO presuppose nothing means to place no 
requirements on the initial context." Heim ( 1982) 
It is easy to read statements A and B in such a way that they say nothing controversial. A 
could be taken to be a straightforward explanation of truth-conditional meaning and B an 
unexceptional definition of presupposition. However, it is our contention that such readings of  
statements A and B are mistaken. 
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If, instead of A, van der Sandt had written A', then we could be sure that what he intended was 
an explanation of what it is to understand the propositional content of a sentence. 
A' "the understanding of sentences always requires that 
we can construct contexts in which those sentences 
could be interpreted." 
However, it is possible and we believe it is correct, that what van der Sandt (1 988) actually 
means is that to obtain the intended information encoded in some token of a sentence a hearer 
often has to construct a context and then add the propositions contained in the sentence to it. 
We find this model of interpretation implausible. It is our contention that in general, in real 
discourses, hearers do not have to construct contexts for sentences using clues contained in 
those sentences. The utterances of discourses take place in contexts, and so hearers have 
contexts available with respect to which they can interpret utterances. However. since the 
propositional content of a discourse is not restricted to the physical situation in whch it 
occurs, it is not always the case that the intended context for some utterance is the context of  
the discourse situation. Even so, it is not necessary to assume that these contexts are 
constructed by the hearer. An equally valid assumption is that alternative contexts are 
ident@ed or chosen by him or her. While there are utterances which contain conventional 
discourse markers employed to constrain the kind of context whch the hearer can choose, we 
claim that it would be a mistake to use these as templates for discourses in general. For 
example, any utterance which begins with one of the phrases in 2.20 is clearly marked as a 
case in whch a new context must be chosen. These markers all indicate that the correct 
context is separate from the context in which the previous discourse has been grounded, and 
they each specifSr some features of the context, e.g. Long ago and far m a y  and once upon a 
time indicate that the following statements are not concerned with the real world. 
2.20. Once upon a time ... 
A man walked into a bar . . . 
Long ago and far away . . . 
An Englishman, a Scotsman and an Irishman ... 
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To these atypical sentence/context pairs we can add the example sentences about John and 
Mary whch are used in semantics textbooks and most unfortunately, the sentences about the 
King of France which appear in expositions of presuppositional theories. 
Heimls (1 982) definition of presuppositions which rests on equating a lack of presuppositions 
with the null context (statement B above) seems equally harmless. But this impression is the 
result of our interpreting Heim's statement as a description of the knowledge states of 
discourse participants. We could accept the claim that a speaker has no presuppositions if he 
or she places no restrictions on the hearerk choice of contexts, or that a hearer has no 
presuppositions if he or she places no restrictions on u7hch contexts he or she will consider as 
potential contenders against whch to interpret an utterance. However, since Heim assumes 
presuppositions to be features of sentences, we must interpret A as a claim that when a 
sentence has no presuppositions. the sentence places no restrictions on the features of its own 
context. And we must contrast t h s  with the other possibility that a sentence which does have 
presuppositions does impose restrictions on the features of its context. Heim's claim, then, is 
open to the same objections which were made to Van der Sandt's: that it is contexts which 
constrain the utterances which occur in them. not sentences which constrain their contexts. 
We must conclude that it is not possible to combine a sentence-level viewpoint with appeals to 
discourse level phenomena such as context and background knowledge. However, one 
sentence level approach to the problems surrounding failed existential presuppositions which 
we believe is particularly interesting and deserves close attention is J.D. Fodorls theory of 
reference (Fodor 1979). In the following two sections we will review Fodor's paper in some 
detail and discuss Burton-Robert's critique of her approach to presupposition failure. 
2.3. Fodor's Possible Worlds Approach. 
J.D. Fodorls 1979 paper In defense of the truth-value gap is worth discussing at some length 
since some of the analysis in the later chapters of ths thesis will either build on the analysis 
presented by Fodor or re-analyse her data in a different way. 
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Before presenting her analysis, Fodor briefly considers and then rejects two alternative 
analyses for aspects of the problem of failed existential presuppositions which both deserve a 
closer look. 
2.3.1 . Irrelevance Analysis 
Fodor contemplates a potential distinction between the results of the failure of relevant 
presuppositions and the failure of irrelevant presuppositions whch could be employed to 
produce an explanation for the truth-value assignments to sentences 2.2 1 (truth-valueless) and 
2.22 valse). 
2.21. The capital of Antarctica is remarkably law-abiding. 
2.22. We are standing in a street in the capital of Antarctica. 
The analysis is that if a hearer of an utterance of 2.22 knows where the utterance is taking 
place and knows that ths location is not in the capital of Antarctica they will be able to assign 
the truth-valuefalse to it without any kmd of access to the capital of Antarctica, and that the 
failure of the presupposition that the capital of Antarctica exists is therefore irrelevant to the 
truth-value assignment. In contrast, a hearer of an utterance of 2.21 must have some kind of 
access to the capital of Antarctica to determine whether or not it is law-abiding and since the 
entity is non-existent this access is not available. This analysis has the result that the 
presupposition that the capital of Antarctica exists is relevant, and the failure of this 
presupposition, brought about by the non-existence of the capital of Antarctica, prevents the 
assignment of a truth-value to 2.21. 
Fodor rejects this analysis on the grounds that it i s  impossible to maintain any distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant presuppositions whch depends on the notion that we require 
access to non-existent entities to assign truth-values in some contexts. She argues that such 
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sentences as instances of irrelevant 
presuppositions since a hearer of 2.23 could establish the identity of the speaker's home t o m  
and make sure that it was not the capital of Antarctica without any kind of access to the 
capital of Antarctica. 
2.23 would have to be classified as containing 
2.23. The capital of Antarctica is my home town. 
Fodor contends that if we accept this, then we must accept that we should be able to make a 
list of all law-abiding places and, having checked that the capital of Antarctica is not on the 
list, be able to assign a truth-value of false to sentence 2.21, again without access to the 
capital of Antarctica. Since sentence 2.2 1 is perceived to be truth-valueless, Fodor concludes 
the divergent truth-values for 2.2 1. and 2.22. cannot be accounted for in terms of a distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant presuppositions. 
2.3.2. Multiple World Reference. 
The second analysis which Fodor considers, but ultimately rejects, rests on the claim that the 
capital of Antarctica although not existing in the real world, exists in an infinite number of 
other possible worlds in each of which it has some distinct level of law-abidingness. Our 
inability to assign a truth-value to 2.21 can be explained in terms of the multiple world 
reference account in either of two ways: either a sentence containing a reference to the capital 
of Antarctica is about the entire set of worlds in whch the capital of Antarctica exists, or it is 
about one of the worlds whose identity we are unable determine. If the former, then it is both 
true and false of the set of worlds as a whole that the capital of Antarctica is law-abiding in 
those worlds, and therefore we cannot say that it is true and we cannot say that it is false. If 
the latter, we simply cannot say whether the particular member of the set of potential reference 
worlds is in the sub-set of worlds in which the capital of Antarctica is law-abiding or in its 
complement; and we are again unable to assign a truth value of either true or false. 
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2.3.3. T h  fictions. 
Having rejected both analyses outlined in the last two sections, Fodor presents her proposals 
for the source of the truth-valuelessness of sentences with failed presuppositions. Her account 
rests on the assumption that fictional worlds such as those containing Winnie-the-Pooh, 
Sherlock Holmes and Mr Chekhov (the navigator of the USS Enterprise) are underspecified. 
By underspecification, Fodor means that it is not necessarily true of a fictional world that 
some proposition predicated of an entity in that world is either true or false. She does not 
discuss how it is decided which properties of a fictional world are specified and which are not 
but we can infer the rule from the examples she gives. 
2.24. Winnie-the-Pooh likeskates honey. 
2.25. Winnie-the-Pooh likeskates Mondays. 
On the strength of these examples, we assume that, in Fodor's view, the only properties which 
are specified in a fictional world are those contained in propositions which are explicitly stated 
in the works of fiction by which the world is invoked. 
Fodor then proposes that non-existent individuals be treated in the same way as fictional 
individuals, so that sentences containing references to non-existent entities should be regarded 
as "thin fictions'' whch refer to what she calls "drastically underspecified worlds" (Fodor, 
1979: 204). For example, she argues that if Winnie-the-Pooh exists in an incomplete world in 
which the truth-value of the proposition that he has the property of liking honey is specified, 
but it is not specified whether or not he likes Mondays, we can account for the lack of a truth- 
value in sentence 2.21 by arguing that the capital of Antarctica exists in a world which is 
unspecified for almost everything. In this world, Fodor argues, the only specified properties 
are those whch must be true of any capital of Antarctica, given that the phrase the capital of 
Antarctica, is used in a literal and conventional sense; for example, the following sentences 
may be assigned truth-values. 
2.26. The capital of Antarctica is a place. 
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2.27. The capital of Antarctica is not in Ahca .  
We have strong reservations about Fodor's notion of thm fictions and will show in chapter 4 
section 4.4.2. that it is unnecessary. other aspects of Fodor's approach are 
extremely interesting and well-motivated, particularly her approach to the question of cross- 
world relations whch we will now review. 
However, 
2.3.4 Cross-world relations 
Fodor proposes that sentences can only be used to make statements about worlds in which 
their constituent referring expressions have referents. Besides sentences about the real, fully 
specified world, whch necessarily have truth-values, and sentences about non-real 
underspecified worlds which might be truth-valueless, there are further sets of sentences which 
are about combinations of the different worlds in whlch their individual constituent referring 
expressions each have referents. For example, 2.28 is analysed as a statement about a pair of 
worlds, 2.29 about a triple of worlds, and 2.30 about a quadruple of worlds. 
2.28. Lieutenant Uhuru bit Elizabeth Bennet. 
2.29. Lieutenant Uhuru introduced Elizabeth Bennet to Agent Scullq'. 
2.30. Lieutenant Uhuru prefers Elizabeth Bennet to either Agent Scully or Melanie 
Wilkes. 
To account for the pattern of truth-values perceived for such sentences as 2.28 - 2.30 Fodor 
divides verbal predicates into three types: affectless, symmetric, and asymmetric predicates, 
and distinguishes between two types of relation which can be described blr verbal predicates: 
same-world and cross-world relations. An affectless predicate is one whose argument or 
arguments pick out referents which are not affected by the occurrence of the event the verbal 
predicate describes: for example, resemble and be taller than are affectless predicates. One 
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feature of these predicates is that they may describe cross-world relations. That is, they may 
be combined with two arguments whose referents exist in dlfferent worlds from one another to 
produce sentences which are potentially true. While other types of predicates can combine 
referents across worlds, Fodor argues that only affectless predicates can combine with a pair 
of arguments in either order to produce sentences which are potentially true. For example: 
2.3 1. 
2.32. 
Oliver Sacks resembles Santa Claus. 
Santa Claus resembles Oliver Sacks. 
Asymmetric affect is a feature of two-place verbal predicates which have one argument whose 
referent is affected in some way by the verb event and one whose referent is not; for example, 
remember (subject affect), frighten (object affect) and the predicates which are classified as 
opaque (subject affect). Fodor claims that asymmetric predicates can cross world boundaries 
if and only if the affected argument has a referent in the real world. For example, 
2.33a. John Major remembers Desperate Dan. 
2.33b. *Desperate Dan remembers John Major 
2.34a. Tank Girl fhghtens John Major. 
2.34b. *John Major fhghtens Tank Girl. 
2.35a. John Major adrmres The Terminator. 
2.35b. *The Terminator admires John Major 
Symmetric affect predicates are those, both of whose arguments have referents which are 
affected by the verb event e.g. These predicates cannot cross-world 
boundaries. For example, 
kick and shoot. 
2.36. 
2.37. 
*Bilbo Baggins kicked Mrs Thatcher. 
*Mrs Thatcher shot Bilbo Baggins. 
Fodor herself recognises that there is a range of exceptions to her general predictions, and she 
proposes a set of pragmatic principles for interpretation whch can be invoked to account for 
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the apparently exceptional truth-value assignments observed. Fodor bases her analysis on the 
assumption that the real world has exceptional status in the set of possible worlds and she 
proposes a Real World Principle (RWP): 
"we tend to relate sentences to the real world if it is possible 
to do so ... [An expression, if] it does refer in the real world 
is understood as so referring." 
(Fodor, 1979: 217) 
The RWP would predict a truth-value offalse for both of the sentences in 2.3 8, 
2.38a. The King of France danced with a Dutchwoman. 
2.3 8b. A Dutchwoman danced with the f ing  of France. 
On the basis of her classification in terms of affect symmetry Fodor would predict that 2.38a 
and 2.38b are both false since dance with is a symmetric predicate, which cannot cross-world 
boundaries, and the Real World Principle requires the a Dutchwoman to have a referent in the 
real world, whle there is no referent for the King of France in the real world. However, 
while 2.38b is intuitively false, 2.38a is perceived as truth-valueless; i.e. both arguments are 
taken to refer in a non-real under-specified world with respect to which the sentence might be 
either true or false. To account for ths,  Fodor, proposes a second pragmatic principle; the 
Principle of Left Association (LAP): 
"An indefinite noun phrase is taken to refer to an individual ... 
in the same world as the noun phrase on its left, if there is one, 
and otherwise to an individual in the real world." 
(Fodor, 1979: 218) 
This ensures that a Dutchwoman in 2.38a refers in the same world as the King of France. 
However, the Principle of Left Association makes a wrong prediction about such sentences as 
2.39a and 2.39b, both of which are intuitively false. 
2.39a. A friend of mine shook hands with the King of France. 
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2.39b. The Kmg of France shook hands with a fhend of mine. 
To account for these sentences Fodor suggests yet another competing pragmatic principle, The 
Principle of Maximising Truth-values (MTP), which stipulates that a friend of mine must 
refer in the real world if this allows us assign a truth-value to either 2.39a or 2.39b: "we tend 
to evaluate a sentence with respect to a world in which it has a truth-value." (Fodor, 1979: 
217). In this case, the RWP and the MTP predict the same referent for a friend of mine, i.e. 
an entity in the real world, and it is plausible that the two principles combined outweigh the 
LAP. However, the same should be the case in relation to sentence 2.38a. Fodor cannot 
explain why the RWP and the MTP do not outweigh the LAP in this sentence. This is all the 
more puzzling since in sentences where the RWP is not applicable, e.g. sentence 2.40, the 
MTP alone outweighs the LAP, with the result that the sentence is false. 
2.40. Bilbo Baggins toured the Enterprise on an open day. 
If Fodor is to salvage her pragmatic principles, she must provide an explanation for the failure 
of the MTP in 2.38a. She concludes that there is some division between those entities which 
we will allow to jump worlds (a Dutchwoman) and those which we will always interpret with 
respect to the real world (a kend  of mine). She acknowledges that this division is fuzzy and 
does not offer any criteria for determining the ability or non-ability of some entity to jump 
worlds but offers the following observation 
"the real world entities which we are prepared to acknowledge as existing in 
non-real worlds seem to be just those publicly familiar entities which we are 
not surprised to find referred to in fictions". 
(Fodor, 1979: p2 19) 
Th~s  statement provides not even the beginning of an adequate explanation. It is certainly 
unarguable, but we are convinced that t h s  is because it is a tautology. If referring 
expressions in fictions pick out entities in other worlds then of course the set of other-worldly 
entities coincides with the set of fictional referents. Without some means of dividing entities 
which can shift worlds fiom entities which cannot, in a non-circular way, the explanatory 
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power of the three competing pragmatic principles is extremely dubious; as they stand it is 
necessary to know the desired truth-value in order to predict the weighting of the principles 
which will produce it8. Although we ultimately reject Fodor's account it is worthwhile 
reviewing a critique of her argument which contains some interesting observations that will 
prove useful in the construction of the current theory. 
2.4. Burton-Roberts' Critique of Fodor 
Burton-Roberts (1 989) contains a sustained and severe criticism of various aspects of Fodor's 
account of which three points are relevant to the current thesis: his defence of the concept of 
irrelevant presuppositions, his attack on underspecification, and his discussion of choice 
among non-real potential reference worlds. 
2.4.1. Irrelevant Presuppositions. 
Burton-Roberts supports the view that failed existential presuppositions which do not result 
in truth-valuelessness in the presupposing sentence can always be identified as irrelevant 
presuppositions; an analysis which Fodor rejected. Recall that Fodor suggested that the failed 
existential presuppositions in sentences such as 2.4 1 and 2.42 were equally irrelevant. 
2.4 1. 
2.42. 
The IOng of France is bald. 
I am standing next to the King of France. 
Fodor denies that the procedure of checking the identity of the individuals standing next to the 
speaker of 2.42 is qualitatively different from the procedure of checkmg the identity of the 
members of the set of bald individuals. Burton-Roberts, however, argues that there is a 
qualitative distinction between the two procedures. He claims that it is possible to know that 
81n chapter 6, we will show that these principles are unnecessary since, the combination of the 
existential ranking of linguistic expressions proposed in chapter 3, with the structure of the set of 
possible worlds proposed in chapter 4, allows us to predict intuitive truth-values in a coherent way 
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the list of individuals standing next to the speaker of 2.42 is complete, without knowing 
whether or not there is a French King but denies that "it is possible to know that the set of bald 
individuals does not contain the King of France without knowing that there is no French 
King." (Burton-Robert, 1989: p.200). Burton-Roberts gives as a further example of an 
irrelevant failed presupposition, the following sentence: 
2.43. Max spent the day at the local swimming pool. (20 in Burton-Roberts. 1989: 
P20U 
He argues that whether or not we know whether there is a referent for the local swimming 
pool we can assign a truth-value to t h s  sentence if we know what activity Max undertook on 
the relevant day. This is indisputable, but we believe that sentence 2.43 can also be, in fact 
must be, interpreted as false by some hearer who knows Max and knows that there is no local 
swimming pool. Burton-Roberts would predict truth-valuelessness for sentence 2.43 in ths 
context. On the other hand, he would predict that the non-existence of the Kmg of France is 
irrelevant to the truth-value assignment for 2.44. 
2.44. In 1978, the King of France shook hands with a certain labour MP. 
He would argue that the assignment is made possible by our abilitj. to make a complete list of 
the individuals who shook hands with labour MPs during 1978 and would predict that a hearer 
does not have to know that the King of France does not exist to be able to assign the correct 
truth-value, -false, to sentence 2.44. 
Fodor, in contrast, would propose a combination of the RWP and the MTP outweighing the 
LAP in the interpretation of sentence 2.44, to predict the truth value which speakers assign to 
the sentence, i.e. -false. However, she could not explain why the weighting of the three 
principles is different with respect to 2.38a which is generalljr perceived to be truth-valueless. 
We find both of these arguments extremely implausible. With respect to Burton-Roberts 
approach, it seems that an analysis of 2.44 as a false statement crucially depends on the 
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knowledge that the Kmg of France does not exist. A hearer must interpret the expression a 
certain Labour M p  as a reference to a real world entity, must interpret the King of France as 
a reference to an entity which does not exist in the real world and must interpret shook hands 
with literally, as a description of a physical action, in order to interpret an utterance of the 
sentence as false. We predict that only a hearer who did not know that the King of France does 
not exist, and who accepted the King of France as a reference to a real world entity would be 
unable to assign a truth-value to this sentence. Burton-Robert's discussion of the analysis in 
terms of irrelevant presuppositions provides a further incentive to account for the truth-value 
of 2.44 along the lines of Fodorls account, but without any reliance on ad hoc principles. 
2.4.2. Underspecification 
Burton-Roberts also takes issue with Fodor's proposals concerning thin fictions which rests on 
an assumption of the incompleteness of non-real worlds. He claims: "Fodor's account exhibits 
a confusion between an incompletely specified world and an incomplete world." (Burton- 
Roberts, 1989: p.212) and argues that while non-real worlds may be incompletely specified. 
no world can actually be incomplete. We believe that the assumption that Fodor is confusing 
two separate issues is mistaken and that the notion of an incomplete world is precisely what 
she intends to underpin the notion of thin fictions9. 
Having discounted the possibility of truly incomplete worlds, Burton-Roberts argues that 
Fodor's use of the concept of thin fictions can only be understood as a claim that a sentence 
such as 2.4 1 has a truth-value in the world where the definite description has a referent, but 
that no truth-value can be assigned to it: an argument which he reject completely. He appears 
to find the notion that a sentence could have a truth-value which no one can assign to it utterly 
unacceptable and presents this as evidence of a flaw in Fodor's argument. 
While we do not believe that Fodor actually intended to imply that there was a distinction 
Like Burton-Roberts, we find the notion of worlds which have the propert4 of being incomplete 
difficult to accept. We deal with the possibility of underspecification at some length in chapter 5 ( 
section 5.3.1.) during the discussion of the nature of possible worlds.. 
between a sentence's having a truth-value and the possibility of that truth-value's not being 
assigned to it, we cannot agree with Burton-Roberts that the notion is unacceptable. In fact 
we will show in chapter 4 section 4.3.1. that this is an extremely useful and important 
distinction . 
2.4.3. Choice of reference world. 
Burton-Roberts (1989) argues that Fodorls account does not predict that sentence 2.45 is 
perceived as truth-valueless but that we can deduce from her predictions that it is both true 
and false. 
2.45. The Kmg of France is bald. 
He claims that Fodorls account predicts that 2.45 is false. He draws attention to her claim 
that sentences are about worlds in which their referring expressions have referents, which 
would ensure that 2.45 cannot be about the real world but he argues that this claim is 
contradicted by her claim that it is possible ta make an exhaustive list of every bald individual 
and check to see if the Kmg of France is on it. This claim, Burton-Roberts contends, has the 
result that 2.45 can be taken to be a false statement about the real world. Burton-Roberts 
then argues that Fodorls analysis allows us to interpret 2.45 as true. 
"if it is clear from the presence of the King of France (in 2.45) that the speaker is 
speaking about a set of worlds containing the King of France it is equally clear 
from the presence of is bald which more specific, more delimited set within that 
set he is tallung about ... he is and must be talking about that set of worlds in 
which there is a bald Kng  of France . . . having allowed speakers a choice as to 
the worlds of which they speak we cannot but allow that what they say of those 
worlds is vacuously true.'' 
Burton-Roberts (1989: p.214 ) 
We agree to a certain extent with Burton-Roberts objection, in that if there is a free choice 
among prospective reference worlds then truth-value assignments can never be predicted, 
although we do not agree that Fodor's theory either advocated or allows such a free choice. 
We do agree, however, that Fodor's insistence that sentences are about worlds, leads to a 
contradictory prediction that sentence 2.45 can and cannot be used to make a statement about 
the real world. The analysis presented in chapter 6 section 6.2.5 includes a coherent means to 
constrain the choice of reference world for thls sentence to ensure that it is perceived as a 
truth-valueless statement about an entity in a non-real world. 
2.5. Beyond presuppositions. 
The discussion of competing presuppositional analyses in the previous sections was intended 
to do three things: first, to bring into focus the area to be covered. second. to highlight the 
valuable insights to be found in what we consider to be the best treatments. and third, to 
identif4 the problem areas which no current theory of presupposition can handle adequately. 
What the discussion showed is that neither semantic nor pragmatic analyses of 
presuppositions can account for the pattern of truth-values observed. It clearly does not 
appear to be the case that a simple correlation between presupposition failure and truth- 
valuelessness is tenable. Indeed, existential presuppositions, whether upheld, failed or 
cancelled, do not appear to provide a rich ecough framework in which to discuss the range of 
references to real, fictional and non-existent entities, and the related truth-values of positive 
and negated sentences which contain them. We will now consider an approach in which the 
category of presuppositions is abandoned altogether. 
In a paper titled Accommodation and the myth ofpresupposition: The view from discourse, 
Paul Werth argues that a logical impasse results if a theory which attempts to deal with the 
problems we are currently addressing is restricted in its perspective to the isolated sentence, 
but at the same time invokes the notion of the context (Werth 1993). 
"Since 'the context', however defined, is clearly not part of the sentence, but 
belongs to the level whch contains the sentence (i.e. discourse) the problem 
ought to be treated as one of discourse, i.e. at the minimal level of inclusion 
for all the elements involved." 
(Werth, 1993: p.46) 
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He goes on to make the controversial claim that presuppositions are the "epiphenomena of an 
inappropriate perspective" and argues that, from the discourse viewpoint, there is no need for 
the linguistic category of presupposition in any form. 
Central to Werth's claim that there is no such thing as presupposition is the idea that the range 
of semantic phenomena which has been lumped together under that heading in the past are of 
two different types. 
. . .accommodation, the introduction of new information non-assertively, is 
not merely a funny kind of presupposition, but is in fact functionally totally 
different, It 
(Werth ,1993: p39) 
t l  
This theory assumes that in any discourse there is a common ground (CG), which includes the 
set of propositions previously expressed in the discourse, the propositions entailed by them 
and the propositions they activate from the set of potentially relevant propositions in the 
knowledge bases of the speaker and the hearer. Werth proposes that we can categorise the 
propositions contained in some utterance in the following way: either as propositions already 
present in the CG which represent backgrounded information (BI) or as propositions not in the 
CG, which represent new information being considered for inclusion in the CG. Werth argues 
that most of what are conventionally called presuppositions can be seen as references to 
backgrounded information and that the rest, conventionally analysed either as failed 
presuppositions causing truth-valuelessness or as presuppositions requiring an 
accommodation mechanism, can be seen as a special means of presenting new information 
which he calls unconventional assertions (UA). Werth also claims that information introduced 
by an unconventional assertion will typically be unimportant or uncontroversial. For example 
in sentence 2.46, the six bracketed clauses represent propositions encoded in conventional 
assertions 
2.46. [I have a neighbour] and [he was a keen gardener]. [I also have cats] and 
[they ruined my neighbour's garden]. [My neighbour took up sailing] and 
[ths was because of my cats]. 
The same propositions, in sentence 2.47, are presented as backgrounded information. If 2.47 
is assumed to follow 2.46 in a discourse the presentation of the propositions in this way 
reflects the fact that they are already part of the CG. If 2.47 is the initial utterance in a 
discourse which takes place between strangers the propositions must be analysed as new 
pieces of information being presented in unconventional assertions. O 
2.47. I am slightly embarrassed that my previously garden-mad neighbour has 
taken up sailing because of my cats' destructive activities. 
Werth claims that although UAs are primarily employed to present uncontroversial new 
information this feature of their use is pragmatic, therefore cancellable and exploitable i.e. a 
speaker may flout the rule to present a startling or otherwise very informative proposition 
using a UA, to give the impression to the hearer that they consider the proposition 
unsurprising (or would like the hearer to believe that they do). For example, 2.48a and 2.48b 
present a (typically) very informative proposition as respectively a conventional and an 
unconventional assertion l .  
2.48a. [I made a million] and moved 10 the Costa. 
2.48b. After [I made my million] I moved to the Costa. 
Werth identifies a range of means by which a proposition can enter the common ground of a 
discourse: these include via conventional assertion or unconventional assertion. by being an 
entailment or an implicature of some other proposition in the common ground or by being part 
of the general world knowledge of the discourse participants. In contrast to the constraints on 
unconventional assertion, Werth argues that a proposition can be referred to by means of a so- 
l OThe distinction between unconventional assertions and references to backgrounded information is 
similar to an idea in Wilson and Sperber (1 979) in which entailments and presuppositions are 
collapsed into an ordered set of truth conditions of one formal type. Wilson and Sperber argue that a 
speaker can pragmatically indicate the most important entailments of an utterance by linguistic 
means (either structural or intonational). They describe the choice between uttering two conjoined 
main clauses to indicate two propositions of equal importance or uttering a main clause/subordinate 
clause structure to indicate that one proposition is less important than the other because it contains 
information that is either old or uncontroversial. 
of existential propositions which can be presented unconventionally. 
'In section 3.2.2.6 of chapter 3 we discuss in detail question of whether there are limits on the range 
called presupposition triggering expression regardless of how it originally entered the common 
ground of the discourse. For example, any of the propositions presented as unconventional 
assertions in 2.47 (read as a discourse initial utterance) can be treated as backgrounded 
information. If the speaker of 2.47 were to continue by uttering sentence 2.49 the pronouns 
they and it, would depend for their interpretation on the existential propositions in 2.49a. 
2.49. They made a real mess of it. 
2.49a. My neighbour has a garden. 
I have cats. 
This a controversial claim and it is dealt with in detail in section 3.2 of the following chapter 
when we consider the existential contribution of  a range of linguistic expressions individually. 
For the moment let us accept that propositions which have been offered for inclusion in the 
common ground by any means can be referred to as backgrounded information. 
Werth's analysis is very interesting but since ,his intention is solely to provide a basis for the 
analysis of discourses and texts he does not address the interesting questions of what his 
analysis predicts for the classical puzzles of ambiguous negation or references to non-existent 
entities. We now discuss the light his approach might throw on the puzzles in these areas. 
2.5.1 . Negation Without Presuppositions. 
Werth's analysis results in an apparent ambiguity, in isolated sentences, between an 
expression being interpreted as an unconventional assertion of new information, or as a 
reference to old information. We will describe this as an ambiguity between anaphoric and 
assertive readings of the expression. If we can show that only existential propositions 
associated with anaphoric expressions can be negated, then we will have solved the problem of 
the source of the ambiguity or vagueness o f  negation scope. In fact, we will be able to show 
that negation is not ambiguous, but that when sentences are evaluated out of context it is not 
always clear which proposition in a sentence is being negated. 
Clearly, negating some proposition being asserted by the use of some expression would 
constitute a contradiction. To illustrate this let us consider an utterance of 2.50 in a context 
where the proposition in 2.50a is not part of the previously established common ground. In 
such a context, the use of the expression my nephew Alastair constitutes a unconventional 
assertion of the proposition that the speaker has a nephew called Alastair. 
2.50. My nephew Alastair is freckly. 
2.50a. I have a nephew called Alastair. 
If in this context, the speaker were instead to produce an utterance of 2.5 1 the utterance could 
contain both an assertion and a denial of the single proposition that the speaker has a nephew 
called Alastair . 
2.5 1. My nephew Alaistair is not freckly 
2.51 in this context, and on this reading, therefore would be a a contradiction. On the other 
hand, in a different context, in which the proposition in 2.50a is part of the established 
common ground shared by speaker and hearer, i.e. if both discourse participants knou7 that the 
speaker of 2.5 1 has a nephew called Alastair, then 2.5 1 contains no contradiction since only 
the property of fi-eckliness is being denied, not the existence of the individual named Alastair. 
A more interesting situation can arise, again when 2.50a is not part of the common ground and 
the speaker of 2.51 does not have a nephew called Alastair. Suppose that in such a context, 
the other discourse participant utters 2.52 in which 2.50a is presented via an unconventional 
assertion. 
2.52. Your nephew Alastair's freckly, isn't he? 
A subsequent utterance of 2.5 1, in this context contains a reference to a proposition already 
asserted, which can therefore be negated by the speaker without contradiction. 
The two states Werth outlines for propositions (the state of being newly asserted and the state 
of being established) can be seen as two extremes on a scale. Current theories of discourse 
suggest that new propositions spend a period of time during which they are under negotiation 
for inclusion in the subsequent common ground. (Brown and Yule, 1983). Before this, 
propositions must be offered for inclusion by a speaker and this may take place by various 
means: conventional assertion, unconventional assertion, implicature and references to unused 
propositions of background knowledge. 
It is usehl to view the status of new propositions in terms of a scale of commitment, with 
conventional assertions being associated with the highest level of commitment from the 
speaker and general background knowledge being associated with the lowest level of 
commitment from both speaker and hearer (Prince, 198 1). 
We propose that different levels of commitment can be seen as differences in the degree of 
responsibility discourse participants must accept for the inclusion of propositions in the 
common ground. If a speaker explicitly offers a particular proposition via a conventional 
assertion he or she must accept a high degree of responsibility for its subsequent presence in 
the common ground and cannot cancel it without contradiction. For example a speaker of 
2.53 has a h g h  degree of responsibility for the inclusion in the discourse of 2.54 and it would 




An apprentice organ-builder from York has invented a time machine. 
There is an apprentice organ-builder from York. 
There are no apprentice organ-builders these days. 
If the hearer does not reject the proposition in 2.53 during the initial negotiating period, then 
he or she must subsequently accept some degree of responsibility for its presence in the 
common ground, but the hearer is able to cancel the proposition in either of two ways: they 
might reject the proposition outright when it is offered for inclusion, or attempt to remove the 
proposition from the background if additional later information shows it to be inconsistent 
with other propositions in the context. Neither of these two methods of cancellation involve 
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the hearer in any measure of contradiction. (Brown and Yule, 1983; Werth 1993) 
At the other end of the scale, if a proposition is part of background general knowledge then we 
claim that both the speaker and hearer have a much smaller amount of responsibility for its 
presence and either one can cancel the proposition without contradiction. The ordering is 
interesting, with respect to negation, because as the discourse participant's level of 
commitment to a proposition decreases, any negation of the proposition appears less like 
denial negation and more like descriptive negation (in the sense of Kempson 1977). For 
example, we can compare 2.56, where A's utterance contains a conventional assertion of the 
proposition negated by B's utterance, with 2.57, where there is very little possibility of 
identifjring the source of the proposition 2.57a whch is being negated. 
2.56. Speaker A: The k n g  of France is bald. 
Speaker B: The King of France is not bald. 
2.57. There is no God. 
2.57a. There is a God. 
The result is that the negation in 2.57 seems less like a denial than the negation in 2.56. 
Nevertheless, we claim that 2.57 does contain an instance of a denial of a proposition in the 
common ground which can be evaluated as either true or false by hearers. In contrast, 2.58 
which has negative structure does not constitute an instance of negation in the current context 
since the proposition in 2.58a is not in the common ground. 
2.58. There is no Flast. 
2.58a. There is a Flast. 
If we make this assumption that speaker and hearer are jointly responsible for negotiating the 
context we can explain why the example given by Kempson (1977) from Strawson (1 950) and 
repeated below is not contradictory. 
"Neither hstotel ian nor Russellian rules gives the exact logic of any 
expression of ordinary language: for ordinary language has no exact logic." 
(Kempson, 1977: 152) 
Contrary to Kempson's claim, the proposition that there is an exact logic for natural language 
is not being asserted in this sentence. The proposition is already present, under negotiation in 
the common ground. But even though the sentence appears in a written monologue this does 
not mean that somewhere in the preceding text, a statement of Strawson's must have asserted. 
entailed or implied this proposition. He may assume that it is part of the world knowledge of 
his readers, or more interestingly, he may assume that the reader will have added the 
proposition to the context because they mistakenly perceive it to be entailed or implied by his 
preceding argument. 
We find the initial analysis of negation without presupposition to be encouraging enough to 
motivate an attempt to re-evaluate the problems of references to non-existent entities without 
using the category of presupposition. In the following chapter we will examine closely the 
validity of Werth's distinction between unconventional assertions and references to 
backgrounded information when it is applied to existential propositions introduced by means 
of different types of nominal expressions. 
Chapter 3 
Existential Features of Linguistic Expressions 
In the introductory chapter, we made use of the idea that there is a plurality of existential 
states when we chose to describe some entities as "existentially questionable" rather than 
simply non-existent. This might be taken to imply that there are further existential 
possibilities besides some entity's existence or its non-existence. It should not be imagined 
that we assume either that there is general acceptance of there being such a plurality or, even 
if there were, that the nature or number of possible existential states is established. On the 
contrary, we acknowledge the strength of the intuition that existence must. in some basic 
sense, be a binary property. However, there is a crucial distinction to be drawn between 
existential properties expressed linguistically and objective existential properties; that i s ,  
between existential aspects of the meaning of nominal expressions and the actual existence or 
non-existence of the objects to which these expressions refer. It is existence as a property of 
objects whch our intuitions dictate must be binary1. There is no compelling motivation, in a 
theory whch embraces pragmatic aspects of meaning, to view linguistic existential properties 
as intrinsically binary. In this chapter, we will propose an approach to the existential aspects 
of the semantics of linguistic expressions which is scalar rather than binary. First we will 
define our use of the term existential force (EF) and discuss its location, that is, identify what 
kind of expressions are the bearers of EF. 
3.1 . Existential Force. 
3.1.1. The definition of EF. 
Existential features of the meaning of linguistic expressions have been given a number of 
different names in the semantic and logical literature; for example, existential force, existential 
import and existential commitment (Kempson, 1977; McCawley, 1980; Burton-Roberts, 
1989). However, the underlying analyses are essentially the same. McCawley (1 980), for 
'In fact, as we discuss in chapter 4, section 4.1, if we recognise a variety of existential locations the 
result is that there appears to be a wider range of possibilities than this. 
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example, defines existential commitment as the commitment of a speaker of some sentence 
which contains a quantified NP to the proposition that the domain of that quantifier is not 
empty (McCawley, 1980: 112). In the terms of Hawkins' (1978) account of reference and 
(in)defiruteness2, where the contribution of definites and indefinites is also seen from the point 
of view of the speaker, existential force could be defined as a signal of the commitment on the 
part of a speaker to the existence of the object to whch some NP refers. In the theory 
proposed here, which views interpretation and truth-value assignment from the point of view 
of the hearer, the level of EF is defined as the level of acceptance, by a hearer, of the existence 
of a referent for some NP. 
3.1.2. The Location of EF. 
Formal accounts of the semantics of NPs tend to view EF as a property of the class of logical 
quantifiers which represent, at the level of logical form, both definite and indefinite 
determiners as well as the set of natural quantifiers. In Montague Grammar, (Dowty, Wall 
and Peters 1981; Cann 1993) and Generalised Quantifier Theory (Banvise and Cooper, 1984; 
van Benthem, 1986; Partee, ter Meulen and Wall, 1990) the, some, sm, both, many and a 
few are translated into logical form as quantifiers with a positive EF value with the result that 
the use of the in an utterance of sentence 3.01 commits a speaker to the existence of a 
leprechaun; the use of both in sentence 3.02, to the existence of two leprechauns, and the use 
of many in 3.03, to the existence of more than two leprechauns. 
3 .O 1 
3.02 Both leprechauns hate vodka. 
3.03 Many leprechauns hate vodka. 
The leprechaun hates vodka. 
In contrast, every. any, few and no are translated as quantifiers with a negative value for EF 
so that utterances of sentences 3.04 - 3.07 do not commit their speakers to the existence of 
leprechauns. 
See chapter 3 for a review of Hawkins' approach 
3.04 Every leprechaun hates vodka. 
3.05 Any leprechaun hates vodka. 
3.06 Few leprechauns hate vodka. 
3.07 No leprechauns hate vodka. 
There is a potential problem, however, with the association of EF with quantifiers and 
determiners; if EF is located in the determiner then any expression with either positive or 
negative EF must be analysed as containing a determiner. We will now discuss the merits of 
positing determiners for the remaining types of nominals i.e. names, pronouns, mass terms and 
bare plurals. 
It is now uncontroversial for syntactic theories to assume that pronouns are determiners. This 
analysis is proposed in Hudson (1984) and the case is argued persuasively in Abney (1987). 
From a semantic point of view also, an analysis which assumes that pronouns are determiners 
i s  well-motivated. The pronoun in 3.08, for example, can be analysed as a combination of an 
inflected determiner which encodes case, number and gender and a null descriptive predicate 
whose content is recoverable either from the preceding discourse in the case of anaphoric uses, 
or from the physical situation of utterance in the case of deictic uses3. 
3.08. He finished the vodka. 
This analysis brings the distribution of semantic content in pronominal NPs into line with the 
distribution of semantic content in NPs with overt determiners and descriptive predicates. 
The problem with bare plurals and mass terms is of a different kind. Here the descriptive 
predicate is phonologically realised but there is no overt determiner. However, these are NPs 
3The deictic uses of third person pronouns are controversial however. It is not generally assumed 
that he and she can are deictic in the same way as me, you, here, there etc. (Lyons, 1975, 1977). 
It may be more accurate to propose that third person pronouns are only indirectly deictic; that they 
are linked with some pragmatic discourse feature such as an intonation pulse, a pointing gesture or 
an eye-flash; and that it is these gestures which have the deictic function. 
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for whch we wish to propose positive EF. For example, the subject NPs in the following 
group of sentences all appear to be associated with positive EF. 
3.09. Leprechauns hate vodka. 
3.10. Leprechauns &shed my vodka. 
3.1 1. Vodka did for the leprechauns. 
There are two possible solutions to the problem of the location of the EF in bare plurals and 
mass terms. We may decide either to view EF as a feature of referring expressions or to 
analyse the NPs in sentences 3.09 - 3.1 1 as having phonologically null determiners. 
There is some independent motivation for positing null determiners for bare plurals and mass 
terms. If we consider the pairs of sentences in 3.12 and 3.13 we can see that bare plurals and 
mass terms are ambiguous between generic readings (in the a versions) and indefinite readings 
(in the b versions). 
3.12a. Gin can cause tearfulness. 
3.12b. Gin was the cause of my tearfulness last night. 
3.13a. Voters are easily frightened. 
3.13b. Voters were frightened by Norman. 
The most straightforward way to deal with the ambiguous referential potential of these 
expressions is to set up two separate unambiguous phonologically null determiners which we 
can call SM and GEN. Clearly, SM whch is simply a null variant of sm is to be analysed 
as having the same positive EF value; we discuss the EF of GEN in section 3.2.1.3.. 
Assuming that bare plurals and mass terms are amenable to an analysis which employs null 
determiners, the simplest and most cohesive analysis would be one in which we could handle 
names, e.g. 3.14 in the same way. 
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3.14. Bill Clinton h s h e d  my vodka. 
In Montague Grammar, the semantics of names is handled by employing a process of type- 
raising to align them with the type of quantified NPs. This analysis is motivated by the 
requirement, which is a central concern of Montague Grammar, that expressions with identical 
syntactic distribution should be assigned to the same syntactic category and that entire 
syntactic categories should be also exhibit semantic uniformity: i.e. if NP is a real syntactic 
category and it includes quantified NPs, defhtes and names then all of these should be 
assigned to the same semantic type. There is, therefore, no difficulty in proposing null 
determiners for names since they must necessarily have determiner nodes at the level of 
syntactic representation (Cann, 1993). In purely syntactic treatments, also, a (usually empty) 
determiner node is now regularly associated with proper names (Hudson, 1984; Abney, 1987). 
There are two types of empirical evidence in favour of a determiner node in the representation 
of proper names. The first o f  these concerns certain uses of proper names in English which 
allow the occurrence of overt determiners. For example: 
3.15. The Mary Smith you were at school with, sounds just like the M a p  Smith I 
was at school with. 
This evidence alone is not entirely compelling, since it is possible to argue that Mary Smith in 
3.15 is not being used as a name but that an utterance 3.15 only occurs if there has been some 
previous mention of Mary Smith and Mary Smith is being mentioned, or quoted, rather than 
used in an utterance of 3.15 and so its occurrence with a determiner is of no more theoretical 
significance than the co-occurrence of a determiner the with a conditional clause in sentence 
3.16b. 
3.16a. I'll be finished by Christmas, if all goes well. 
3.16b. The if all goes well is the problem. 
page 54 
However, sentence 3.17 (whch was uttered in a real discourse situation) provides an example 
of an occurrence of an overt determiner with a first mention proper name, Janice Wilson. 
3.17. The Mandy McBain you were at school with, sounds just like the Janice 
Wilson I was at school with. 
Even more compelling is the possibility of the co-occurrence of a with a name in such 
sentences as 3.1 8.  
3 .18.  If there is a Duane Dibley in the hotel, would he please go to the foyer. 
However, we could argue that a Duane Dibley i s  an elliptical form of a person called Duane 
Dibley, in which case, t h s  is no more evidence of the co-occurrence of determiners with 
names than 3.19 is of the occurrence of strings consisting of determiners, adjectives 
prepositions and names. 
3.19. The blue envelopes are for Manchester and the red for London. 
On the other hand, if we read a Duane Dibley as meaning a person called Duane Dibley and 
the Janice Wilson I was at school with as the meaning the person called Janice Wilson 
whom the speaker was at school with, we could argue that, for example, any occurrence of 
the name Duane Dibley without an overt determiner could be analysed as meaning the person 
who has the property of being called Duane Dibley. Indeed, in such systems as that proposed 
by Keenan and Falz (1985), in which there are no expressions whch directly denote 
individuals, the proper name Duane Dibley is analysed as denoting a set of properties, of 
which the property of being called Duane Dibley must be a member. We can conclude that, if 
we can accept the uses above as examples of naming, we must posit a determiner node in the 
syntactic representations of proper names, since this node is not always empty. 
A stronger argument for this analysis can be made by considering cross-linguistic evidence. 
Many languages show the regular co-occurrence of overt determiners and names e.g. Italian 
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Gianni or I1 Gianni. In such cases, the variants with and without overt determiners appear to 
be optional paraphrases without any of the semantic effects or restrictions associated with co- 
occurrences of names and overt determiners in English (L. Serratrice, pers. corn.). 
In the end, we must acknowledge that the existence of null determiners for proper names 
remains controversial. However, since names tend to present problems for all semantic and 
syntactic theories and since these problems are of many different kinds, we are not inclined to 
give too much consideration to the fact that names to not fit neatly into our view of NP 
semantic structure. Fortunately, the questionable status of null determiners for names will not 
present any practical problems for our theory of EF. We do agree that EF originates in the 
determiner of an NP. However, we can also think of NPs (or discourse referents) as having 
EF which they inherit from their determiner and. given two assumptions, this will allow us a 
straightfonvard treatment of the EF of names. The first assumption is that a determiner's EF 
is fixed; that is, no determiner can have positive EF when combined with one descriptive 
predicate and negative EF when combined with another. The second assumption, which we 
will defend in the section 3.2.2.4., is that there is no ambiguity in the EF of a name. In 
contrast to bare plurals and mass terms, if there is a normally empty determiner node 
associated with names, there is no evidence from the existential aspects of the meaning of 
names that more than one null determiner can fill it. We do not need access to the null 
determiner which occurs with a name in order to identify it, since we know that it is always the 
same one, therefore there would not be any serious negative implications for the current theory 
if it turns out to be impossible to defend the claim that the determiner node is actually there. 
3.1.3. Binary or Scalar EF. 
In Montague Grammar (Dowty. Wall and Peters 1981; Cann 1993) and Generalised 
Quantifier Theory (Banvise and Cooper 1984) the, some, both, many and a few are 
translated into logical form as existential quantifiers i.e. quantifiers with positive EF, while 
every, any, few and no are translated as quantifiers with negative EF. In fact, in all formal 
semantic theories the existential force of natural quantifiers and other determiners is 
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necessarily defined as a binary logical feature. However, we are convinced that a more 
accurate analysis of determiners is one which treats their existential properties as scalar. 
Table 3.1. shows the arrangement we propose for the scale of EF. 
Table 3.1. 
Scale of Existential Force 
strongest EF 
Duane Dibley 
h m  
the bombardier 
some classic serials 
both world wars 
GEN vodka 
a lion tamer from Cardiff 
sm figure-skating judges 
many Australian road movies 
a few honest politicians 
every woman in the room 
any fiend of Margaret's 
few edible mushrooms 
\L no particular reason 
weakest EF 
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Despite the deviation from the traditional, formal view of EF as a binary feature which results 
from our placing the determiners on a scale, we do agree to some ex-tent with the stance taken 
in formal accounts, and our arrangement does reflect the notion that it is possible to divide the 
determiners into two discrete sub-sets; those which are existential and those which are non- 
existential. The top two slots on the scale contain those determiners which are traditionally 
analysed as existential; the, some, both, sm, many, a few. The next lower two slots, which 
we will argue are associated with two weaker levels of EF, contain those determiners, every, 
any and few, whch, if existential force is viewed as a binaq feature, are lumped together with 
what we take to be the only non-existential determiner no. Our proposed scale is very similar 
to the binary analysis in that we retain the groupings at the top and bottom of the scale and the 
introduction of the two intermediate slots could be seen as no more than a blurring of the 
boundary. Since the abandonment of the binary distinction results in a system less formally 
elegant, and for which inferences are much more difficult to determine, we must face the 
question of whether we lose more than we gain by recasting EF as a scalar propertj. 
Since our interests lie squarely in the area of the behaviour and use of referring expressions 
(and hence determiners) in real discourse we are generally happy to let empirical accuracy 
overrule considerations of formal elegance. In this instance, we propose to show that a scale 
of EF allows us to predict the behaviour of referring expressions in a much more realistic way 
than a binaq split. Evidence for this claim is presented in detail in sections 3.2.2.-3.2.2.8 of 
this chapter. 
3.1.4. Combining Linguistic EF with Objective Existence Types. 
The question of the number and nature of kinds of existence is presently unresolved. Let us 
adopt the position discussed in chapter 4 section 4.1 that there are seven ways for entities to 
exist. Then, given the five possible levels of EF distinguished on the scale given in Table 3.1 ., 
there should be a potential thirty -five existentially distinct combinations of referring 
expressions and referents. It is our claim that all thirty-five potential combinations are 
possible; that an expression at any level of EF can pick out an object with any kind of 
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existence; and that since no collocation has any special idiomatic effect, that the result of the 
combination of any particular EF with any type of existence is completely predictable and no 
co-occurrence is deviant or borderline. The thirty-five possible combinations are laid out in 
Table 3.2 . The remainder of this chapter comprises a detailed discussion of linguistic 
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3.2. Levels of EF. 
3.2.1. Strongest EF: Pre-establishment. 
The first controversial feature of the proposed scale of EF is that there is a distinct level of 
existential force above the minimum level associated with the existence of a referent. That is, 
we are proposing that the traditional definitehndefinite distinction which separates the and a 
is seen as a distinction in EF, albeit one at a hgher level on the scale than what has been 
traditionally labelled the existentialhon-existential distinction which separates many and any. 
Our discussion of the contrasts at this end of the scale relies heavily on the definite and 
indefinite usage types classified by Hawkins (1978, 1984). 
Hawkins employs two contrasts which he claims can distinguish among the range of definite 
and indefinite uses. The first of these i s  a g i v e h e w  distinction which Hawkins handles by 
means of the concept of sets of entities whose members are familiar to the participants in a 
discourse. Hawkins argues that features of the discourse context and utterances in the 
discourse trigger the participants to set up what he calls pragmatic sets (p-sets) of entities 
whose members can subsequently be referred to as familiar entities. He distinguishes between 
references to members of existing p-sets and references which trigger the inclusion of a new p- 
set. For example, in an utterance of sentence 3.20, a eat is said to trigger a new p-set with 
exactly one member, and it is said to refer to t h s  p-set member. 
3.20. I had a cat but it died. 
The second distinction H a w k s  invokes is an inclusive/exclusive distinction. An inclusive 
reference to a p-set member is defined as a reference to the totality of members of some p-set 
which satis@ the descriptive predicate of the referring expression. An exclusive reference to a 
p-set member is defined as a reference to some proper sub-set of the members of some p-set 
which satisfy the descriptive predicate. The use of it in 3.20 then, would be defined by 
Hawluns as an instance of inclusive reference. The use of a cat in 3.21, however, would be 
defined as exclusive reference. 
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3.2 1. No& had a mating pair of every kind of animal, until a cat drowned. 
In the discussion whch follows we investigate the usefulness of existential features in 
accounting for Hawkins' range of usage types. 
To return to the EF scale itself, we propose that the strongest existential effect is one which 
we can call pre-establishment. To say that an expression has the existential force of pre- 
establishment is to say that a hearer will understand from a speaker's use of such an 
expression that the existence of a referent for that expression, and the identity of that referent, 
were already established before the utterance of the expression5. In Hawkins terms. pre- 
establishment is a feature of p-set members. 
3.2.1.1. Anaphoric Definites. 
The paradigm example of an NP with the EF of pre-establishment is a non-assertive or 
anaphoric definite description, e.g. the lghlighted definite in 3.22: 
3.22. A: Who bit the bombardier? 
B: I bit the bombardier. 
For the interpretation of B's utterance in 3.22 as a true statement, it is necessary that there is 
some entity available to be identified as the referent of the bombardier, but the availability of 
this referent is not sufficient for the appropriate use of the definite. In addition, we propose 
that the existence of the entity must have been established prior to B's utterance. In 3.22, both 
these requirements are met, since B's utterance is preceded by A's utterance, and so B's 
utterance of the definite can be classified as appropriate and the statement can be analysed as 
potentially true. In turn, A's use of the definite, if it is appropriate, rests on the utterance of 
some still earlier establishing expression or the presence in the visible context of a 
recognisable bitten bombardier. 
5The initial establishing of the existence and identity of some referent is associated with the use of 
expressions with a weaker level of EF and will be discussed in section 3.2.2 
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We must defend thls analysis on three fronts. It must be shown; (1) that it is well-motivated 
to claim that the existential reading originates in the definite description; (2) that the EF in this 
sentence should be analysed using a new category "pre-establishment'' rather than using the 
existing and widely accepted category "presupposition"; and (3) that pre-establishment merits 
inclusion, and inclusion at a separate level, on the EF scale. 
(1) It might be suggested that the EF in 3.22 originates in the verb; i.e. the requirement for the 
existence of a referent for the bombardier results principally from its co-occurrence with the 
combination of the pronoun I and the verb bit rather than from any feature of the definite 
itself. That is, any expression which occurred here would have to be interpreted existentially. 
If we understand EF as a requirement of existence on the part of some entity then it does 
follow that it is the selectional rules for the verb bite which contribute the EF in this sentence. 
On such an analysis we would say that, for this sentence to be interpreted as an expression of 
a true proposition, the verb requires that its arguments have referents which physically co- 
exist. In addition, since the speaker of (some utterance of) this sentence necessarily exists in 
one particular location, this amounts to a requirement for the existence of the referent of the 
definite in the same location as (and furthermore in physical proximity to) the speaker. 
Our answer to this objection is that it rests on a model of interpretation which is at odds with 
the view taken of interpretation in the current thesis. We are interested in interpretation as a 
dynamic process which takes place during real discourse and which relates contexts, through 
utterances, to further contexts. It is only from the point of view of theories such as DRT 
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993) or Montague Grammar (Cann, 1993), which state interpretation 
declaratively as a function from sentences (or their logical translations) to models, that the EF 
in 3.22 can be argued to originate in the verb. Put informally, the interpretation component of 
DRT allows the verb to dictate the features of the model with respect to which some sentence 
is interpreted; in this case, the model must contain a referent for the bombardier. 
It is clear however that although a semantic analysis of the verb bite might select for the co- 
existence of the referents of its arguments, it does not follow that the use of bite in any way 
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confers co-existence on a pair of objects in any particular model. For example, taking 
sentence 3.23 as a representation of an utterance by the author of this thesis on the first of 
October 1995, 
3.23. I danced the last waltz with the Wizard of Oz last night. 
although dance here requires the physical co-presence of Catriona McPherson and the Wizard 
of Oz on the 30th of September 1995, hearersheaders of this sentence are not bound to 
interpret the sentence with respect to some model which fulfils the requirement; and if readers 
of 3.23 choose to interpret it with respect to the real world they cannot interpret it as a 
representation of a true proposition6. 
(2) The EF of definites used in the way represented in 3.23 has traditionally been dealt with 
under the heading of presupposition (Strawson, 1950; 1954, Karttunen, 1973, Burton- 
Roberts, 1989). It was argued in chapter 2, following Werth (1 993), that the employment of a 
logical category of presupposition is misguided and unnecessary, its apparent usefulness being 
merely a side-effect of the tendency of linguists to examine isolated sentences out of context. 
We claim that when a representation of a sentence with no context is presented to a reader, as 
is usually the case in the literature on presupposition, it is likely that readers of the sentence 
immediately and automatically fill in a context to facilitate the interpretation of that sentence. 
We believe that the reader's lack of awareness that the process of supplying a context has been 
carried out means that the reader uses a context without acknowledging its existence or paying 
attention to how any particular context is chosen and so is led to mis-analyse the behaviour of 
definites by claiming that a definite carries an existential presupposition or triggers an 
existential presupposition7. We propose that, in fact, the relationshp between definites and 
existence is the exact reverse of this: the use of a defk te  description is licensed or made 
%ee chapter 6 for a full discussion of choice of existential location as a part of interpretation. 
7The unconscious supplying of contexts has been implicated in further cases of misanalysis since 
where there are two possible contexts for some construction the more common contex? tends to be 
assumed with the result that the construction is then defined by its occurrence in that context only. 
e.g. one use of do which typically but not exclusively occurs in sentences like Do sit down has 
largely been analysed as a marker of women's speech, since its other context, e.g. in Do read those 
papers over (as I suggested earlier) which is not predominantly used by females, is much more 
uncommon. (Ellen Prince, Henry Sweet Lecture, LAGB 1995) 
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appropriate by the existence of the object to which it refers. B's utterance in 3.22, for 
example, occurs after the existence of the bombardier has been offered, negotiated and 
accepted by the discourse participants as a result of the preceding discourse. Ideally, to avoid 
the pitfalls associated with evaluating sentences out of context it would be preferable to 
present all the example sentences in this thesis preceded by a portion of discourse to fix some 
features of the context. However, this is not possible due to practical constraints, but we trust 
that an awareness of the process of filling in a context will suffice. 
We recognise that part of the obscurity of some of the semantic literature and much of the 
misunderstanding on the part of linguists working in this field of other linguists' work arises 
from the profusion of different terminology covering more or less the same ground. For 
example, presupposition is defined by different linguists as a semantic or a pragmatic relation 
which holds between sentences, propositions, statements, utterances, or between a speaker and 
one of these. The relation of presupposition has been called a weak entailment (Wilson, 1975), 
a semantic entailment, (Keenan, 1972), and a weak entailment without a strong entailment 
(Burton-Roberts, 1989). Levinson (1983) reviewed semantic and pragmatic theories of 
presupposition and identified a wide range of conflicting pragmatic definitions; for example. 
conventional implicatures (Karttunen and Peters, 1979). and the theory of potential and actual 
presuppositions owing to Gazdar (1979). Levinson (1983) also noted that while the category 
of presupposition should be reduced to other "more useful concepts", there was little 
consensus among linguists as to how t h s  should be achieved (Levinson, 1983: 217). It is not, 
therefore, a decision to be taken lightly to introduce the new label pre-establishment to define 
what might be seen as essentially back-to-front presupposition. It would be possible to use the 
term presupposition with the stipulation that it is understood that hearers presuppose existence 
as a result of prior establishment of existence. However, the use of the term presupposition to 
describe a process of definites triggering existence is so pervasive and we find the notion of 
this process so misguided and misleading, that we conclude that it is preferable to use a 
different term. 
(3) There is a sense in which if the EF scale is understood as a scale of existential 
commitment, and all utterances are assumed to take place in contexts, then a definite such as 
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the bombardier in 3.22 has existential properties whch are "off the scale"; that is. the use of 
the indicates a recognition of mutual acceptance of the existence of the referent while at other 
points on the scale, the choice of determiner indicates the minimum necessary level of 
commitment or acceptance of the existence of the referent. If EF is viewed from the 
perspective of the speaker, as in McCawley (198 1) pre-establishment would not merit a slot 
on the EF scale, since a speaker's level of commitment to the existence of some entity cannot 
be affected by whether or not the hearer shares it. However, the claim of the current thesis is 
that EF level is a measure of the hearer's degree of acceptance of the existence of some entity. 
In view of t h s  it is valid to associate a pre-established existential proposition with a higher 
level of EF than some existential proposition which is undergoing consideration by the hearer 
for inclusion in the common ground at a particular stage in the discourse. 
3.2.1.2. Pronouns. 
We have argued that it is because we can analyse the uses of definites discussed above as 
anaphoric that we can define their EF as pre-established. Our next claim, that pronominal 
NPs should also be assigned a level of EF which places them at this point on the EF scale, 
should not therefore be difficult to defend. We claim that the pronoun him in 3.24, for 
example, must be interpreted as a reference to some object whose existence is pre-established 
before 3.24 is uttered. 
3.24. I bit him. 
In fact, it might be said that a pronoun is the most intuitively clear example of an NP which is 
appropriate only where the existence and identiq of its referent are beyond debate. Indeed, if 
pronouns are analysed as determiners as we suggested in section 3.1.2, the existence and 
identity of some object to be associated with the null predicate of a pronominal NP must be 
pre-established as there is no semantic content in the predicate slot to allow an interpretation 
otherwise. In 3.25 (with the context outlined for 3.23) B's utterance cannot be interpreted as a 
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true statement since the identity of the only available referent for him precludes the necessary 
physical proximity of that entity with the speaker. 
3.25. A: What can you tell me about the Wizard of Ozi? 
B: I danced the last waltz with himi last night. 
It is not our intention to suggest that anaphoric pronouns which are coindexed with discourse 
internal, linguistic antecedents are in any way more basic than deictic pronouns whose 
referents are fixed directly by features of the context. 
3.2.1.2.1. Basic and Derived Pronoun Types. 
Some procedural semantic frameworks do take anaphoric pronouns with linguistic antecedents 
as prototypical pronominals and handle deictic pronouns by analogy. For example, in Heim's 
file-change model (Heim, 1982), referring expressions are associated with file-cards. She 
proposes that an indefinite triggers the introduction into the universe of discourse of a new 
file-card, while a definite brings about the modification of some existing file-card by the 
addition to it of more information concerning the entity with which it is associated. Anaphoric 
pronouns, in Heim's analysis, are always linked to existing file-cards. Deictic pronouns, on 
the other hand, are handled by the inclusion in the file of an initialljr blank context file-card 
onto which pseudo-antecedents for deictic pronouns are introduced by an accommodation 
mechanism which is activated at the point in the discourse when the deictic pronoun is uttered. 
Deictic pronouns are then co-indexed with these "antecedents" in a way which mirrors the 
association of anaphoric pronouns with linguistically expressed antecedents. 
We do not agree with Heim that it is a well-motivated step to analyse anaphoric pronouns as 
more basic than deictic pronouns. In fact, there may be some evidence from child language 
acquisition and from historical and cross-linguistic studies, for the opposite claim: that deixis 
is more basic than anaphora. 
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The evidence from chdd language acquisition on this point is indirect. Children acquire deictic 
h c t i o n  relatively early in their language development far in advance of their acquisition of 
anaphoric function (Bowerman, 1973: Radford, 1990). For example, Crystal (1987) quotes 
Stoel-Gammon and Cooper (1984) who list "What's that?" among the first fifty utterances of 
two children whose lexical development was studied between the ages of eleven and sixteen 
months (Crystal, 1987). 
However, it is also a feature of child language acquisition that chddren begin with what 
Bloom, Lightbowm and Hood call a nominal style whch persists until the relatively late 
development of the determiner system, including personal pronouns (Bloom et d., 1978). For 
example: 
3.26. Amy draw boat. (I am drawing a boat) 
3.27. Mummy tickle Amy (Tickle me) 
3.28. Amy touch Amy toes (I am touchmg my toes) 
Abney (1987) argued that the lack of any overt inflections on this and that in English allows 
children to misanalyse them as full nominals rather than pronominal determiners. So it 
appears that although utterances of that should be analysed as having deictic function they 
cannot be analysed as having the form of pronominal determiners. 
Clearer evidence that deixis is more basic than anaphora comes form the argument that 
anaphoric function actually derives from deictic function (Lyons, 1975; 1977). 
I' ... deictic distinctions can be used to identifqi the antecedents of 
anaphoric expressions. Anaphora involves the transference of what 
are basically spatial notions to the temporal dimension of the context 
of utterance and the reinterpretation of deictic location in terms of 
what may be called location in the universe-of-discourse." 
(Lyons, 1977: 670) 
The view that anaphoric function has derived from deictic function in the evolution of 
language across time is well-motivated in that it conforms to the general trend of semantic 
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change identified by Traugott (1982, 1989). Traugott proposes three distinct semantic 
components in language: the propositional component, consisting of the means bjr which a 
language connects with states-of-affairs, e.g. concrete nouns: table and action verbs: kzck; the 
textual component, consisting of the means by which discourses are organised, e.g. textual 
connectives: however and anaphoric devices: the former; and the expressive component, 
consisting of the means available to a speaker for expressing attitude, e.g. sentential adverbs: 
surprisingly, unfortunately. Traugott claims that semantic change tends to involve process 
whereby propositional meanings develop into textual meanings and then into expressive 
meanings. McMahon (1994) gives the example of Old English bu hwile be 'at the time that'. 
which links two propositions, developing first into Middle English whyle 'while', which can 
also be used to link two clauses, and then into present-day English while which, besides 
having these functions, can be used with the meaning of 'although' to link two attitudes on the 




While I was sleeping, someone stole my car. Propositional use 
Whde the lioness is fierce, the lion is placid. Textual use 
While I enjoy the arias, some of the plots are laughable. Expressive use 
If Traugott's claims about general trends in semantic shifts are correct. then the development 
of anaphoric, textual hnctions associated with pronouns whose original function was to 
express propositional, deictic meanings is unremarkable. 
If we accept that the anaphoric use of a pronoun is historically derived from its deictic use, 
can be analysed as a special type of deictic use, and is acquired later than its deictic use, then 
any analysis which treats anaphoric function as more basic than deictic function is called into 
question at least at a pre-theoretical level, and an analysis whch derives anaphoric uses from 
deictic uses would be preferred. However, from the point of view of the interpretation process 
the most satisfactory analysis would be one in which neither aspect of the total context of 
utterance, whether linguistic or exqra-linguistic, was seen as basic. The reason for this is that, 
as was shown in Werth (1993), it does not appear that the method by which the proposition 
that some entity exists enters the common ground affects the subsequent potential for 
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pronominal references to it. For example, referents for it, he, and she are necessary for the 
proper use of these pronouns in sentences 3.32 - 3.34, but there is no difficulty in interpreting 
the sentences even though the existence of suitable entities must be inferred from the preceding 
linguistic context. 
3.32. I'm pregnant so it will be born in the spring. 
3.33. I was married before, but he was a swine 
3.34. I wanted to get my hair cut but she was fully 
booked. 
It is possible to cancel the association between it and the baby, he and the husband, and she 
and the hairdresser as sentence 3.35. shows: 
3.35. I was married before but hei was a swine. although my husbandj was alright. 
The important point is that it is not possible to cancel the association on the grounds that the 
entity does not exist. If the most likely referent is explicitly ruled out then some other referent 
must be available, e.g. sentence 3.36. 
3.36. I was married before but hej was a swine - my father-in-law? that is, not my 
husbandi - so this time I'm going for an orphan. 
It should be noted, however, that the use of he in 3.36 is not possible without previous explicit 
mention or some other type of contextual availability of the speaker's father-in-law. 
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3.2.1.3. Names. 
The third type of NP we propose for inclusion at t h s  level of EF is the class of proper names. 
We propose that the object in 3.37 exhibits the same EF as the definite in 3.22 and the 
pronoun in 3.25. 
3.37. I bit Bilbo. 
Our claim is that 3.37 is appropriately used only in those contexts of utterance where there is 
an entity which is identifiable as the referent of the name Bilbo, and the existence of the entity 
and it's being named Bilbo are pre-established. 
One possible objection can be identified to our inclusion of names at the same level of EF as 
definites and pronouns. The argument in this objection rests on a view of the semantics of 
names in which names are analysed as rigid designators which must refer and always refer to 
the same entity. On this analysis, names only cause sentences to be uninterpretable, if, as is 
the case if we try to interpret 3.38 (taking ths real world as the model), the proper names do 
not have any reference. 
3.38. Coynburgh is the county town of Tarelginshire. 
We must supply justification for the added requirement that the existence of a referent for a 
name be pre-established. Take for example sentence 3.39, in the current context (i.e. in which 
3.39 is a token of a sentence written by the current author and read by the current reader): 
3.39. Brian is three years older than Andrew. 
It may be the case that this sentence is as uninterpretable as sentence 3.3 8 or that the referents 
for the names can be identified and the truth-value of the sentence assigned. Which of these 
two possible situations actually holds depends on the current reader's access to the appropriate 
context. 
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In expositions of Montague Grammar or DRT, where the context to be used in interpretation 
is fully defined by the model theory, any example sentence can be interpreted, since it is 
always clear whether the specified index contains the required entities in the required relations. 
In other words, in Montague Grammar or DRT, interpretation is an idealised concept, 
abstracted away from the utterance context, generalised to cover both speakers and hearers, 
and not constrained by any epistemic limitations on the hearer's access to the correct index in 
the model. However, it is a central contention of the current theory that a crucial part of the 
interpretation of utterances consists in locating the referents of all referring expressions at the 
correct index in a model whlch, for any individual hearer, is incompletely specified. 
We can make the stronger claim about the appropriateness of names, because we accept that 
for some hearer of 3.39 who cannot identify the named entities, 3.39 is as uninterpretable as 
3.38 which contains names without any referents. In other words, we are claiming that it is 
not of primary importance whether or not referents for names exist, but that if hearers do not 
know that they exist, then they will be unable to interpret sentences containing the names*. 
We also propose the inclusion of the determiner GEN at h s  level on the EF scale. However, 
we cannot offer an argument in support of t h s  decision until after the discussion of the next 
lowest EF level. We will now turn our attention to this discussion and return to the question 
of the EF of generics in section 3.2.2.5. 
3.2.2. Assertion 
3.2.2.1. The EF of Indefites. 
The second highest level on the EF scale is one whch we can define as being associated with 
assertions of existence by the speaker. At this level we can place those determiners which are 
used to assert the existence of entities for the first time in a discourse. The idea of assertive 
*The possibility o f  weaker EF for some uses of names is discussed in section 3.2.2.4. 
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EF seems to accord rather well with people's intuitions about many uses of the indefinite 
articles d s m  whch Hawhns (1978) would categorise as references to entities which are not 
members of any existing p-set but trigger the introduction of a new p-set. For example; 
3.40. 
3.41. 
A student tried the meatloaf recipe. 
Sm monkeys have landed the contract to run the zoo. 
Traditional analyses have viewed the EF of a/sm as entailment and contrasted it with 
presupposition arguing that these two contrastive options constitute the entirety of positive 
existential features of meaning (Kempson, 1977). We have already made it clear that we 
believe it is useful to recognise a richer range of existential levels of meaning. In addition, the 
formulation of our theory of the interpretation of referring expressions is at odds with the 
characterisation of the EF of an indefinite as a kind of entailment. To see the EF of a as an 
entailment, it is necessary to take a view of interpretation which works from sentences to 
contexts, that is, to employ a model theoretic interpretation procedure. Using such a 
procedure it is plausible to argue that the appropriate utterance of sentence 3.42. for example, 
entails that the model in which the interpretation of 3.42 is embedded, must contain at least 
one individual who is a retired lion tamer and who lives in or comes from Cardiff i.e. the use 
of the indefinite entails the existence of a referent in the model. 
3.42. A retired lion tamer from Cardiff has won first prize in this week's 
national lottery. 
However, our approach views interpretation in a less idealised way from the point of view of 
the hearer. Thls has the effect of turning the relation around. Instead of an entailment from 
the indefinite to the lion tamer, we express the connection between the indefinite and the lion 
tamer as a type of licensing relation. That is, there must be at least one retired lion tamer who 
lives in or comes from Cardiff for the speaker of some utterance 3.42 to use it to make a true 
statement. As we pointed out in section 3.2.1.1, our analysis has the result that, from the 
point of view of the speaker there is no distinction between the requirements for the utterance 
of expressions with pre-established EF and asserted EF; in both cases, the existence of some 
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object must be known to the speaker before an utterance of some sentence containing either a 
definite or indefinite reference to that object can be used to make a true statement9. 
From the point of view of the hearer, however, whde prior knowledge of the existence of some 
object is necessary to interpret properly an NP with pre-established EF, NPs with what we are 
calling asserted EF do appear to entail the introduction and therefore the existence of their 
referents in the knowledge base of the hearer. l h s  rests on the operation during any 
discourse of a mutually acknowledged co-operative principle (Grice. 1975) on the strength of 
which hearers will accept statements made by speakers and update the common ground of the 
discourse according to reported information. We acknowledge that the negotiation of an 
existential proposition into the shared context can be initiated by the utterance of an indefinite. 
If the hearer of 3.42, for example, chooses to accept the addition of the individual referred to 
by the indefinite to the set of individuals which exist in the shared context, then we can say 
that the establishing of a lion tamer in Cardiff in the knowledge base of the hearer is entirely 
due to the occurrence of the indefinite description. 
What this amounts to is that when hearers assign truth-values to utterances, and specifically 
when they assign the truth-value true, they very often do so on solely on the basis that, 
according to the co-operative principle, if the speaker has asserted that some state of affairs is 
the case then it must be the case. However, we believe that although indefinites may under 
certain conditions trigger the acceptance of the existence of an entity on the part of a hearer, 
and that this could be seen as a kind of pragmatic entailment, this does not offer any 
motivation to analyse assertive EF in terms of semantic entailment. We must evaluate the 
proposal in Hawkins (1 978) that assertive EF can be analysed as pragmatic entailment. 
Hawkins' claim that this use of indefinites triggers the introduction of a new p-set can be seen 
as equivalent to a claim that ths use of an indefinite pragmatically entails the existence of its 
referent (Hawkm 1978, 1984). We propose that defining assertive EF in terms of even 
pragmatic entailment is misguided and misleading. 
9the existential status of the referents of definites and indefinites in opaque contexts will be discussed 
in chapter 7. 
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The difficulty with arguing against a pragmatic entailment analysis is precisely the fact that 
the co-operative principle ensures that most example sentences containing indefinites will be 
interpreted as counter-examples. However, there are cases in which the appearance of a 
pragmatic entailment relation can be cancelled. These are cases where the hearer's existing 
epistemic state rules out the acceptance into the shared context of some entity which is offered 
for negotiation into the context by an indefinite referring expression. For example, 
3.43. 
3.44. 
I saw a ghost last night. 
There are sm fairies at the bottom of my garden. 
We claim that these examples show that rather than expressions with assertive EF 
pragmatically entailing the existence of their referents, the existence of referents is a pre- 
requisite for the use of these expressions in utterances used to make true statements. We 
assume that readers of 3.43 judge it to be false in the current context and that its perceived 
falsity is caused by the inability of readers to accept the existence of a ghost which the writer 
of 3.43 has seen. If the use of an indefinite really did pragmatically entail the existence of its 
referent for a hearer there would be no easy way to explain the perceived falsity of 3.43.. 
However, i f  only the availabiliy of a referent can license the use o f  an indefinite, it  follow^ 
from the unavailability of a referent for a ghost in 3.43, that the use of an expression with 
assertive EF is not appropriate, that the indefinite description is not licensed and that, 
therefore, 3.43 cannot be used to make a true statement. 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, we propose that bare plurals be analysed using 
phonologically null determiners and since the two sentences in 3.45, for example, appear to be 
exact paraphrases it is proposed that some occurrences of bare plurals are assigned the null 
determiner SM, equivalent to the phonologically realised determiner sm which has assertive 
EF. 
3.45a. Sm monkeys have seized control of the zoo. 
3.45b. Monkeys have seized control of the zoo. 
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3.2.2.1.1. Other Uses of Indefinites. 
We stated at the beginning of this section that assertive EF characterises some of the uses of 
indefinites; those which Hawluns categorises as instances of reference to entities not included 
in any p-set. The remaining uses of indefinites are those which Hawkins classifies as 
instances of exclusive reference to members of existing p-sets, e.g. the use of a cat in 3.2 1 
(repeated here). 
3.2 1. Noah had a mating pair of every kind of animal until a cat died 
Recall that we noted in chapter 2 section 2.1.2 that one important advantage of Russell's 
analysis of indefinites as existential conjunctions was that this allowed us to rule out the 
possibility of a sentence such as 3.46 being assigned the truth-value true if its speaker could 
continue with the second conjunction of 3.47. 
3.46. 
3.47. 
A black cat Idn ' t  cross my path. 
A black cat didn't cross my path but another one did. 
However, it is not accurate to rule out all sentences of the v p e  shown in 3.47. There are 
numerous examples, such as 3.48, which are perfectly acceptable and can be interpreted as 
potentially true statements. 
3.48. The doctor thought I might have thrombosis since I had a swollen leg. but 
she changed her diagnosis when she realised that the other one was all right. 
We can show that by invoking Hawkins distinction between the two tjpes of indefinite use, we 
can predict why the conjunction in 3.48 is acceptable but the conjunction in 3.47 is not. 
Werth (1 993) claimed that the means by which propositions enter the context of a discourse 
are irrelevant to their subsequent status as part of the common ground. Werth went on to 
argue that any existential proposition in the common ground could be treated as backgrounded 
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information i.e. could be associated with a definite. We argued, following on from Werth's 
observations, that only those propositions which are either part of the common ground or are 
being offered for inclusion in the common ground can be negated. 
If we analyse the use of the indefinite in 3.49 as assertive (what Hawkins calls reference to a 
entity which is not in any existing p-set), then we can explain why the existence of this entity 
cannot be in the scope of the negation in sentence 3.46 since this would involve the speaker in 
a contradiction; both asserting and denying the existence of an entity. 
3.49. A black cat crossed my path. 
Furthermore, if the indefinite in 3.46 is assertive, then the continuation in 3.47 is not possible 
because there is no referent available for the pronominal expression another one. The 
assertion of the existence of one black cat in the context, does not facilitate the location of any 
other black cat in the context. In contrast, in sentence 3.48, a set of legs with two members 
associated with the speaker is part of the common ground of the discourse as a result of 
general background knowledge about human physiology. Therefore, a swollen leg, in this 
context, can be interpreted as an instance of exclusive reference to a proper sub-set of a p-set 
of legs. Th~s  explains why a referent is available for the expression the other one in this 
sentence. Since the existence of the set of legs in this context is part of the common ground, 
the speaker would be able to deny the proposition that either or both of these legs exist@) 
without uttering a contradiction. For example: 
3.50. The doctor thmks I may have thrombosis, since I have a swollen leg. 
The other one is not swollen - it was amputated years ago. 
We could account for the possibility of denying the existence of an entity picked out by an 
indefinite description if we analyses the indefinites Hawkins associated with exclusive 
reference as having pre-established EF. There is some precedent for positing a mismatch 
between the pair of categories we are calling pre-established and assertive EF, and the pair of 
expression types exemplified by the and dsm (Hawkins, 1978; Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 
Werth, 1993) but usually the claim that is made is that defhtes have some assertive uses. not 
that indefhtes have anaphoric uses. In the next section, we will consider in detail the so- 
called assertive uses of definites, pronouns and names to see if they coincide with the uses of 
indefinites whch we have claimed might be more properly analysed as non-assertive or 
anaphoric. If this is the case, then the motivation for analysing such definites. pronouns and 
names as assertive is greatly reduced. 
3.2.2.2. Definite s. 
We indicated in the discussion of anaphoric definites that it might be possible to analyse some 
definites in another way. There are three interesting treatments of definites in the semantic 
literature, reviewed below, which all make similar distinctions between anaphoric and what we 
might call assertive definites. These theories make the common claim that assertive uses of 
definites are restricted in a way that the uses of other assertive expressions, such as indefinites 
are not. We will evaluate this claim and then consider an alternative analysis which argues 
that, because these restrictions are identical to the restrictions on uses of indefinites which are 
better analysed as non-assertive, it is not possible or well-motivated to claim that any definites 
are assertive. 
Werth (1 993) distinguishes anaphoric definites, which he claims contain only given, 
background existential propositions, from non-anaphoric definites, which are used to make 
unconventional assertions of new existential propositionsIO. He argues that the degree of 
appropriateness of unconventional assertions correlates with the level of expectedness of the 
asserted existential proposition. 
On this point, his analysis shows similarities to the distinction Sperber and Wilson make 
between foreground and background entailments (Sperber and Wilson 1986), in which it is 
argued that foregrounded existential entailments, whch are expressed by indefinites, may 
'OSee the review in chapter 2, section 2.5. 
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contain information whch is costly in terms of processing effort, whereas backgrounded 
existential entailments, which are reflected in definites, must involve little processing cost. 
Both of these approaches are heavily indebted to Hawkins' account (Hawkins 1978) of the 
semantics o f  defhtes  and indefinites in whch he argues that assertive definites are only 
appropriate if they refer to some entity whose existence in the common ground i.e. in a p-set 
predictable on the grounds of stereotypical expectations. 
Table 3.3 shows the similarity among the three approaches. 
Table 3.3 
Restrictions on anaphoric definites 
Hawkins (1978) 
anap ho ric defini tes assertive definites 
second mention definites 
licensed by antecedents in 
the shared previous 
discourse set 
first mention definites 
licensed by membership of 
some other shared set 
Sperber & Wilson anaphoric definites assertive definites 
(1 986) reflecting backgrounded expressing fore-grounded 
entailments entailments 
Werth (1993) anaphoric definites referring assertive definites 
to given information in the 
common ground new information 
conveying uncontroversial 
Hawkins first divides the class of definite usages into two broad categories: first and second 
mentions. Second mentions can be classified as anaphoric. The hghlighted NP in sentence 
3.5 1, for example, shows anaphoric usage in which a definite is coindexed with a preceding 
indefinite in the utterance: 
3.5 1. A mani came in, and then a woman and then, I think, a 
another woman might have. I definitely remember the mani. 
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Hawluns also includes a range of cases in which no straightforward co-indexing is possible 
but which can nevertheless be analysed as instances of indirect anaphora. The highlighted 
definites in 3.52 and 3.53 are examples of some of these types of usages. 
3.52. I saw a man and a woman sitting on a bench. The couple were 
obviously having an argument. 
3.53. I don't want to drive to London again. The journey is easier by train. 
The last and most interesting class of anaphoric definite usages is what Hawkins calls 
associative anaphora. These are instances of definites which refer to objects whose existence 
is in some way implied the preceding discourse. The highlighted definite in 3.54 is an 
example of an associative anaphoric use in which the defimte is licensed because the presence 
in the common ground of a church implies the presence in the common ground of a set of 
entities which co-occur with churches; e.g. ministers. 
3.54. I went to a church and couldn't find the minister 
Associative anaphoric uses are particularl!. interesting because their appropriateness seems to 
depend on hearers' beliefs about reliable stereotypes. Hawkins handles this feature of their 
meaning by employing a stereotype requirement, whch marks as deviant sentences such as 
3.55, in comparison with 3.54, since the assumption of the presence in the common ground of 
a giraffe, after the mention of a church, is not licensed by our background knowledge of 
stereotypical churches. 
3.55. I went to a church and couldn't find the giraffe. 
The example in 3.56 was uttered by a six-year-old while taking part in Christmas celebrations 
at primary school for  the-first time: 
3.56. I'm in the nativity play - I'm one of the Hawaiian dancers 
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The speaker in this example inadvertently flouts the stereotype requirement, since with only 
one example of nativity plays to draw on, she cannot distinguish stereotypical components 
from others. 
As well as these types of anaphoric uses, Hawkins distinguishes among several varieties of 
first-mention usages, which cannot be interpreted in any way as linguistic all^^ anaphoric. but 
depend for their interpretation on either the visible situation, the immediate non-visible 
situation or the larger situation. For example, sentence 3.57 uttered by a speaker to a hearer 
while both are watching a ballet. contains a first-mention definite where the visibility in the 
physical situation of utterance of a suitable referent for the definite fulfils the requirement for 
availability and identifiability. 
3.57. The ballerina looks tired 
Hawkins uses the highlighted definite in 3.58 (on a sign on a garden gate) as an example of a 
first-mention usage whch is licensed by the immediate situation. 
3.58. Beware of the dog. 
Like associative anaphoric uses, this usage is said to be subject to a stereotype effect. In this 
example it is argued that it is our knowledge that houses regularly have dogs in them which 
licenses the use of the definite. However, this particular example does not perhaps provide 
sufficiently strong evidence for the stereotype effect, since "beware of the dog" is a fixed idiom 
in the sense that replacing the dog with any other definite results in a bizarre seeming sentence 
whether or not the substituted expression refers to an entity of a tqpe regularly found in houses 
or not. For example, 3.59 and 3.60 seem equally odd; neither is completely anomalous but 
neither is as acceptable as 3.5 8. 
3.59. Beware of the cat. 
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3.60. Beware of the giraffe. 
However, it is possible to identie a range of examples which do support the claim that a 
stereotype effect is at work in first-mention uses, although it is not entirely clear whether these 
are examples which Hawkins would analyse as immediate situation uses or larger situation 
uses (see below). Consider sentences the two sets of possible responses to the question in 
3.61. 
3.6 1. Did you have a good Christmas? 
a. Not really. The pipes froze. The boiler burst. The chip pan went on 
fire on Boxing day. The dog ate the turkey and the car got stolen. 
b. Not really. The giraffe died and the photocopier never turned up. 
In the response a. all the definites are easily interpretable as immediate situation uses, licensed 
by our knowledge that people often spend Chnstmas at home in houses which typicallj, 
contain pipes and boilers, and regularly contain dogs, cars and c h p  pans". In contrast. 
giraffes and photocopiers are not stereoppical features of houses. The b. response, therefore. 
appears peculiar when presented out of context in a way that the a. response does not. 
The defhtes  which Hawluns identifies as larger situation uses are those which are dependant 
on the uniqueness of their referent relative to some situation Lvhich is not defined b!, the 
discourse but is larger than the physical situation and possibly smaller that the world as a 
whole. For example, the highlighted definites in 3.62 and 3.63 could be ana1)sed as examples 
of larger situation definites. 
3.62 
3.63 
The Prime Minister has announced her resignation. 
I'm not going to the nine-o'clock lecture tomorrow. 
'Note that the turkey would be analysed as an associative anaphor o f  Christmas. 
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A token of 3.62 was broadcast on BBC R4 in November 1990 and in t h s  context. the UK. 
since there is an entity whch uniquely satisfies the descriptive predicate of the definite, this 
use i s  licensed by the availability and identifiability of a referent. This use would not have 
been appropriate on a BBC World Service broadcast. for example, since the identity of the 
intended referent would not be uniquely fixed by the definite in that context, where more than 
one female Prime Minister exists. Likewise, the hghlighted definite in 3.63 is appropriate 
between university class-mates, since there can only be one nine o'clock lecture each day in 
each course. 
Although we agree with Hawkins' observations and acknowledge that definites can be handled 
bjv distinguishing the two types of usage he proposes. we cannot conclude that a split between 
anaphoric and assertive defhtes is necessarily the only, or the best, way to account for the 
data. Rather than accepting that there is a catego? of assertive definites which is subject to 
stereotype restrictions, we could argue that there is no need for this category if bq' taking 
anaphora to include a very broad range of relations, we classier all definites as anaphoric. 
We will examine several aspects of the question of whether to split definites into assertive and 
anaphoric uses. First. we will tn' to determine the position of the putative division. 
Secondly, we will consider whether by accepting the existence of such a split between 
assertive and anaphoric definites we weaken other areas of our emerging characterisation of 
the EF scale. Thirdly, we will examine the evidence for the two competing analyses. 
3.2.2.2.1 The Position of the Dividing Line Between Assertive and 
Anaphoric Definites. 
Hawkins identifies three categories of definite usage whlch, he argues, employ anaphoric 
means: direct, indirect and associative anaphoric uses. If we could support an argument that 
the remaining three uses, visible, immediate and larger situation uses, are in any way more 
assertive than each of the first three categories we could confidently claim that what 
distinguishes anaphoric from assertive definites i s  whether the conditions which license their 
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use are linguistic or non-linguistic. However, if we consider examples of each t>pe of definite 
in terms of how assertive seeming they are, we find that the intuitive distinction does not 
accord with the linguist i chon -1ingu i st ic distinct ion. 
Linguistically licensed 
Table 3.4 




I saw a man. 
I bit the man. 
The chorus sounds tired. 
(at the opera) 
I swore at a policewoman. 
The oath appeared to offend her. 
I went to the church. 
I couldn't find the minister. 
Beware of the dog. 
The Prime Minister ate his peas. 
The examples of direct and indirect anaphoric use seem unequivocally non-assertive, as does 
the visible situation use and this instance of a larger situation use, although other examples 
such that in 3.63 appear less so. In contrast, the associative anaphoric use and the immediate 
situation use appear more assertive. However, even though there does not appear to be strong 
evidence of a clear distinction, we could argue that there are clear cases which accord with the 
linguistichon-linguistic distinction and that we could pay the price of treating the others as 
exceptional if there were theoretical as well as this rather ambivalent observational motivation 
for positing the split. 
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3.2.2.2.2. The Effect of an Assertive/Anaphoric Distinction. 
It is far from being an unprecedented step to propose a distinction between the contributions to 
the interpretation process of the linguistic and extra-linguistic context. It might even seem 
unaccountably squeamish to hesitate at all over employing this tactic. It is a general feature of 
many semantic theories that there is a dichotomy between the preceding discourse and the 
more general context of utterance. It is uncontroversial to categorise anaphoric and deictic 
pronouns separately and Hawkins' analysis of definites into first and second mentions relies on 
the acceptance of this kind of distinction. Formal theories very often take the further step of 
ignoring entirely the non-linguistic context. Such a decision can be justified for sentence-level 
model theoretic frameworks such as Montague Grammar but this type of division is also 
employed in current formal discourse-level approaches to first-mention definites as the 
following quotation from Kamp and Reyle's exposition of DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) 
shows. 
"The initial context ko for a given discourse should be a DRS incorporating that 
(relevant) information which is available to the recipient of the discourse at the 
point when he starts processing it. Nothing o f  importance is lost, however, zf we 
make the simplifying assumption that the initial context contains no 
information at all . " 
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993 (emphasis CMcP)) 
The result of this assumption is that none of Hawkins' class of first mention definites can be 
accounted for in Kamp and Reyle's framework. Clearly, we could not take the step of 
ignoring the context all together, but we must ask ourselves what would be the result for our 
emerging analysis if we were to make the weaker assumption that we can distinguish 
anaphoric and assertive definites along the linguistdcontextual split and account for them in 
different ways. T h ~ s  would involve anaphoric definites being anal)rsed as referring to objects 
whose existence is pre-established and assertive definites being analysed as referring to objects 
whose existence is expected or uncontroversial. Recall that we claimed that by accepting 
Werth's (1993) argument that some definites should be analysed as assertions, we could avoid 
the problem of ambiguous negation, since only in utterances in which the existential 
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propositions were not being asserted would it be possible for them to be negated. It would 
only be possible to continue to hold h s  assumption, and to distinguish assertive and 
anaphoric definites, if it could be shown that so-called assertive uses cannot be negated and 
that this results from the impossibility of simultaneously asserting and negating the same 
proposition.. 
A simple example can establish that for some utterances of negative sentences containing 
assertive definites whch are contextually licensed no interpretation is possible if it is the 
existential proposition which is the focus of negation. For example, if 3.64 is uttered in a 
situation where exactly one cat is visible, and the cat is interpreted as a reference to that cat, 
the sentence cannot be assigned the truth-value true on the basis of the truth of 34a.. 
3.64. 
3.64a. It does not exist. 
The cat does not belong to me. 
However, even though 3.64 on this reading is not true we cannot accept that this is a result of 
the fact that the speaker has contradicted her own assertion. It seems obvious that 3.64 will 
be judged to be false because the cat's existence is physically established and that the use of 
the definite merely reflects this. We conclude for visible situation uses. the existential 
propositions associated with definites cannot be negated but that this is not the result of the 
impossibility of simultaneous assertion and negation of the same proposition. This example 
does not allow us to conclude that definites are assertive. 
If we turn our attention to immediate situation uses, we find examples which suggest that the 
existential propositions associated with definites can be negated. Consider sentence 3.65 in a 
context where the speaker is calling to a stranger who has been knocking at their next-door 
neighbour's front door and is now walking round the side of the house. 
3.65. 
3.65a. It's padlocked. 
3.65b. There isn't one. 
The back door isn't open. 
page 86 
It is possible to negate sentence 3.65 (on the b. reading), but we could argue that the 
proposition that the back door exists is implied by the actions of the hearer not bq the 
speaker's use of the definite i.e. it is possible to argue that the use of the back door in 3.65 is 
not assertive. Stronger evidence still can be found in immediate situation uses where the 
existence of the referent of the definite is necessary rather than merelq. stereotypical since we 
find in these cases, such as 3.66, that negation is not possible. 
3.66. Alcoholism has not ruined the liver of this patient. 
3.66a. In fact. his liver is remarkably healthy. 
3.66b. This patient does not have a liver. 
Although it is not possible for 3.66 on the b. reading to be a true statement. we must attribute 
this to the impossibility of a human being without a liver. This example cannot be used as 
proof that there are such things as assertive definites which resist negation. 
An examination of larger situation uses reveals similar findings. Sentence 3.67 on the b. 
reading is not possible but this is because we know that the Prime Minister exists and that 
therefore a negation of the proposition that he exists is false. 
3.67. The Prime Minister has not died 
3.67a. But he is critically ill. 
3.67b. There is no such person. 
We conclude that if the defining characteristic of an asserted proposition is that it cannot be 
negated. then there is no evidence from the three first-mention uses of definites we have 
considered that they are assertive because in each case either the?. can be negated or the 
impossibility of negation must be analysed as originating elsewhere. 
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3.2.2.2.3" Evidence For and Against the Assertive/Anaphoric 
Distinction. 
We have claimed that if the stereotype requirement exists this allows two possible anallses of 
definites and indefinites. We will examine the case for each of the two analyses in turn. 
The strongest case for an analysis which distinguishes anaphoric from assertive definites 
would be if we could show that definites are not, in fact. restricted bjr a stereotype 
requirement; that is, if definites can be used to assert not only uncontroversial existential 
propositions but also controversial propositions, as these uses could not be analysed as 
anaphoric in any way. 
Ideally. we could reject this analysis by showing that definites which contravene the stereotype 
requirement are uninterpretable or lead to a breakdown in discourse. In our framework, 
discourse breakdown would be signalled bj. the hearer's inabilitj. to assign a truth-value. 
However, we can predict that whether or not the analysis is correct. \ye \vi11 not be able to 
show that the result is that the discourse breaks down whenever the stereotlpe requirement is 
flouted. since discourse participants, behaving co-operativel)., are normally able and willing to 
cam '  out quite substantial amounts of on-line repair and remedial w7ork on discourses (Brown 
and Yule. 1983). To formulate an argument in support of the stereot!pe requirement we 
must, therefore, find a way of by-passing the confounding influence of the co-operative 
principle12. We propose the following test. 
We assume that if a speaker erroneousljr assumes that the hearer has some piece of knowledge 
and makes an assertion which rests for its interpretation on the hearer's using this piece of 
knowledge then the hearer is entitled to draw attention to the speaker's error and request the 
missing information. For example, consider the small discourse in 3.68. 
3.68. A: I deny categorically that I ever did so and therefore 
B: Wait a minute! Did what? 
~~ 
12see the discussion in chapter 4 section 4.5 
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We will apply this "What? test" to the definite uses we have considered so far. 
Anaphoric: 
3.69. A: A man; came in. and then a woman and then, I think. a 
another woman might have. I definitely remember the man;. 
B: What man? 
Indirect anaphoric: 
3.70. A: I was behind a woman and her husband at the supermarket. 
The couple were having a raging argument. 
B: What couple? 
Associative anaphoric: 
3.71. A: I went to a wedding where the bride wore black. 
B: What bride? 
Visible situation (context as for 3.57.): 
3.72 A:  The ballerina looks tired. 
B: What ballerina? 
Immediate situation (context as for 3.65): 
3.73. A: The back door's locked. 
B: What back door? 
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Larger situation: 
3.74. A: The Prime Minister didn't eat his peas. 
B: What Prime Minister? 
These sentences all fail the What? test in that it does not appear that B's response in any of 
these cases can be interpreted as a legitimate request for missing information. In contrast. in 
3.75 and 3.76, although the definites are not uninterpretable, i.e. although the hearer can add 
the existential propositions required for their interpretation, we claim that the addition of these 
propositions should count as on-line repair of the discourse, a view which is supported by the 
fact that these definites pass the What? test i.e. the repair of the discourse can be undertaken 
overtly. 
3.75. A: I went to the church but couldn't find the giraffe. 
B: What giraffe? 
3.76. A: The Pharaoh has died. 
B: What Pharaoh? 
We can compare these with instances of uncontroversially assertive expressions which are not 
constrained by the stereotype requirement. What? questions in such cases can only be 




B: What marmoset? 
I have adopted a marmoset. 
A:  
B: What microwave sandwich toaster? 
A microwave sandwich toaster fell down my chimney last night. 
If we accept that such uses as those in 3.75 and 3.76. which would surel), flout an\.' stereotype 
requirement, can result in a potential breakdown of the discourse, we can argue that although 
the discourse may recover, we are not bound by our intention to account for definite usage to 
be able to analyse them. Therefore, we can conclude that all the definite uses kve must 
account for can be analysed using the notion of a stereotjpe requirement. 
A strong case can be made for the second possible analysis of definites, on which all definites 
are treated as anaphoric, by considering the occurrences of pronouns in the set of 
environments proposed by Hawkins for definites. We will show that for each of the six 
definite usage types there is a corresponding pronoun usage tjpe. Using these observations. 
we could either propose that there is a category of assertive pronouns or. assuming that 
pronouns cannot be analysed as assertive (a claim which can be backed up by applying the 
What? test), that the occurrence of definites in any of the six environments does not force us to 
analyse them as assertive either. 
3.2.2.3. Linguistically Licensed Uses of Pronouns. 
No argument is required to support the claim that pronouns can occur in straightfonvard CO- 
referential positions. We show in examples 3.78 and 3.79 below, that the environments 
Hawluns analyses as indirect anaphoric uses are also available to pronouns. 
3.78. M a v  got married last year. He's a dentist. 
3.79. I saw a man and a woman sitting on a bench 
The), were having a raging argument. 
There is a discussion in Kamp and Reyle (1 993) of the type of anaphora in 3.79 which they 
handle by means of what they call a summation operation, by which the discourse referent of a 
man is added to the discourse referent of a woman to obtain a third discourse referent which 
can serve as a straightfonvard antecedent, thus allowing they to be interpreted as a regular 
anaphoric pronoun. Summation can also be applied to antecedents, like that in 3.80, which 
have to be inferred from the linguistic context: 
gage 91 
3.80. My neighbour and I are both pregnant so they will be in the same 
class at school. 
Sentences 3.8 1. and 3.82. represent possible examples of pronominal associative anaphora. 
3.8 1. I went to the beauty salon but she was fully booked. 
3.82. When I got locked out of my flat I tried to get help at a fire station but they 
were all out on an emergency call. 
It appears that these sentences are as acceptable as the examples of associative anaphoric 
definites such as 3.54 (repeated here). 
3.54. I went to church but couldn't find the minister 
We conclude therefore, that pronouns have the same range of linguistically licensed uses as 
definites. 
3.2.2.3.1. Contextually Licensed Uses of Pronouns. 
As well as the accepted deictic uses of pronouns, which correspond to Hawkins' visible 
situation uses of definites, we can identify immediate and larger situation occurrences. 
Sentence 3.83. would be an acceptable utterance from a neighbour to a stranger knocking on 
the door of the next house. 
3.83. He's out. 
Likewise. sentence 3.84. could be appropriately uttered by a speaker to a stranger in the street 
who was looking in exasperation at a car which was boxing in her oun. 
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3.85. She's just gone into the dry-cleaners. 
The intuition is that these pronouns do not appear assertive on the What'? test, i.e. what? 
questions cannot be analysed as requests for missing information. 
Larger situation pronouns are not common. since there are few contexts in which a unique 
referent can be identified on the grounds of gender alone; however sentences 3.86 and 3 87 
would be plausible national newspaper headlines in the given contexts. 
3.86. It's over. (the royal marriage) 
3.87. He's innocent. (OJ Simpson) 
In summary, we cannot claim that every definite usage type is as unequivocally anaphonc 
seeming as the cases where the definite is dlrectly co-indexed with a co-referential indefinite 
antecedent. However, there does not appear to be sufficient evidence or other motivation for 
splitting the set of definites into two types; assertive and anaphoric. The contexts in Lvhich we 
find the "more assertive'' dehi tes  coincide with the contexts in which we find the "least 
assertive" indefinites. If we chose to ignore this and analyse first-mention definites as 
assertive. we would have to acknowledge that the existential assertions made using definites 
are constrained in a way that other existential assertions made using indefmites are not, and 
we would have to account for this. Furthermore, since the environments where definites 
occur are also available to pronouns, we would not be able to attribute the definites' assertive 
status to their occurrence in these environments, but would have to find some other 
explanation. For these reasons we conclude that it is preferable for all definites to be 
analysed as having pre-established EF, to take all definites to be anaphoric on a broad 
understanding of what constitutes anaphora. 
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3.2.2.4. The Uses of Names. 
Having decided that definites are to be associated exclusively with pre-established EF and 
restricted to the usage types discussed, we will now consider the question of the assertive 
potential of names. We will first test the six definite environments to see if names can occur 
in each of them. We will then try to establish whether the use of names is restricted to these 
environments or whether names can be used to assert the existence of entities more generally. 
Consider sentence 3.88 in which a name occurs in what, for definites and pronouns would be a 
straightforward anaphoric context. 
3.88. I met a fbend on the train. Graham was on his way to an interview. 
It is possible to interpret the indefinite and the name as coreferential. given a particular 
accenting pattern in which the name is given almost no prominence. If Graham in this 
sentence is accented, the reading is not available. If we apply the What? test (in this case the 
Who? test) to sentence 3.88, with Graham de-accented. we find. as was the case with 
anaphoric definites and pronouns that the sentence fails the test. 
3.89 A: I met a friend on the train. Graham was on his waj. to an intervieLv:. 
B: Who's Graham? 
Given this intonation, Who's Graham? can only be a request for extra information, not an 
on-line repair of the discourse. 
We will now consider each of the remaining five types of environments. 
Indirect anaphoric. 
3.90. A: I did not enjoy giving birth. Murdo was over twelve pounds. 
B: Who's Murdo? 
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Associative anaphoric. 
3.91. A: I quite like my family, although Margaret can be a pain. 
B: Who's Margaret? 
Visible situation: (at a party) 
3.92. A: Elaine is drunker than I've seen her before. 
B: Who's Elaine? 
Immediate situation (context as for 3.65): 
3.93. A: Norma is round the back. 
B: Who's Norma? 
The Who? question cannot, in any of these examples, be read as a legitimate request for 
missing information intended to facilitate repair work on the discourse. 
If we consider larger situation uses of names there is an interesting effect to be observed. We 
can say that it is part of our background knowledge about people that they have sets of family 
members, friends and acquaintances and that each of these individuals has a name. We might 
expect therefore that in any discourse there is a p-set of named individuals associated with 
each participant. This should permit a very general use of assertive seeming names, but this 
does not appear to be the case. The sentences in 3.94 and 3.96 both pass the What? test 
although the existential propositions they are associated with are no less stereotypical than 
those in 3.95 and 3.97 for which What? questions are not legitimate responses. 
3.94. I went out with Sonia last night. 
3.95a. The speaker knows someone called Sonia 
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3.95 I have left the dog in the car. 
3.95a. The speaker has a dog and a car 
3.96. I have just discovered that Graham has died. 
3.96a. The speaker knew someone called Graham. 
3.97. I have just discovered that the butler has died. 
3.97a. The speaker had a butler. 
We conclude that the uses of names appear to be constrained by a stereotype effect and that 
the possible range of p-sets in which the referents of names are to be located is restricted to 
some extent. Given these observations, there does not appear to be any justification for 
analysing any occurrences of names as instances of assertive EF. Instead, we will assume 
from now on that names are unambiguously associated with preestablished EF. 
3.2.2.5. The EF of Generics 
We proposed in section 3.1.2 that some uses of bare plurals should be analysed as containing 
a phonologically null determiner SM which is equivalent to the overt determiner sm and can 
be assigned assertive EF. However, since some bare plurals can only be interpreted as 
instances of generic reference, for example the highlighted expression in 3.98, we proposed a 
second phonologically null determiner GEN. 
3.98. Monkeys are always the most popular zoo animal. 
We propose that generics with the phonological forms of singular definites and indefinites, for 
example in 3.99 and 3.100 should be analysed as semantically equivalent to these bare plurals, 
by assuming the overt determiners to be paraphrases of the generic determiner GEN. 
3.99. The monkey is always the most popular zoo animal. 
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3.100. A monkey is always the most popular zoo animal. 
It must now be determined where on the existential scale generics should be placed. Carlson 
(1977, 1989) argues that two types of generic constructions, singular definites and bare 
plurals, should be analysed as proper names for "kinds of things'' since these, in contrast to 
singular indefinites, may occur with kind-level (e.g. 3.10 1) as well as object-level (e.g. 3.102) 
predicates. 
3.10 1. The Panda/Pandas/*A Panda is almost extinct. 
3.102. The Panda/Pandas/A Panda love(s) bamboo shoots. 
If singular definite and bare plural generics really are proper names, and our decision about 
the place of proper names on the EF scale is correct. then we would expect them to be 
associated with pre-established EF, but we must provide some reason for including singular 
indefinites at this level. Carlson's analysis of generics allows us to do this. 
We propose that all objects of any particular tjpe must be regarded as members of at least one 
stereotypical set, the set of all things of that type. In other words, for any individual who 
knows the meaning of the word dog (for example). the existential proposition that the set of all 
dogs exists can be regarded as a part of that individual's background knowledge during an!' 
discourse in which he or she participates. A non-generic specific indefinite can be then 
defined as an assertion of the existence of some particular entity in that set. We can then 
define a generic indefinite as a reference to some stereotlpical member of that set. This use is 
not an assertion, since the knowledge that such stereotlpical members exists must be pre- 
established. Bare plural and singular definite generics can be interpreted either as references 
to the set-membership as a whole (with kind-level predicates) or as further examples of 
references to stereotypical set members (with object-level predicates). In each case, pre- 
established EF is required. 
One potential objection to this analysis is that it appears that generics are regularly used to 
inform hearers of the existence of objects of some tjpe. Sentence 3.103. for example. would 
be appropriate in the setting of a lecture. 
3.103. Hyphomycetes are fungi which produces spores through pores. 
However, we can argue that the set <hyphomycete> is not necessarillr mutually accessible to 
the speaker and hearers of this discourse since an utterance of 3.103 does not constitute an act 
of generic reference to the set or to stereotypical members of the set, but instead an initial act 
of naming in the sense of Kripke (1 980) which introduces the set to the hearers. If we can 
analyse such acts of naming as distinct from acts of generic reference. the wa). is clear to 
claim pre-established EF for all instance of generic reference. 
3.2.2.6. The EF of Every. 
In semantic theories. such as Generalised Quantifier Theon. (Barwise and Cooper, 1984, 
Partee. ter Meulen and Wall, 1990) which view existential import as a binary logical feature, 
any quantifier or determiner whch does not entail existence has no EF. However, we will 
argue that every, for example, should be associated with a level of EF distinct from pre- 
established or assertive EF, but distinct also from the total absence of EF associated with the 
quantifier no. The examples in 3.104 and 3.105 show two distinct readings of every an 
existential reading in 3.104 and a non-existential reading in 3.1 OS. 
3.104. I thanked everyone who helped. They had been very kind. 
3.105 speaker A: So why didn't you write to me? 
speaker B: You didn't write to me! 
speaker A: I answered every letter I got. 
page 98 
To account for these two readings, we could say that every has no existential force and that 
the proposition (in 3.104) that there exists some individual who helped comes about as a 
result of the use of the pronoun they. However. it \vas argued in section 3.2.1.2 that a 
pronoun has pre-established EF, i.e. that the proper use of a pronoun requires that the 
existence of its referent is already established. The cross-sentential anaphors of every, if it 
was analysed as non-existential, would contradict our claims regarding this feature of the EF 
of pronouns. 
Kamp and Reyle (1993) discuss the cross-sentential anaphoric potential of every at some 
length and propose an operation which the17 call ubstruction, the function of which is to 
provide every with a discourse referent which can then be linked directly to the anaphor by 
co-indexing. This type of treatment accounts for the facts, but again the abstraction operation 
is triggered by the occurrence of the anaphoric pronoun rather than bjr the occurrence of the 
antecedent containing every. and so it appears that under their treatment too. a requirement 
that the existence of an anaphoric pronoun be pre-established is not met. 
It appears that if the treatment of every as an antecedent is not to interfere with the general 
requirement that the existence of referents for pronouns is pre-established. then every must be 
analysed as unequivocally associated with positive EF. However, the impossibility of this 
analysis is shown by the short discourse in 3.105 repeated here. where it is possible for all 
three sentences to be true. 
3.105 speaker A: So why didn't you write to me? 
speaker B: You didn't write to me! 
speaker A: I answered every letter I got. 
The truth of speaker A's second utterance rests on the possibility of a non-existential reading 
every allowing the interpretation of the utterance as an expression of the proposition that since 
she received no letters from B, it is true that there is no letter which she received but did not 
answer. Most 
naturally occurring instances from real discourse are jokes, such as 3.106: 
Non-existential readings for ever)! are not common, but they do occur. 
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3.106. Bernard Manning is not offensive to women. Every feminist with a sense of 
humour adores him. l 3  
Even though non-existential readings are stjlistically marked, because the sentences 
associated with them are true, we cannot simply disregard these instances as mis-uses. There 
is further motivation for a treatment of every which allows both readings Lvhen \ve consider a 
problem identified by Fodor (1 979) in her account of the asymmetry of opaque predicates. 
Fodor characterised the asymmetry between the affectedness of the arguments of an opaque 
predicate such as think of by stating that, given two individuals, Xenon and Yolande, of 
which only Xenon is accessible, there is "nothing we can do" to Xenon to bring about a state 
of affairs about which sentence 3.107. is a true statement. 
3.107. Yolande is thinking about Xenon. 
If we have access to Yolande alone, on the other hand. Fodor observes that we can bring about 
the state of affairs w l c h  3.108 describes. 
3.108. Yolande is thinking about everyone who is eating cheese. 
The problem Fodor identifies with this analysis is that: 
"given that Yolande is thmking about evevone who is eating cheese, then 
by getting Xenon to eat cheese it would appear that we could make it true 
that Yolande is thinking about Xenon." 
(Fodor, 1979: 2 15) 
Given an analysis of every, which allows both existential and non-existential readings, the 
solution to this problem is easily identified. A sentence such as 3.108 is true if and only if 
every member of a set of people who are eating cheese is accessible to Yolande. In other 
13The semantic plurality of every which contrasts with its syntactic single number can also be 
cancelled and this also appears usually to be feature of jokes. For example: Every Tory voter in 
Scotland has turned out to greet you, Prime Minister. Shall I show him in? 
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words, the possibility of this statement being true rests on the possibility of an existential 
reading of every whch facilitates a de re interpretation of everyone who is eating cheese. If 
we add Xenon to the set, the set membership changes, it may no longer be the case that 
Yolande has access to the entire set of people who are eating cheese, and so the statement may 
no longer be true. Sentences such as 3.109, however, do not show this effect. 
3.109. Yolande, a vegan, would like to kill everyone who is eating cheese. 
The truth of 3.109 does not require an existential reading of every and in these cases. on a de 
dicto reading of everyone who is eating cheese, we can add Xenon to the set of cheese-eaters 
without causing a change in the truth-value of the sentence. 
The preceding discussion indicates that the most satisfactory analysis of every is one which 
accounts for its cross-sentential anaphoric potential and allows for the infrequent instances 
where it must be understood as non-existential. We conclude that the EF of every should be 
analysed as a strong, but cancellable. implicature. 
Implicature as characterised by Grice (Grice 1975) is a scale of declining strength with three 
slots; conventional (for example the temporal ordering conveyed bq’ and). generalised 
conversational (for example, the causality conveyed by therefore) and particularised 
conversational implicatures. Since we are attempting to show that existential force is also best 
seen as a scale of declining strength. it is worth looking to see if the various determiners which 
are not associated with pre-established or assertive EF. could be slotted into the spaces on the 
Gricean scale with respect to their existential import. 
Grice defined typical conventional implicatures as determinate and uncancellable, in contrast 
with generalised conversational implicatures whch are typically indeterminate and 
cancellable. The existential implicature associated with every, however, is determinate in that 
it always concerns the existence of some entity in the denotation of the common noun it 
quantifies, but is cancellable. It i s  immediately clear that existential implicatures will not fit 
neatly into the Gricean scale. We will not therefore, pursue the classification of this and the 
weaker levels of EF using the standard characteristics of conventional or conversational 
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implicatures, but will simply say that every is associated with the strongest possible 
cancellable implicature of existence, which allows subsequent pronominal reference to the 
object whose existence it suggests (as in 3.104) and that cancellation of the existential 
implicature is stylistically marked. 
We cannot end a discussion of the existential readings and anaphoric potential of every 
without considering the issue of donkey anaphora. Sentences such as 3.1 10 have been 
notoriously problematic for analyses which translate every into the universal quantifier of 
classical predicate logic since in the logical translation the last x and y variables are outside 
the scope of the quantifier and yet the interpretation of the sentence demands that the pronouns 
are bound by the quantifier, since the reference of he and it vary according to the reference of 
a farmer and a donkey. 
3.1 1 0. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
3.11Oa. Vx (farmer (x) & 3y(donkey(y)) & onms (x,!,)) beats (x,y) 
The Discourse Representation Theory approach to quantification and anaphora has solved the 
problem of the translation of donkey sentences into predicate logic formulae. We cannot go 
into the details of the DRT approach here, but very briefly. DRT introduces an intermediate 
stage (the Discourse Representation Structure) between the sentence in natural language and 
the logical translation. At this stage every is represented as a conditional and nekv variables 
are introduced which serve as "discourse referents'' for the pronouns. This DRS is then 
translated into predicate logic as: 
3.1 lob. Vxy ((farmer(x) & donkev * I  (v) & owns (x,y) -+ 3uv (U = x & v = y 
& beats (u,v))) 
On the approach to the interpretation of every taken in the current thesis. donkey anaphora is 
not a particularly problematic issue. It appears that the interpretation of every in donkey 
sentences, as in other contexts, can be either existential or non-existential, since there are 
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acceptable continuations which both uphold and cancel the existential implicature. 
example: 
For 
3.1 10. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
a. Thankfully The Sun has adopted all of them and put them out to grass at 
Southend. 
b. Their suffering is indescribable. 
Whether every is interpreted existentially or non-existentially, it seems the sentences are best 





If a farmer owns a donkey, he or she beats it. 
Farmers ~ 7 h o  wn donkeys beat them. 
The farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
In any case the problem of the fixing referents for he and it does not arise if we accept the 
broad characterisation of anaphora proposed by Hawkins (1 978) and discussed in section 
3.2.2.2. above. 
3.2.2.7. The EF of Any and Few. 
We would expect to find, in expressions mith weaker existential implicatures than that 
associated with every, either less potential for the expression to appear in antecedents of 
cross-sentential anaphoric pronouns, or that the cancellation of the existential implicature 
would be less stylistically marked, or both. 
There does not appear to be any strong evidence that any and few are less able than every to 
hnction as cross-sentential antecedents. The following three examples seem equalll- 
acceptable. 
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3.1 15. I am determined to kill every rabbit living in my garden. The\, have eaten all 
my seedlings two years in a roLv. 
3.1 16. I am determined to kill any rabbit living in my garden. They are eating 
everything I plant withm a day. 
3.117. So far I have witnessed very few rabbits in the act, but at least I have been 
able to kill them14. 
However, there does appear to be evidence that the existential propositions associated with 
any and few are more readily cancellable than those associated with every (e.g. 3.118 
compared with 3.1 19) and that their cancellation does not have so marked a stylistic effect 
(e.g. 3.120 compared with 3.121.). 
3.1 18. ??I expect I will be bitten by every hamster in the show, but luckily only 
dogs and cats are entered. 
3.1 19. I am free to discuss my case with any doctor in the hospital, which would 
be more of a comfort if the Trust could afford to have doctors on the staff. 
3.120. ??I plan to dance with every woman in the room, and since it is an all-male 
gathering that will leave plenty of time for cards, 
141n addition to this type of anaphoric link, few can also occur as an antecedent for what we might 
call complementary anaphors, such as them in sentence 3,113. 
3.113. So far I have managed to kill very few rabbits, but I am determined that I will get 
them in the end. 
The referent of the highlighted pronoun in 3.113 is the complement of the sub-set of rabbits picked 
out by the expression very few rabbits. This referent is located by subtracting the referent of very 
few rabbits from the p-set of rabbits in the discourse context. It is a general feature of monotone 
decreasing determiners such as few, less, and no that they can serve as antecedents for 
complementary anaphors. 
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3.12 1. I will happily promise to luss any frog in the pond since I know there are 
only goldfish and ducks. 
We propose, on the strength of these of examples, that the EF of the quantifiers any and few 
should be analysed as a level of implicature weaker than that associated with the EF of every. 
Before we leave the discussion of the EF of any, we will consider the question of whether 
there is any support from existential aspects of the meaning of any, for an analysis of this 
quantifier as ambiguous between two readings: any1 w h c h  is polarity sensitive (e.g. 3.122) 
and any2 which has been called "free context any'' (e.g. 3.123) (Ladusaw 1979). 
3.122. I have never seen any 1 dolphins in Scottish waters. 
3.123. Any2 cabby will let you pay by cheque if you tip in cash. 
The label "free-context any" is somewhat misleading. since the contexts, besides negatives, in 
which any may occur are highl!. constrained; being restricted to modal contexts (e.g. 3.123). 
antecedents of conditionals (e.g. 3,124). and generics (e.g. 3.125). 
3.124. If I hear anything, I'll ring you. 
3.125. I like any food with lots of calories. 
There does not appear to be an>' reason to analyse any as ambiguous with respect to the 
strength of its EF since if we simply extend the set of permissible contexts for the single 
unambiguous any to encompass both so-called free-context positions and positions within the 
scope of a negation operator we can say that in each environment the existential proposition 
can either be cancelled or upheld and that the resulting truth-value is predictable. For 
example, 3.126 and 3.127 are acceptable on either the a or the b readings. 
3.126. Any dragon would nip you over the channel for a fiver. 
3.126a. And it is usually easy to find one. 
3.126b. But since there are none you will have to pay the fern. fare. 
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3.127. I have never seen any mermaids in Scottish waters. 
3.127a. But I know that there are lots of them. 
3.127b. I am not too hopeful of doing so since there are none. 
Unlike the continuations of statements with expressions containing every however. the b 
versions of 3.126 and 3.127 which cancel the existential implicature of any seem marginally 
less marked than the a versions which uphold it. Furthermore. the most acceptable 
continuations tend to be ones in which the pronoun which picks out the referent of the 
expression containing any, is not in a completely transparent context. Both of these 
observations offer further corroboration of our analysis of the EF of any as an extremely 
weak implicature. 
3.2.2.8. The EF of no. 
The lowest level on the scale of EF is that associated with the determiner no and its 
pronominal variant none, e.g. the object NPs in 3.128 and the second conjunct of 3.129. 
3.128. The pet shops around here have no bilingual hamsters. 
3.129. I wanted a bilingual hamster but the pet shop had none. 
The EF of no and none is straightforward to classify since the function of no in some NP is to 
assert the nonexistence in the context of any entities which satisfq. the descriptive predicate of 
the NP. The precise details of the interpretation of determiners such as no and none have a 
attracted a degree of interest in formal approaches to quantification whch analyse no as 
containing a quantifier and a negation operator (Maj., 1985). The focus of such work has 
mainly been to provide a translation into a logical language in which the relative scope of the 
quantifier and the negation operator reflects the interpretation of the corresponding sentence in 
natural language. For example, such theories seek to reflect the truth-conditional non- 
equivalence of sets of sentences such as 3.130. - 3.1 32. 
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3.130. I did not tell everyone. 
3.13 1. I did not tell anyone. 
3.132. I told no one. 
With respect to the purely existential features of no and none, there may be semantic effects 
to be observed relating to a possible distinction between references to backgrounded 
propositions of non-existence and new assertions of non-existence, but this potential area of 
research lies beyond the scope of the present stud),. We conclude simply that expressions 
containing the determiners no and none are incompatible with the existence of an!’ referent of 
the type denoted by the descriptive predicate. 
3.3. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we have concentrated on the existential possibilities associated with linguistic 
expressions. We have argued that to account for the pattern of occurrences of NPs of 
different types, and the anaphoric potential of these NPs we must recognise that existential 
force is a scalar phenomenon comprising five levels and that NP types should be placed on the 
existential scale in the order in which we have discussed them above: names, pronouns, 
definites and generics at the highest level, followed by indefinites, every N, any N and few N, 
and no N.  In the next chapter we turn our attention to the problem of the existential 
possibilities associated with entities. We will formulate a theory of possible worlds which 
allows us to account for the types of existence which hold of entities. as opposed to linguistic 
categories, and in the following chapter, we combine both types of existential features to 




Existential Features of Entities. 
4.1. Types of Existence. 
There is a long and prolific body of work in the phdosophcal discipline concerning questions 
of existence' which the current thesis, to a large extent. ignores. The justification for our 
decision not to discuss the philosophical work on existence in any detail must be that our 
interest in the questions surrounding this area is of a very limited and specific kmd. We are 
seelung to account for the effect that the existence and non-existence of objects has on the use 
of referring expressions as attempts to pick out these objects. Our first concern is to develop 
whatever approach to the existence of entities and the status of possible worlds will allow an 
accurate and linguistically well-motivated characterisation of reference and truth-value 
assignment. Although we would not posit any view of the existence of entities which flies in 
the face of established philosophical views. without some compelling motivation, our aim is to 
construct a linguistic, not a philosophcal theory. 
To return to the question of types of existence, we could prehct that a philosophically naive 
informant, if asked to decide how many kinds of existence there were. b\r making a decision 
about how many occupiable slots there were on a scale between existence and non-existence, 
would replJr that there were two; that either something exists (e.g. the King of Jordan) or it 
does not exist (e.g. the Queen's second daughter); that there can be no middle ground. 
However. although thls limitation is initially appealing on an intuitive level for such clear cut- 
cases, it appears less useful when we consider the list of entities in 4.01. 
4.01. John Major, Pitt the Younger, Santa Claus, 
Bilbo Baggins, Chelsea Clinton's sister. 
It is to be expected that there would be considerable disagreement in any attempt to distribute 
these individuals between the two slots. It would be reasonable to claim that only John Major 
for example, Carnap (1 947). Strawson (1 950), Quine (1 953). Geach (1 959). Kripke (1 980) 
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exists, but it would be equally reasonable to claim of the non-existent entities that they each 
fail to exist in distinct ways. We could say that Pitt the Younger does not exist any more; 
Santa Claus does not exist outside European folklore; Bilbo Baggins does not exist outside 
Middle Earth; and Chelsea Clinton's sister does not exist at all. So might this mean that we 
must. after all, recognise a variety of levels of existence? If we want to avoid such a step and 
instead retain the binary logical definition of existence, we could reason that each of the "non- 
existent" entities can be characterised bv a distinct exception to its non-existence. 
But if we accept that there are exceptions to the non-existence of the "non-existent entities", it 
is unclear on what grounds we could continue to define them as non-existent. This becomes 
still harder to defend when we reflect that the entity (John Major) which we defined as having 
existence in an ideal sense, itself fails to exist in some of the other locations. For example, 
John Major does not exist in European Folklore or in various fictional locations such as 
Middle Earth. It is more straightfoward. in view of this observation, to sa). that John Major, 
Santa Claus and Bilbo Baggins all exist, but in different locations. This allows us to continue 
to hold the concept of existence as an essentially binary propem, since any entity either exists 
or does not exist at some location. Furthermore, if we are prepared to accept the idea, 
generally assumed in formal semantics, that the same spatial location at two different times 
constitutes two separate locations i.e. that the slots in which entities occur are best 
characterised as indices which are space-time pairs, then we can also claim that Pitt the 
Younger and John Major exist at different locations. 
On the other hand, when we say that Chelsea Clinton's sister does not exist at all, what we are 
saying is that there are no identifiable exceptions to her non-existence, no easily named or 
recognised location in which she might exist. We are not saying that there is no conceivable, 
potential exception to her non-existence. We are happy to accept that, in some location, an 
individual might have existed or might yet exist who could be referred to as Chelsea Clinton's 
sister. On the basis of ths, we propose a further type of existential location, which can be 
called a possible (although non-actual) location and we are now able to claim that all of the 
entities in 4.01 exist, in a range of locations. 
page 109 
The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter are taken up with a dscussion of one 
particular view of what might constitute the set of actual and potential existential locations; 
that is, the notion of a set of possible worlds. 
4.2. Possible Worlds. 
The way in which possible worlds are put to se in the current thes' 
from their original purpose in modal logic and from their place 
differs considerably both 
in model theoretic formal 
semantics. The notion of possible worlds was first used in the field of logical linguistics in the 
analysis of the semantics of alethic modal statements (Lyons. 1977). Necessary truth had 
been defined by Leibniz as truth in all possible worlds and contingent truth, as truth in at least 
one possible world. From this basis. a characterisation of all of epistemic and deontic 
modality in terms of possible worlds could be derived. Possible worlds used for this purpose 
can be thought of as alternative (non-anomalous) states-of-affairs (McCawlelr, 198 1) or 
simply ''ways in which the world could have been2" (Allwood, Andersson and Dahl. 1977). In 
Montague Grammar, a set of possible worlds is included as one of the primitives of the model 
with respect to which m y  sentence. not only sentences expressing modal statements, is 
evaluated. Here, the set of possible worlds has identical ontological status to the set of 
primitive entities, the set of primitive times and the denotation assignment function. The truth- 
conditional meaning of a declarative sentence, in Montague Grammar, is therefore taken to be 
the truth-value of that sentence with respect to some model which specifies a sub-set of 
entities, a denotation assignment function, a particular world, and a particular time (Cann, 
1993; Dowty, Wall and Peters, 1981). 
In short, the employment of an infinite set of possible worlds is now unremarkable in linguistic 
semantics3 as well as in the fields of logic and philosophy. However, although possible 
worlds are in general use as a theoretical tool, there is a considerable amount of disagreement 
surrounding them. There are several distinct and contradictory definitions of possible worlds 
2or "must have been" or in deontic modal statements "ways in which the world is obliged/permitted 
to be" or in epistemic modal statements "ways in which the world is believedknown to be". 
see for example Bradley and Swartz (1979); McCawley (1981); Green (1 989): Cann (1  993) 
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and little consensus concerning what exactly they are. Two main classes of definition stand 
out. 
According to one type of definition, a possible world is a type of enti5. This definition 
derives originally from Wittgenstein's definition of a world. To define the real world, 
Wittgenstein proposed an ontology which consisted of four primitives: objects and individuals. 
which together make up the class of items. and properties and relations, which together make 
up the class of attributes. He proposed that items and attributes together make up states of 
affairs and then defined the real world as 'the totality of actually existing states of affairs" 
(Wittgenstein, 1921). By analogy with this definition of the real ~ o r l d .  we can give a 
definition of a possible world as an entity which is the totality of some set of possibly existing 
states of affairs . 
Other logicians, philosophers and linguists have taken possible worlds to be abstract 
constructs. For example, for McCawley. a possible world is an abstract linguistic construct 
defined as "any assignment of the values true and false to all propositions of a given 
l a n g ~ a g e " ~ .  An impossible world is defined as one which does not conform nith the rules of 
lnference in a given system (McCawley, 1981). Similarl~~. Allwood, Andersson, and Dahl 
define a possible world as "the set of propositions whch are true in it (and thus describe it)." 
(Allwood, Anderson, and Dahl, 1977). 
In contrast to both of these stances, some linguists acknowledge the philosophical problems 
which seem to be inherent in the concept of possible worlds but explicitly set aside the issue 
and rely on a functionally and technically adequate definition. For example C a m  (1993). 
makes no decision about the status of possible worlds but treats them as abstract constructs: 
4McCawley actually uses the term "non-anomalous state of affairs" but explicitly states that the term 
is intended to be synonymous with "possible world", 
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"...the adoption of a set of primitive worlds is somewhat mysterious ... the 
ontological status of possible worlds has been the subject of much 
phlosophcal debate, but it is not my intention to go into this. If we assume 
that possible worlds are theoretical constructs (whose ontological status is 
similar to other mathematical constructs) then what we as linguists need to do 
is assess their usefulness in acheving the general aims of semantic theory.. . I '  
(Cann, 1993: p270) 
Other linguists appear to attempt to reap the benefits of a particular view of the nature of 
possible worlds while leaving an escape route to be used if the holding of that particular view 
entangles them in philosophical difficulties. For example, Fodor (1979) would like to claim 
that possible worlds are more like real entities than abstract constructs but in the end ducks 
the argument: 
' I . . .  I shall assume an ontology of possible worlds ... The "psychologically real" 
ontology is the one relevant to explaining the semantics of a natural language. even 
if upon examination it proves indefensible as a theory of Lvhat "reallj~ exists" in our 
universe. But in an)' case, as far as I can determine the references in what follows 
to non-real worlds and individuals are innocent and could be translated bq' anyone 
Lvho is squeamish about them into less loaded (though also less vivid) terms." 
(Fodor, 1979: p2) 
Not all philosophers take any more seriously than linguists the problem of the actual nature of 
possible worlds. For example, the philosophers Robert Bradley and Norman Swartz in their 
text book on possible worlds assume with little preliminary argument that possible worlds are 
abstract entities theoretically equivalent to such other abstract entities as numbers (Bradley 
and Schwarz, 1979). However. Lewis (1986) expounds a theory of possible worlds, which he 
calls modal realism, that consists in a kind of super-real definition of a possible world. He 
holds the view that all possible worlds actually exist. i.e. that they have the same existential 
status as the real world, and argues at length against approaches which allow possible worlds 
into their ontology as abstract entities; labelling the resulting theories scathingly as examples 
of various kinds of "ersatzism" and claiming that definitions such as McCawley's (linguistic 
ersatzism) are no more than attempts to gain "paradise on the cheap"; by which we can take it 
that he means to suggest that they are unacceptable attempts to exploit the power which 
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possible worlds contribute to a theory without having to countenance what even he admits is 
the counter-intuitive notion that all possible worlds "actually" exist. 
However, given that our interest is specifically linguistic, we are inclined to give more weight 
than Lewis to linguistic arguments in favour of one or the other type of definition. In fact. 
even from some linguistic points of view there is conflicting motivation. It is problematical to 
argue from a purely formal linguistic framework that worlds are in any way distinct from their 
descriptions since the utility of possible worlds is bound up with. and inseparable from, the 
characteristic property that two worlds are distinct if and only if there is some statement in a 
language that is true in one world but false in the other. If possible worlds are analysed as 
existent entities, then two worlds may be distinct even if for every statement in a language the 
truth-value of that statement in one world is matched by its truth-value in the other. 
On the other hand, if possible worlds are analysed as existent entities the linguistic problem of 
characterising translation is simplified. since we can say that given two languages L1 and L2 
and two statements 4 and i + ~  in L1 and L2 respectively, $ can be defined as a translation of \v 
if and only if the set of worlds in which 4 is true i s  identical to the set of worlds in which \v is 
true? If possible worlds are not analysed as existent entities but as partitions on a 
vocabulary. then it becomes impossible to define translatability since the set of possible 
worlds described by L1 is of necessity distinct from that described by L2. 
Despite such difficulties, there are several reasons why, in the context of the current thesis. it 
is not satisfactory to leave the problem of the essential nature of possible worlds on one side 
and simply use the notion as a theoretical tool. We aim to define each possible world in terms 
of its accessibility from, and proximity to, other worlds and in this way to build an extremely 
structure-rich arrangement of worlds in which each individual world is uniquely determined 
along a number of mutually independent parametersh. In the pursuit of this aim we have to 
provide answers to a number of specific questions concerning properties of possible worlds 
this can be parameterised to handle near misses. 
%ee, for example. chapter 5 ,  section 5.1.1 
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such as whether it is possible for worlds to be ~nderspecified~ or whether there is any such 
thing as a impossible world. 
Since the features of possible worlds are to be defined relationally, our task is only possible if 
we can start from one world which has its nature and features independently fixed and define 
other worlds comparative to it. The world which appears to be the best candidate to be 
defined external to the theory is the real world. If we accept that the real world is the most 
likely world to be an existent entity and we agree to accept our intuitive judgement about what 
the real world is, then by deciding to view all other possible worlds as essentially the same as 
the real world (i.e. as existent entities) we are able to make predictions about the properties of 
worlds about which we have no direct knowledge. There is in addition some specifically 
linguistic motivation for analysing possible non-actual worlds as equivalent to the real world 
in that there is no evidence from the comparison of the behaviour of the real world with that of 
non-real worlds in discourse which convinces us of the necessity to treat them as essentially 
different. In fact, there are several potential problems involving reference and truth-value 
assignment which are most easily handled if all worlds, real and non-real. are taken to be of 
the same kind. 
However, one problem with the modal realistic view is that it is difficult to give a definition of 
the primitive entities of which worlds consist. If we return to Wittgenstein’s definition of a 
world as a totality of states of affairs made up of items and attributes, it is easy to see that, on 
a modal realistic approach, we can define in a straightforward wa\. what the set of items in a 
world contains: concrete objects such as tables, squirrels and Zsa-Zsa Gabor: groups of 
concrete objects such as species, generations and forests; concrete masses such as oceans, 
deserts and wine. It is hardly more problematic to accept the existence of abstract objects 
such as ideas and numbers; groups of abstract objects such as manifestos; and abstract 
masses such as integrity and love. However, it is difficult to define the nature of the other 
type of primitive entity; the set of attributes. 
7c.f. chapter 5 ,  section 5.3.1 
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If a world is an abstract linguistic construct then the set of attributes is defined in a 
straightforward way by the denotation assignment function, but if worlds exist independently 
of any language then properties and relations cannot be defined in this way. We are forced 
simply to accept the notion that worlds contain two types of primitive entities: items - things 
in the world, and attributes; ways that things are. Note that we define attributes as ways that 
things in worlds are and not ways that worlds are. This reflects our claim that sentences are 
about individuals in worlds not about worlds themselves and that statements are true of 
entities in worlds not true of worlds themselves. 
4.3 The Choice of Reference World. 
Clearly a participant in some discourse can refer to and make statements about things which 
do not exist in the world in which the discourse takes place. For example, Sentences 4.02 - 
4.05 can be read as tokens of true statements about entities which exist in four worlds which 
are, in various ways, distinct from the world in which this thesis is being written. 
4.02. 
4.03. 
4.04. Bilbo baked bread. 
4.05. 
The sun never sets on the British Empire. 
Sherlock Holmes puffed on hs pipe and pondered. 
The Tooth Fairy had a busy night. 
The British Empire picks out an entity Lvhich exists in the same world at an earlier stage; 
Sherlock Holmes picks out an entity in the fictional counterpart of the real world described in 
the novels of Arthur Conan Doyle; Bilbo picks out an entity which exists in the fictional world 
Middle Earth, and the Tooth Fairy picks out an entiqr which exists in what we could call a 
mythological counterpart of the real world. As well as such earlier, fictional or mythological 
worlds, discourse participants are also able to invoke an infinite variety of other worlds "off 
the cuff'. For example, we would expect that first-time hearers or readers of 4.06 would be 
unable to interpret it in any other way than as a factual statement about an entirely unfamiliar 
world. 
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4.06. Chelsea Clinton's sister had a tummy tuck. 
In addition, speakers can also invoke what we could call temporary counterparts or 
alternatives to the real world. The sentences in 4.07 and 4.08, for example, might be read not 




Chelsea Clinton's sister might be called Belgravia. 
My daughter would never play with Power Rangers8. 
Having proposed the inclusion in our ontology of a set of possible worlds which include such 
unfamiliar worlds as that in which Chelsea Clinton's sister exists, there is no rationale for 
ruling out any world in which Chelsea Clinton's sister has, or does not have. any particular 
property. If we accept, for example, the existence of a world in which Chelsea Clinton's sister 
exists we must inevitably recognise the existence of a world in which Chelsea Clinton's sister 




Chelsea Clinton's sister had a tummy tuck. 
There is a world in which Chelsea Clinton's sister had a tummy tuck. 
If we analyse every referring expression as picking out an entit_)r in some possible world, we 
are forced to accept that, for any sentence we utter, there is some world in which it is true (and 
some world in whch it is false). But we are not proposing that the role of possible worlds in 
the process of interpretation and truth-value assignment is to facilitate the analysis of sentence 
tokens as true statements, since recognising that there must be some world in which a sentence 
is true, is clearly distinct from judging a particular utterance of that sentence to be true. In 
other words, any particular token of sentence 4.09 is not inevitably perceived as true, on the 
basis that sentence 4.10 is necessarily true. If we believe that any sentence that is not 
81n a context in which the speaker has no children 
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anomalousg is true in some possible world, and if we were to accept 4.10 as an accurate 
paraphrase of 4.09, rather than merely an entailment. it would follow that any utterance of 
any non-anomalous sentence would be trivially true, and hence massively uninformative. We 
claim instead that a knowledge of truth-conditions is not part of interpretation, but rather a 
prerequisite for successfbl interpretation. Knowledge of lexical meaning and syntax between 
them constitute the potential ability to state the truth-conditions of any of the infinite number 
of possible sentences of a language. But this does not enable any language user to assign a 
truth-value to so much as one utterance of any of these sentences. We could say that knowing 
what a sentence means - knowing its truth-conditions - relies on our (possibly unconscious) 
acceptance that a sentence is true in some possible world. However. this knowledge alone 
never leads to an assignment of a truth-value of true. Likewise, knowing a sentence's truth- 
conditions entails that we accept that there is (at least) one world where that sentence is false 
but this does not lead us to interpret any utterance of that sentence as false. 
The process of interpretation may consist of many more tasks than truth-value assignment 
although it is our contention that truth-value assignment is an essential part of the 
interpretation of the utterance of any proposition. The simplest type of interpretation process 
therefore consists of truth-value assignment alone. This is the case when the intended 
communicative effect of some utterance is notlung more than the transference of the 
information contained in the proposition lexically encoded by the sentence. However, even in 
this simplest of cases, it is rarely the hearer's aim to assign the truth-value true to an 
utterance. The hearer's aim is to assign the appropriate truth-value according to whether or 
not the utterance reflects a state of affairs in an accurate way, and since truth-values are 
defined with respect to particular referents, and referents are to be located in any of a variety 
of worlds, we can say that an important initial step in the process of truth-value assignment i s  
the choice of reference world. 
The entities with respect to whch the speaker intends some statement to be evaluated must in 
every case (including all of those in 4.06 - 4.10 above) be inferred by the hearer. That is. 
excepting the referents of deictic expressions (although even in these cases the hearer must 
91n chapter 5 we discuss the question of  anomaly when we consider whether there are such things as 
impossible worlds. 
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decide that they are deictic) the referent has to be located by the hearer. To say that the hearer 
must locate the referent, having claimed that the hearer must recognise that potential referents 
exist in an infinite number of distinct possible worlds, is equivalent to saying that the hearer 
must choose which possible world is the correct location for the referent of an NP in any 
particular case. 
The choice of reference world, as part of the process of interpretation, could be seen as the 
result of a decision about how far a hearer will go towards the possible world where any 
sentence is true. The important task for this thesis is to identify the rules which govern the 
amount and kmd of world-shifting which goes on during interpretation. 
To determine whether the rules we propose are correct. ~ 7 e  will rellr on native speaker intuition 
and to harness our intuitions it is necessary to disregard some lunds of discourse contexts 
since they are associated with fixed conventions with regard to how much world-shifting is 
permitted to take place during the interpretation of utterances which occur in them. Contexts 
in which unconstrained world-shifting takes place include storytelling discourses. Contexts 
where any world shifting is prohibited include the giving of courtroom evidence, where not 
only are false factual statements about the real world viewed as such, rather than as true 
factual statements about some other world, but modal statements are constrained 2nd it is not 
permissible to state propositions which rely on certain types of knowledge, such as hearsay. 
However, courtroom evidence apart, the intuition is that it is rarely the case that the real world 
has the kind of exceptional status in terms of truth-value assignment which is sometimes 
claimed for it (e.g. in Russell's and Strawson's approaches to reference and truth-value 
assignment). We claim that hearers do not generally interpret as true only those sentences 
which are true of entities in the real world. Nor are true-in-the-real-world sentences 
interpreted as in some way more true than other sentences. For example, we claim that 
sentences 4.11 and 4.12 are equally open to an interpretation which assigns to them a truth- 
value of true even though the named entity in 4.1 1, Mr Major. is an inhabitant of the current 




Mr Major wears a grey suit. 
Santa Claus wears a red suit. 
We might want to say that Santa Claus exists in the current world in that representations of 
him exist in the current world and in the overwhelming majority of these he is depicted 
wearing a red suit. We could then be forced to admit that both 4.1 1 and 4.12 are true 
statements about entities which exist in the current world. If indeed Santa Claus is the name 
of a set of entities of a recognised type which exist in the current world we can explain why 
sentence 4.12a. is perceived to be true and roughly equivalent to sentence 4.12. 
4.12a. Santa Clauses wear red suits. 
However, we can identify properties which hold of Santa Claus, the entity which exists in 
mythology, but not of the Santa Clauses, i.e. the representation of Santa Claus. pictorial or 
animated, which exist in the real world. 4.12b. and 4 . 1 2 ~ .  show examples of these: 
4.12b. Santa Claus comes down chimneys in the middle of the night. 
4 . 1 2 ~ .  Santa Clauses come down chmneys in the middle of the night. 
For 4.12b. to be perceived as true it must be a statement about the mjthological entity rather 
than the set of real world entities; it cannot be paraphrased as 4 . 1 2 ~ .  without a change in 
truth-value to-false. Since 4.12b. is indeed perceived as a true statement we can conclude that 
the name Santa Claus in it picks out a entity which does not exist in the current world. 
To summarise, we can say that to know what a sentence means, to know its truth-conditions, 
is to recognise the necessary properties of the possible worlds in which it is true and the 
necessary properties of the possible worlds in which it is false. and this in turn requires the 
implicit acceptance that there is some possible world in which it is true and some possible 
world in which it is false. However, there is no motivation in the process of interpretation and 
truth-value assignment to take the step from the knowledge that an utterance represents a 
sentence that is true in some possible world to the judgement that the same utterance expresses 
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a true statement with respect to a specific world; i.e. that it will be perceived as true once the 
reference world has been chosen. During truth-value assignment, the identity of the world or 
worlds in which referents are to be located. far from being given in advance. has to be fixed 
as part of the process of interpretation. We will call this view of the process of the 
interpretation of referring expressions, which states that a referent must be located in one of a 
set of possible worlds in this way, a location theory of reference. 
The term "location" has been used before in connection with questions of reference, in 
Hawkins (1978; 1984). Hawkins claims that some uses of definites and indefinites instruct 
the hearer to locate a referent in a p-set. a shared set of entities (Hawkins. 1978: 167). For 
example, the use of the definite in 4.13, on Hawkins theory. would constitute an instruction to 
locate the referent of the class in a p-set (e.g. to understand it as reference to a class that the 
speaker is a member of, or is the teacher of etc.). The indefinite then instructs the hearer to 
locate the referent of a student in the p-set invoked by the utterance of the class. 
4.13. The class broke up early because a student set off a stink-bomb 
In the terms of the theoq. developed in this thesis. we agree with Hawkins that the location of 
the referent of a student is governed by a relation of associative anaphora with the class; the 
question relating to location which concerns us is what governs the choice between locating 
the referent of the class in the real world or some other possible world. 
4.4. Initial Motivation for Location in Possible Worlds. 
Our theory of the interpretation of referring expressions, which stipulates that all referring 
expressions must have referents, since they are interpreted by a process of locating those 
referents, is obviously at odds with the view that potentially referring expressions do not have 
referents in particular environments. known as opaque contexts. It is also incompatible with 
the view that truth-valuelessness can be explained as a result of reference failure. An in-depth 
discussion of the efficacy of a location theory using possible worlds in accounting for patterns 
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of truth-values is not given until the next chapter. However, before setting out a detailed 
account of the structure of the set of possible worlds, we will offer some initial justification 
for the theory by comparing the current approach with two others and will show that neither 
an analysis of "referring expressions" without referents in opaque contexts, nor an analjsis 
whch rests on the notion of reference failure, can account for the full range of data. 
4.4.1 . Location and Opaqueness 
It has been argued that nominal expressions in opaque positions do not refer (Quine. 1960). 
We will show that such an analysis is flawed. To do this we will look in some detail at the 
behaviour of such expressions in what are called opaque predicate positions; i.e. those 
contexts in which the Law of Substitution fails. Examples of verbs which express opaque 
predicates are dream about, admire, hate, worship, and want. In the current context, the 
important property of an opaque environment is the property which has been defined and 
explained away as an ability to cancel the existential presupposition of its object NP. For 
example, the object NP in 4.14 would not be analysed as having an existential presupposition 







the Queen's second daughter 
Frege accounted for this by arguing that in such contexts expressions denote their intensions 
(Sinnen), while they refer to their extensions (Bedeutungen) in transparent contexts (Geach 
and Black, 1980). On this analysis, since normally referring expressions do not refer, it is not 
sensible to talk of any requirements of existence on their referents. For example, 4.17 and 
4.16, as well as 4.15 have the potential to be interpreted as true statements, in the current 
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context where the speaker/writer is the writer of this thesis, if dream about is analysed as an 




I dreamed about John Major's brother last night. 
I dreamed about Sherlock Holmes' brother last night. 
I dreamed about Chelsea Clinton's sister last night. 
What we will call the opaqueness explanation begins with the premise that failed existential 
presuppositions (themselves brought about by the non-existence of a referent) result in the 
truth-valuelessness of the presupposing sentence. To account for the possibility of a truth- 
value being assigned to sentences such as 4.15 - 4.17 the opaqueness explanation appeals to 
the notion that the existential status of the referent of the NP in object position is irrelevant to 
the process of truth-value assignment. The opaqueness explanation would predict truth- 
valuelessness for sentence 4.18 since Chelsea Clinton's sister occurs in a transparent, 
presupposition preserving position and its referent does not exist, and indeed this accords with 
our inability on an intuitive level to assign a truth-value to t h s  sentence. 
4.18. Chelsea Clinton's sister dreamed about Sherlock Holmes. 
However, the opaqueness explanation cannot account for the perceived truth-value of 4.19. 
4.19. Sherlock Holmes dreamed about Chelsea Clinton's sister. 
The opaqueness explanation would predict either that, if Sherlock Holmes is taken to be an 
existent entity, 4.19 could potentially be interpreted as true since the referent of the subject 
exists, and only the referent of the object (in an opaque position) does not exist; or that, if 
Sherlock Holmes is taken to be a nonexistent entity, 4.19 is truth-valueless since the subject 
NP refers to a non-existent entity. In this case, both of the possible predictions of the 
opaqueness explanation, i.e. that the sentence is true or that the sentence is truth-valueless. 
'*Other opaque predicates such as admire, worship, forget. and want pattern with dream about 
with respect to Sherlock Holmes' brother and Chelsea Clinton's sister. 
page 122 
conflict with the truth-value assigned using native speaker intuition, i.e. that this sentence 
must be false. 
If we consider sentence 4.20 we see that it shares an intuitive truth-value (false) ui th  4.19 but 
that 4.21, in contrast, patterns with 4.18. 
4.20. 
4.2 1. 
Sherlock Holmes dreamed about John Major. 
Sherlock Holmes dreamed about Oliver Cromwell. 
To summarise, the opaqueness explanation predicts that only the existential status of the 
referent of the subject NP of an opaque predicate has any effect on the truth-value of a 
sentence. and that the location of the existence of the referent of the object NP cannot be 
important, since the object NP contributes only its intensional meaning. However. we observe 
that the pattern of truth-values which occurs in sentences 4.15 - 4.2 1 cannot be accounted for 
by the opaqueness explanation. and we will argue instead that the object NP does refer and 
further, that the location of the referents of subject and object NPs which occur with opaque 
predicates influences truth-value assignment l .  
We conclude that there is initial evidence that there are phenomena which cannot be handled 
by presuppositional theories employing the notion of opaque contexts. From the brief survey 
of sentences 4.15 - 4.21 it appears that the pattern of truth-values ma), be bound up with the 
existential location of the subject and object NPs of these opaque predicates. 
4.4.2. Location and Reference Failure. 
Just as it is not possible to reason from particular truth-conditions to particular truth-values, 
neither is it possible to reason from the truth-conditional inevitability of a truth-value in every 
possible world to the actuality of a truth-value with respect to some particular world. To put 
'This will not interfere with the failure of Leibniz's law in opaque contexqs since the de re/de dicto 
distinction is retained. cf. chapter 7 for a discussion of how to account for the failure of Leibniz's 
Law if all referring expressions refer extensionally, 
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this another way, our knowledge12 that for any individual it is either true or false that that 
individual has had a tummy tuck does not automatically enable us to decide whether or not 
sentence 4.22 represents a true statement. 
4.22. Chelsea Clinton's sister had a tummy tuck. 
We can say that our understanding of truth-conditional meaning rests on, among other things, 
our acceptance of the law of the excluded middle ( - (A & - A)). Language users, when they 
infer from the truth of some sentence the falsity of its negation. do so on the implicit 
assumption that for any particular sentence there can be no possible world that neither meets 
its truth-conditions nor fails to meet them, and no possible world which both meets its truth- 
conditions and fails to meet them. When we sa>' that the truth of the sentence in 4.23 entails 
the falsity of the sentence in 4.24, what we are actually claiming is that the truth of any token 
of the sentence in 4.23 entails the falsity of any token of 4.24 if and only if the referring 
expressions in both pick out the same entity. 
4.23, The dog decomposed. 
4.24. The dog didn't decompose. 
Likewise when we say that 4.25 is necessarily false, what we mean is that some token of the 
sentence in 4.25 is necessarily false if and only if the dog and it are coreferential. 
4.25. The dog decomposed and it didn't decompose. 
Despite this, there are many instances of tokens of sentences to which we do not and cannot 
assign truth-values. To explain this phenomenon. while retaining the notion of a set of 
possible worlds whch adheres to the law of the excluded middle, we could build into our 
theory (of the application of possible worlds in truth-value assignment) some principle which 
defines circumstances under which we do not choose any possible world as the location of the 
12Whether t h s  is indeed knowledge or should be defined instead as a belief (i.e. whether the law of 
the excluded middle defines the limits of actual possibility or merely those of epistemic possibility) is 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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referent of some expression. l h s  kind of approach to the problem of perceived truth- 
valuelessness has been taken in the past and still has its followers. It has been suggested by 
McCawley for example, that while most sentences are "about" particular worlds some 
sentences should be analysed as being "about" a set of worlds (McCawley. 1981). For 
example, sentence 4.26 can be interpreted not as being a statement about an entity in some 
particular possible world, but rather as a statement about the entire set of worlds in which the 
King of France exists. 
4.26. The King of France is bald. 
The alleged truth-valuelessness of sentence 4.26 can then be explained in the following way. 
The proposition in 4.26 reflects a state-of affairs whch holds in one sub-set of the worlds 4.26 
is about; i.e. those worlds in which the King of France is bald. However. 4.26 does not 
accurately reflect the complement of this sub-set. the worlds in which the King of France is 
not bald. Therefore, 4.26 is neither true nor false of the set of worlds in which the King of 
France exists. 
An alternative, although similar anal>sis (van Fraassen. 1966) discussed by Fodor (1 979) 
takes the view that sentences may be about unidentifiable worlds. In this case, although this 
sentence must be about one particular member of the set of possible worlds in which the King 
of France exists, rather than being about the set as a whole, nothing in 4.26 specifies which 
world is the one in question, and therefore we do not know whether it is one of the worlds in 
which the King of France is bald or not. 
A third option which we mention briefll. here, and discuss in detail in Chapter 5, is that 
sentences can be about underspecified worlds. Fodor (1979) proposes an analysis in which a 
sentence such as 4.26 is about one particular world which is underspecified to such an extent 
that it only has one property; the existence in it of the King of France. In this underspecified 
world, then, it is actually neither true nor false that the King of France is bald. 
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All of these explanations of the truth-valuelessness of 4.26 depend on some kind of 
indeterminacy with respect to the reference world; either 4.26 is about more than one world, or 
is about an unidentified world, or is about a world which is itself indeterminate. Since it is 
sentences like ths ,  indeed this very one, which have traditionally been examined in the 
presuppositional literature almost to the exclusion of all others, it has come to be accepted that 
plausible explanations for their truth-valuelessness are plausible explanations for truth- 
valuelessness in general. 
It might be expected that the current theory, whch holds that the location of referents is 
closely (if indirectly) bound up with truth-value assignment. would be well-served by an 
analysis of truth-valuelessness which sees it as the result of the unlocatability of referents . 
However, we observe that if we employ this analysis many intuitively truth-valueless 
sentences cannot be accounted for. 
Consider the following sentence: 
4.27. Sherlock Holmes has his cheese sent from Sheffield. 
Let us assume that 4.27, like 4.26, is perceived as truth-valueless. Given this assumption. we 
must take one of the two following views. Either the respective truth-valuelessnesses of 4.26 
and 4.27 are of different kinds, and therefore may be accounted for by different explanations. 
or they are of the same kind and are to be explained in the same way. The first of these two 
options is not attractive. We are wary of positing a plurality of types of truth-valuelessness as 
anything but a last resort. Let us assume then. that the truth-valuelessnesses of 4.26 and 4.27 
are of the same type and let us try to account for 4.26 and 4.27 by applying the three 
previously presented types of indeterminacy explanation. 
An indeterminacy explanation would hold that we cannot assign a truth-value to sentence 4.27 
for one of the following reasons: 
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a. because it is both true and false since it is about a set of worlds, in some of 
which the proposition that Sherlock Holmes had his cheese sent from 
Sheffield is true and in some of which the proposition is false. 
b. because it is either true or false since it is about some unidentified member of 
the set of worlds in which Sherlock Holmes exists. 
C. because it is neither true nor false since it is about a world which i s  not 
specified with respect to the relevant properties. 
Explanation a. and explanation b. both predict the correct truth-value assignment for this 
sentence; we could say that we do not know whether or not it is true that Sherlock Holmes has 
his cheese sent from Sheffield, because the sentence is not about an individual in any specific 
world, or because we do not know which specific world the referent of Sherlock Holmes 
inhabits. It is interesting to observe, however, that native speakers seem much more 
squeamish about emplo\ing either of thess explanations to account for 4.27 than the) do with 
respect to sentence 4.26. Since neither of these two explanations have any intuitive attraction 
to add to their empirical adequacy, we will consider explanation c. which states that although 
Sherlock Holmes can be understood as picking out an individual in some identifiable world, 
i.e. the world invoked by the fiction of Conan Doyle, this established familiar fictional world 
is incompletely specified. This amounts to a claim that it really is neither true nor false of this 
world that Sherlock Holmes has his cheese sent from Sheffield. Rather than deciding on the 
answer to this question on the basis of 4.2713. let us consider sentence 4.28. 
4.28. The Princess of Wales' first nanny had green eyes. 
Let us assume that, like the previous two examples, 4.28 is perceived as truth-valueless b!. 
current readers. We are equally (if not more) squeamish about accounting for its truth- 
valuelessness by claiming that it is about a set of worlds, or about an individual in some 
unidentified member of a set of worlds. Our strong preference is to interpret 4.28 as a 
13we will deal specifically with the possibility that fictional worlds are incomplete in chapter 5 ,  
section 5.3.1. 
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statement about an individual who exists in the real world. However, we are resistant to the 
option of accounting for the perceived truth-valuelessness of 4.28 by claiming that the 
reference world, in this case the real world, is underspecified or incomplete. Not only does 
this conflict with our intuitions about the nature of the real world. but it also seems 
unnecessary and irrelevant to complicate the matter in this way to account for the perceived 
effect. 
Instead we can argue that 4.28 is about a particular world and that that world is completely 
specified with the result that the sentence in 4.28 has some truth-value; but that the inability of 
hearers (or readers) of 4.28 to assign the appropriate (i.e. the correct) truth-value to it is a 
result of the particular limitations on the knowledge states of those hearers. In other words. 
the inability of hearers of 4.28 to assign a truth-value to a statement that the Princess of 
Wales' first nann)' had green eyes arises straightforwardly from their not knowing whether or 
not the Princess of Wales' first nanny had green eyes. A language user's knowledge that this 
sentence must be either true or false does not enable them to assign either value to it. 
We have been able to account for the truth-valuelessness of sentence 4.28, without 
complicating the notion of locating referents in possible worlds in any of the ways suggested 
in other analyses. We can account for the truth-valuelessness of sentences whose referring 
expressions have potential referents in the real world without being forced to argue that the 
sentences are not about these real-world entities. or that we do not know whether the sentences 
are about these real-world entities or that the real world is incomplete. Given this. we see no 
reason to propose any of the more complicated explanations to account for the truth- 
valuelessness of 4.26 and 4.27. We propose instead that sentence 4.27 is a statement about 
an entity in the fully specified world invoked by the fiction of Arthur Conan Doyle, that 4.27 
has a truth-value in this world, but that hearers might not be able to assign a truth-value to 
4.27 because they do not have sufficient knowledge about the properties of that world. 
Similarly, we propose that sentence 4.26 i s  about an entity in a particular fully-specified 
world and that it therefore has a truth-value. We claim that a statement that the King of 
France is bald is perceived as truth-valueless because we do not know, and cannot find out. 
whether or not the King of France is bald. 
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4.5, Conclusion. 
We have given some indication that the relation between the location of referents and truth- 
value assignment might not be what it has generally been assumed to be. In particular, 
contrary to the claims of opaqueness analyses, the location of referents of expressions in 
"intensional" contexts may be crucially involved in the assignment of truth-values, and 
contrary to the claims of indeterminacy analyses, the location of the referents of expressions in 
other truth-valueless sentences might have no direct bearing on their truth-valuelessness . 
To summarise, for any sentence. there must some world in which the referent of a constituent 
referring expression can be located such that the sentence is true, and there must be some 
world such that if the referent is located there the sentence is false. Furthermore. there is no 
world in which, if the referent is located there. the sentence is neither-true nor-false or both- 
true-and-false. However. tokens of these sentences undergo only one truth-value assignment 
and that might result in the assignment of any value. A theory which predicts whether a 
particular utterance of a sentence is actually true, actually false or neither, must resolve the 
question of how we decide in which of the infinitely many possible worlds where we could 
locate the referent of some expression. we actually do so. However, although the correct 
choice of reference world is necessary. it alone may not be sufficient to account for truth- 
valuelessness. We will analyse truth-valuelessness as the result the failure of a part of the 
interpretation procedure which is separate from. and subsequent to. the fixing of referents in 
some world. 
Thls procedure, which we set out in the chapter 6 of the thesis, depends, as stated earlier, on a 
particular view of the nature of possible worlds which allows the imposition of a particular 
structure on the set. In the next chapter we discuss the nature and ontological status of 
possible worlds and set out the structural relationship that holds between them. 
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Chapter Five. 
The Set of Possible Worlds: Arrangement and Relations 
5.1. The Current World. 
We proposed in the previous chapter to define one world and then relate all other members of 
the set of possible worlds to it. This world, the most possible world, will henceforth be 
labelled WO. For the purposes of the following discussion WO is assumed to be the world in 
which this thesis is being written, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. We will argue that in 
general the current WO should be defined relative to individual acts of utterance or discourses 
such that if an utterance is made in or with respect to a particular world then that world is WO 
for that utterance. Thinlung of WO as the current world rather than the real world allows us to 
conceive more easily of shfts in its identity. To suggest that the identity of the real world 
changes when we consider different discourses could possibly lead to confusion since there is 
a strong intuitive pull to the notion that the identity of the real world is fixed'. On the other 
hand, we want to be able to interpret an act of utterance which takes place in another world 
on the assumption that that other world is WO for that utterance. This is essential if we are to 
understand deixis in fiction and in counterfactuals. For example, when we read that Scarlett 
O'Hara said "I can't think about that today; I'll think about that tomorrow", we understand 
that the proposition expressed is that Scarlett OlHara will not think about some issue which 
she previously mentioned on the day she makes ths utterance but will instead think about that 
issue on the subsequent day. We do not infer that (to take one possible example) Margaret 
Mitchell decided not to thnk about something that the typesetter of the edition of the novel 
that we are reading said over lunch on the day that we read the sentence2. 
~ 
'In the novel Sophie's World by Jostein Gaarder the heroine discovers that the characters she is 
reading about in a book are real and that it is she, herself, who is fictional. The implication is that 
we, the readers of Gaarder's book, might make the same discovery. 
21ndeed, our acceptance that deixis works in fiction according to a locally determined WO is so strong 
that it is questionable to label the second interpretation "possible" at all. 
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5.1.1 The Set of Possible Counterparts to the Current World 
Given the current world, a modal realistic approach demands that eve?. possible counterpart 
of that world exists. That is, every world which differs from WO, by virtue of an\. or all of its 
properties (items and attributes) co-exists with WO in the set of possible worlds. Since the 
theory of reference and truth-value assignment which we are working towards in this thesis. 
involves the choice of one over all other possible worlds as a location for the referent of 
linguistic expressions, and since modal realism stipulates that all worlds are of the same type. 
to make any sense of the process of choosing a world we must impose a structure on the set of 
worlds. That is, since all worlds are of equivalent status and cannot therefore be distinguished 
by virtue of their inherent type, we must distinguish between worlds by means of the relations 
which hold between them. We claim that the set of possible worlds is such that given some 
WO all other worlds can be ordered with respect to their proximit\f to it. Following Lewis 
(1968, 1986) we will assume that non-real "versions" of the real world are best seen as 
counterparts of that world, and that the properties of these counterpart worlds. the sets of 
entities and relations, are counterparts of the properties of the real world. We do not claim 
that the same entity may exist (or the same relation hold) in two separate worlds (McCawley 
1981; Lewis, 1986 )3, 
The first feature of the set of worlds wie propose is the relation of proximity between 
counterparts. The proximity of some world WO' to another world "0 is measured by the 
number of counterpart properties which have a different value in WO' and k v o .  We can say 
that given the current world WO and some other world wottt there is some number of 
intervening worlds. which can be ordered with respect to decreasing proximity to WO"' and 
increasing proximity to WO. We can say that WO and WO"' are connected b!, a string of 
intervening counterparts with as many intermediates along it as there are differences in the 
values of the counterpart properties of wo and WO"'. For example, if there is a world WO such 
that in WO some individual a has the properties of being single, childless. and a student then 
3There are concomitant difficulties with the notion of counterparts. especially with respect to the use 
of names in modal statements c.f. Kripke (1980), but since our interest is primarily in the use of 
linguistic expressions we are content to reflect what appear to be general intuitions about the use of 
names (chapter 6 section 6.2 and chapter 7 section 7.2.2) not withstanding possible philosophical 
objections. 
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there is a world WO' in which a' is employed, single and childless, a world WO" in which a'' is a 
employed, married and childless and a world WO"' in which a"' is an employed, married parent. 
Figure 5.1 represents a partial diagram of the set, U, of possible worlds showing this string of 
counterparts. 
Figure 5.1 
A partial diagram of counterpart worlds 
From now on we will describe strings of worlds in terms of a counterpart relation, &. A one- 
place counterpart relation &' is a relation which holds between some ~ o r l d  WO and some 
world WO' whch is an identical counterpart of WO except for the value of one property or 
minimal bundle of properties. The use of minimal bundles of properties. rather than single 
properties allows us to define WO' in fig 5.1. as a one-place counterpart of WO even though , if 
the counterpart of a in WO' has the property of being married which the counterpart of a in WO 
does not, then some other individual b in WO' has the property of being married to a', some 
third individual has the property of having married a' to b and so on. A two place 
counterpart llnk is a relation h2 which holds indirectly between two worlds WO and NO" 
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whch differ from each other by the value of two minimal bundles of properties. and which are 
each joined by a one-place link RC1 to an intervening world WO'. Thus, we can define & as a 
cumulative relation such that if WO &l  WO' and wot &n WO" then WO R, n+l WOt1. We can 
also define RCn as a symmetric relation such that if wo hn WO' then WO' RCn WO. Figure 5.2. 
shows the relations between a partial string of counterparts in U. 
Figure 5.2 
A partial diagram of counterpart worlds showing counterpart links 
This relation gives us a way to express the notion that every world is related to every other 
world. We will propose further inter-world relations in the forthcoming discussion. 
Henceforth we will call a world WO' which is linked with some WO onIy by an n-place 
counterpart relation, a counterpart of WO. We will call a world WO' which is linked to a world 
WO by a one-place counterpart relation a minimal counterpart of WO. 
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5.2. Temporal Counterparts of the Current World. 
It is relatively straightforward to characterise the elements which co-exist spatial111 in WO in a 
comprehensible way; we have no difficulty in understanding definitions such as Bradley and 
Swartz (1979), McCawley (1 98 1) or Lewis (1986) that WO consists of everything that there is, 
or the totality of actually existing states of affairs, or the universe as a whole etc. Much more 
problematic, however, is the question of what, if any elements, co-exist temporally in WO. 
That is, whether WO is an instantaneous snap-shot of all at that there is at some moment or 
whether WO contains a temporal dimension. Phdosophers, logicians and linguists disagree 
fundamentally on this point. For example, Bradley and Swartz define the real world as "all 
that was, is or will be" (Bradley and Swartz, 1979: 9), firmly indicating that they take worlds 
to have a temporal dimension, while the proponents of tense logic assume that moments in 
time are the temporal equivalents of the wholly spatial worlds of modal logic (McCawley. 
198 1). Lewis argues that worlds persist through time in a way which he calls "perdurance" 
which is the temporal equivalent of the way that entities such as roads persist through space: 
different parts occurring/existing at different temporal/spatial locations (Lewis. 1986) . 
Since we proposed in chapter 4 that two such entities as John Major and Pitt the Younger 
exist in different worlds, and since their respective worlds can be seen as distinct from each 
other only temporally, it appears that we are assuming the stance that worlds do not contain a 
temporal dimension. We must now look closely at the question of whether WO should identic 
the current world as it is now or the current world at all times. Much of the difficulty in this 
area concerns the problem of the future. There is a great deal of debate over whether the 
future is the same kind of thmg as the past. It is not a clear-cut issue, in fact, whether there is 
a future at all, and not a set of indistinguishable potential futures. Since these questions are of 
a kind which do not generally arise when we consider the past, we will take the expedient step 
of discussing earlier and later versions of the current WO separately. 
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5.2.1. The past. 
If worlds include no temporal dimension, but are instantaneous snapshots, then we must add 
to their ontology a temporal index, such that WO consists of a set, A, of entities. a set, P, of 
attributes and a time index, t. We cannot take the temporal index of a world to be one of the 
properties which make up the set of its attributes since t h s  would leave us unable to 
distinguish those worlds which are "earlier versions" of WO from other "alternative versions" 
to WO which differ from WO in other ways. That is, each of the three worlds, about which 




The Queen has advised an early divorce. 
Charles and Diana have announced their engagement. 
Diana has broken off the engagement after a chat with Camilla. 
One way to avoid ths is to say that 5 .O 1 and 5.02 are about the real world at different times 
and that 5.03 is about some other world. However, if the real world as it is in 1996 is taken to 
be a different world, WO, from the real world as it was in 1796, say ~ 0 - 2 0 0 ~ .  we must impose 
some structure on the set of worlds, which will identifq. these two worlds. and all those worlds 
which intervene, as members of an internally consistent sub-set. 
Ideally we would like to be able to define earlier versions of WO as those possible worlds 
which are identical to the real world save that they have a lower time index. If WO = <A, P. 
to>. then we could define an earlier version of WO. e.g. WO-200. as <A, P, t-200> and an) 
earlier version of WO, w,n as <A. P, t,n>. However, there is clearly a problem with this 
definition, in that many attributes of a world bring about change in the inventor?, of items 
and/or attributes in that world. To put this another way, a true statement about some entity in 
a world might entail that the membership of the sets of items or attributes in that world 
4The use of the subscript -200 to distinguish 1996 from 1796 is for ease of interpretation only. We 
do not mean to imply that only 199 temporal counterparts intervene. Since the problem of identiQing 
the smallest interval of time is currently unsolved, the value of this index is arbitraq. 
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changes. Such attributes include the processes expressed by change-of-state verbs such as 
die. For example, let us assume that sentence 5.04 represents a true statement about an entity 
in some world. 
5.04. Pitt the Younger died. 
Our intuitions tempt us to define this world as w-190 with respect to WO in the current 
context. That is, we take sentence 5.04 to be a statement about an individual in an earlier 
version of the current world. However. the individual named, Pitt the Younger, even if he 
exists as a member of the set of items in w-190. does not exist in WO, therefore by the 
definition above W-190 is not an earlier version of WO. This is not an insuperable problem. 
however. We must abandon the attempt to define temporal counterparts as worlds which are 
identical counterparts apart from their temporal indices and instead define them as worlds 
which are temporally linked and mutually consistent with one another. We can then refine the 
definition of "an earlier version" as follows: w-1 is an immediate (one-place) temporal 
counterpart of WO iff W-1 differs from WO only by having a lower time index and by such 
properties as are consistent with the entities which exist and the attributes which hold in WO 
and W-1. Thus, W7-n is an n-place temporal counterpart of WO iff \v-n differs from WO only by 
having a lower time index and by such properties as are consistent with the entities which exist 
and the attributes which hold in WO, w-n or any intervening temporal counterpart. 
Clearly the value of this definition is bound up with the possibility of defining consistency. 
The definition of consistency for a logical system is straightforward. For example: 
"A formal system is consistent if it is not possible to derive from the axioms 
of that system both some statement and the denial of that same statement." 
(Partee, ter Meulen and Wall, 1990: 202) 
If, therefore, we were to view worlds as linguistic or logical constructs, e.g. if a world was 
seen as a set of propositions, it would be a simple matter to distinguish pairs of consistent 
worlds from pairs of inconsistent worlds. However, since we take a modal realistic view of 
worlds, the problem is more serious. Can we say that a pair of worlds is temporally consistent 
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iff it is not possible to produce a contradiction by combining true statements about each 
world? Clearly we can state of 1796 that Pitt the Younger exists, and state of 1996 that Pitt 
the Younger does not exist. The only waj. to show that a conjunction of these two statements 
is not a contradiction is to appeal to the intervening counterparts. This, however, would 
render our definition circular. 
We propose to break the circularity involved in stating a formal definition of temporal 
consistency and inconsistency for pairs of worlds. by the use of paradigm examples. Below 
we cite what we take to be a clear case of a set of temporally consistent worlds and a clear 
case of a set of temporally inconsistent worlds. We acknowledge that there will be many less 
clear examples. However, we can observe that those worlds which appear to be borderline 
cases, as regards their temporal consistency with the current world ~v0 .  are worlds either in the 
future5 of WO or in the very remote past. For example, there is more general agreement about 
the identity (the properties) of 1995. than there is about the identity of 1997 or of 20,000 BC. 
Recall that the modal realistic view of possible worlds taken in the current thesis applies only 
to the worlds themselves. We do not claim that the structure on the set is  anJthing other than 
a theoretical construct developed to allow us to model interpretation. Given that our view of 
interpretation is based on the processes which take place in real discourse contexts involving 
speakers and hearers, there is no difficulty in accepting that the limits to speakers' and hearers' 
knowledge about worlds affects their ability to interpret statements about these worlds. In 
short, if we accept that the borderline cases lie in the future and the remote past, then it i s  
surely a positive feature of an epistemically based theory that these worlds m e  borderline 
cases. 
Let us take the following three worlds as a clear example of temporal consistent).: 
5we return to the topic of limit epistemic access to the future in section 5.2.2. 
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where A and A' (the sets of items), are identical except that Pitt the Younger is a member of 
A but not a member of A' and P and P' (the sets of attributes) are identical except that Pitt the 
Younger has the property of dying according to P' but not according to P. In other words. in 
w-200 Pitt the Younger exists, in w-190 Pitt the Younger dies and in WO Pitt the Younger does 
not exist. We assume for the sake of simplicity that all other properties of the three worlds are 
identical. 
w-200 can be seen to be a temporal counterpart of WO since it differs from WO only by 
features which do not block a relationship of succession between worlds: w-200 has a l o ~ r  
time index than WO and A in "-200 has a member which is not a member of A' in buf the 
non-existence of that item in WO is entailed by an attribute of the intervening world w, 1 90. U', 
190 can in turn be identified as an temporal counterpart of WO since it differs only in terms of 
having a lower index and such differences in the membership of their respective sets of items 
and attributes as are consistent with properties of WO (since even  property must be consistent 
with itself). Similarly, w-200 can be identified as a temporal counterpart of kv-190. 
In contrast. let us consider a similar set of three worlds: w-200. w-190'. and WO. \v-1901 i s  
identical to w-190 except that in w-190' Santa Clam is a member of A. Since no attribute of 
w-200 brings about the existence of Santa C l a w  and there is no intervening w.orld between 
M'-200 and w-190' with such an attribute, w-190' is not consistent with w-200 and cannot be 
one of its temporal counterparts. Similarl>r. since no attribute of WO (or any other world 
which intervenes between W-190' and WO) brings about the loss of Santa Claus from the 
membership of either of the sets of items A or A', w7-190' is not consistent with WO and cannot 
be one of its temporal counterparts. 
We will call the set containing WO and its temporal counterparts W. Given some w, we can 
identifir a partial membership for the corresponding W, using a relation Rt which defines what 
we thnk of as subsequent, temporal ordering or chronological succession. A one-place 
temporal link Rtl is a relation which holds between some world m70 and kv0-1: i.e. between a 
world and an immediately preceding temporal counterpart of that world. An n-place temporal 
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link Rtn therefore, holds between a world WO and a world "0-n. Rt cannot be described as a 
transitive relation. since if w-2 Rtlw-l and w-1 Rtl WO, then it is not the case that w-2 Rtl 
WO. We can describe Rt instead as a cumulative relation since if w-2 Rtlw-l and w-1 Rtl 
WO, then w-2 R? WO. Figure 5.3. shows a partial diagram of the set. U, of possible worlds. 
containing part of the set W associated with the current WO. 
Figure 5.3 
A partial diagram of  W for the current WO 
time 
TO summarise: Wi Rt 1 wj iff u'i = <A, P, tm> and wj = <A', P', t,> such that t, = tn-l. A is 
consistent with A' (with respect to P'), and P is consistent with P' (with respect to A')? 
6This view of the association of time and worlds departs from the formulation in Montague 
Semantics (Dowty, Wall and Peters, 1981; Cann. 1993) in that worlds for Montague are not 
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We can differentiate the worlds in W either by naming them, as in figure 5.3, using calendar 
dates or by identifying attributes which distinguish them from all the other depicted worlds 
(although not from all other possible worlds). WO, 1996, is the world in which the planetary 
probe Discovery enters Jupiter's atmosphere. w-1, 1995, is the world in which the Queen 
advises an early divorce. "-2, 1994, is the world in which the Soccer World Cup takes place 
in the USA. W-190 is the world in which Pitt the Younger dies. The other worlds in U cannot 
be named using calendar dates but can be identified by means of their attributes. \vo-ll is the 
world in which the Queen enters Jupiter's atmosphere, and WO-190' is the world in which Pitt 
the Younger discovers the structure of DNA. 
Because the definition we have given of temporal counterparts states that a temporal 
counterpart of some world WO must have a lower time index than WO, Rt is an asynmetric 
relation whch can only be used to relate some WO to earlier versions of itself but not to later 
versions of itself. We must now decide whether we can define later versions of LVO in the 
same way whch would allow us to re-formulate Rt as a symmetric relation and close the 
open-ended set W. 
5.2.2 The Future 
As was mentioned brieflq- in the previous section, there is a great deal of debate about how to 
account for statements about the future. Lyons (1977) discusses the view that the future i s  
fundamentally different from the past and argues that this difference can be summed up by the 
claim that "futurity is modal in nature" 
"Ever since h s t o t l e  first raised the question, the factuality of statements 
descriptive, or predictive. of future events, or states-of-affairs, has been 
philosophically controversial and many philosophers would deny that we can 
make statements about the future at all. on the grounds that we cannot have 
knowledge, but only beliefs, about future world-states .'I 
(Lyons, 1977: p8 14-8 15). 
temporally bound. Instead. W i s  constructed as a set of indices <w,t> which are worldhime pairs. W 
is ordered with respect to the set of all temporal indices T, using a precedence relation <. such that 
Vt E T, 3w [<w,t> E W]. So what is an index in MG, we are taking to be a world. 
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One side of the argument then can be summed up as follows: a factual statement is a statement 
which can be assigned a truth-value, and truth-value assignment requires verifiability. Since 
we have no access to the future, attempted factual statements about the future cannot be 
verified and so are closer in status to modal statements, which are also not directly verifiable, 
than to successhl factual statements about the present and the past. This point of view 
crucially depends on the claim that there is more than one possible future and the actual future 
is not identifiable. 
The opposing stance is taken by Lewis, who observes that since we can make statements 
about the future there must be only one future since this alone allows us to explain what it 
means to talk about it. (Lewis 1986: 207). We assume that what Lewis means by making a 
statement is what Lyons means by making a factual statement, i.e. makmg a statement with a 
verifiable truth-value. 
The disagreement can be summarised as whether there is one future which is the same kind of 
thing as the past, or a branching future which can be contrasted with a unified past. Lewis is 
strongly opposed to any analjsis which might force the acceptance of the possibility of 
overlap between worlds. He therefore argues against the notion of a branching future since, 
he claims that this would result in the possibility that two worlds overlap (Lewis. 1986). He 
argues that given the idea of a branching future. 
''...one world consists of the initial segment plus one of its futures: the other 
world consists of the identical initial segment plus the other future. In divergence 
on the other hand there is no overlap. Two worlds have two duplicate initial 
segments, not one which they share in common." 
(Lewis 1986: 206). 
The difficulty we perceive with the notion of the divergence of two worlds with duplicate 
initial segments as an explanation of the future. is that it seems to imply that what happens in 
the future defines the present. If we take Lewis's future to be WO then what he seems to be 
saying is that the identity of the w we currently inhabit depends on what happens in the future. 
If, for example, our alarm clock does not go off tomorrow morning then we currently inhabit 
some U' which is a temporal counterpart of that WO. On the other hand, if our alarm clock 
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does go off tomorrow morning, then we currently inhabit a dzfferent w, which i s  a temporal 
counterpart of that WO. Given Lewis's view that overlap between worlds is impossible, this is 
not a trivial claim. It means that the w we currently inhabit really is a different entity 
depending on what will happen in the future. Lewis appears to be saying that the future is 
determinate but the present is not. This is an extremely counter-intuitive notion. 
A solution to this problem is possible given the distinction we have proposed between w and 
W.  We can retain the notion of the indeterminacy of the future without having to countenance 
the possibility of overlap, in either of tw70 ways. We can assume that we cannot identifi the 
complete membershp of the W we inhabit, since it contains counterpart ws which correspond 
to alternative future states of affairs. This is the view of W which is represented in the 
diagram in Figure 5.4. Alternatively. we can say that each possible W contains only one 
consistent set of temporal counterparts but that we do not know which W we inhabit. This 
view of W is represented by the diagram in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.4 A single W containing counterpart futures 
Figure 5.5 A partial diagram of three internally consistent W's 
time 
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Lewis goes on to argue that "a modal realist who believed in genuine branching in which his 
world overlaps with others by having initial segments in common would agree (that the future 
has no determinate truth-value - CMcP)." (Lewis, 1986: p207). Given the second of the 
views of W sketched above, i.e. that in Figure 5 . 5 . ,  understood in a modal realistic sense, we 
believe that it is possible to hold that the future branches while at the same time, claiming that 
the future is determinate. We can say that the future branches in that it contains infinitely 
many possible alternative ws. Since each of these ws, however, exists in a consistent W made 
up entirely of temporal counterparts, we can say that every W and every w is determinate, 
therefore the particular W which we inhabit and all of its constituent ws are determinate. This 
does not necessarily contradict Lewisls claim however, as it might be that this view of the 
structure of W does not constitute "genuine" branchmg. 
While we deny that our view of W forces us to accept tha the fbture has no determinate truth- 
value, we happily concede that the future has no determinable truth-value from our vantage 
point in our present, kvhich is the future's past. Future versions of WO can be thought of as 
further examples of worlds whch exist and are completely specified but about which our 
knowledge is limited. The only relevant difference bemeen the reference worlds we use for 
5.05 and 5.06 is that we might soon come to find out whether 5.05 is a true statement about 
the world in which the referent of the definite exists whereas the reference world employed for 
5.06 is more likely to remain inaccessible. 
5.05. Tomorrow the sky ~ 7 i l l  turn red. 
5.06. The Pope's wife wears lovely hats. 
Lewis argues that the fact that we make statements about 'the' future means that the idea of a 
branching future is flawed. He asks what it would mean to say that T h e  fbture holds a sea- 
fight." if there were more than one future. (p207) We, on the other hand, have no difficulty 
with the idea that it is possible to make assertions of propositions to which neither the speaker 
nor any hearer is able to assign a truth-value. A speaker can make the assertion in 5.07 
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secure in the knowledge that they may be mistaken about what 'the' future is: i.e. which future 
will turn out to be 'the' future. 
5.07. The future holds my death at fifty. 
Furthermore, given a thirty year old speaker, hearers may not be able to assign a truth-value 
of true to 5.07 for twenty years, although they may be able to assign the truth-value -false 
sooner, if the speaker is mistaken about the future and dies before the age of fifty. but we do 
not see how this fact would prevent anyone from knowing what it means for the speaker to 
make the assertion. Roughly, 5.07 can be paraphrased as 5.07'. 
5.07'. I assert that out of the many possible futures the one which will come to pass 
is the one in whch I die at fifty. 
The apparent problem with this and other future statements dissolves if we distinguish the act 
of malung an assertion from the act of assigning a truth-value to it. Lewis appears explicitly 
to reject this kind of distinction. He claims that, 
"...respect for common sense gives us reason to reject any theory that says that 
we ourselves are involved in branching . . . But we need not reject the very 
possibility that a world branches. The unfortunate inhabitants of such a world, 
if they thnk of 'the future', as we do, are of course sorely deceived, and their 
peculiar circumstances do make nonsense of how they ordinarill. think. But 
that is their problem; not ours, as it would be if the worlds generally branched 
instead of diverging. 'I 
( Lewis, 1986: p209). 
We claim, in contradiction to Lewis, that the inhabitants of the current WO in which this thesis 
is being written are in the unfortunate position he identifies. We make statements about the 
future, some of which turn out to be true and some of which turn out to be false, but none of 
which can be assigned any truth-value at all at the time of utterance. We do behave 
mistakenly as if there is only one possible future when we predict states-of-affairs or events 
which do not occur, when we feel happiness in the anticipation of pleasant future events whch 
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fail to take place, when we feel dread in the anticipation of unpleasant future events which do 
not occur. 
We have been content to recogmse the existence in the set of possible worlds as a whole, 
worlds to which we have permanently and severely restricted access. such as the reference 
world employed in interpreting sentences about the King of France. Therefore we see no 
reason to balk at the inclusion in W of ws to which we currently have no access. That is. we 
see no reason not to include future temporal counterparts in the membership of W as well as 
past temporal counterparts. As we indicated above however, there are two possible ways to 
do this and we must now decide between them. 
The first approach takes what we might call the omniscient view of W on which W contains 
the actual future and the actual past. The second approach, which we might call the 
epistemically constrained approach would include in W the actual past and all possible 
futures. On either approach our decision to include future temporal counterparts in W has the 
result that our knowledge about W is limited in some way. since even though future 
counterparts are entities of the same type as past counterparts (i.e. even though the future is 
the same kind of thng as the past) they are viewed by us from a different perspective. The 
problem is that we cannot achieve the perspective whch allows us the same kind of access to 
the future as we have to the past. 
If W contains only the actual fbture and the actual past we have to accept that we do not 
know bvhich of a number of potential W's we inhabit. If W contains a branching future then 
we can say that we do know which W we inhabit but we do not know what the properties of 
W are. The second of these two options would more closely resemble the argument we put 
forward regarding our of use of counterparts as reference worlds for expressions which occur 
in sentences we perceive as truth-valueless. There we claimed that we can locate the correct 
world but that we do not have sufficient knowledge about its properties to assign truth-values 
to all statements about entities which exist in it. However, the problem with arguing that we 
can in a similar way, locate the W we inhabit but cannot identifi the constituent ws which it 
contains, is that we cannot then claim that future temporal counterparts are related to WO in 
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the same way as past temporal counterparts. That is, we cannot claim that W is internally 
consistent if it contains alternative futures. For this reason, we choose to anallse the 
membership of W as a complete set of temporal counterparts and we must conclude that our 
lack of access to future ws means that we do not know which W we are in. 
5.2.3 Constraints on the Past and Future. 
Although we must concede that we do not know which W we are in. we will now consider the 
question whether we can say what Ws we are not in. That is, we will attempt to establish 
what, if anything, constrains the past and the future; whether we can make a distinction 
between possible and impossible pasts and futures. 
It is deceptively straightforward-seeming to harness our intuitions about what distinguishes 
possible from impossible pasts. Quite simply, it appears to us that what is possible in the past 
is what exists there and nothing more; In 
contrast. with respect to the future, it is what intuition tells us is possible that constrains what 
we will accept is going to take place or exist; i.e. it appears that the actual future is one of the 
possible futures. This distinction is, however, spurious as we can see if we consider more 
carefully the reliability of our intuitions about the future and the past. These are not so clear 
cut in relation to past and future temporal counterparts which are far removed from WO. 
Although our epistemic access to the past is not limited in the striking way that our access to 
the future is, it is limited and our access to more and more remote pasts is increasingly 
restricted. When we try to access temporal counterparts of WO which are among those we 
describe in terms of geological time, the)’ look surprisingly like the future in that what we take 
to exist there is constrained by what we consider possible. It i s  important, therefore, to 
divorce the question of our constrained access to the future and the past, which appears to 
allow indeterminacy, from the indisputable fact there is only one set of temporal counterparts 
in the W we inhabit. The question which remains is whether there are any worlds which 
cannot be temporal counterparts of this WO. 
i.e. the only possible past is the actual past. 
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We can immediately identifj! worlds which are inconsistent with earlier members of W as ws 
which cannot be temporal counterparts of the current WO either in the past or in the future7. 
However, we cannot so easily determine what ws are inconsistent with future temporal 
counterparts of WO since we have no access to those temporal counterparts which will allow 
us to identifL their properties and from this to identifj! what properties are consistent with 
them. 
Although we are less sure about what is possible in increasingly remote futures (and past), it 
may be possible to set some outer boundaries. We will consider the plausible contention that 
the set of possible hture  ws must be contained within the set of physicall). possible worlds. 
We must at the outset distinguish two types of worlds which could each be thought of as 
physically possible. There is a set of worlds whose membership can be defined as those 
worlds which are consistent with the contingent physical properties of WO; that is the items 
and attributes which make up WO. There is. besides. a larger set of worlds, which contains 
these and also other worlds which are not consistent with the contingent physical properties 
which hold of WO but adhere to the physical laws of W. For example, with respect to the 
current WO, a world WO' which contains the pair of individuals about whom 5.08 represents a 
true statement, is a phqsically possible world in both senses. 
5.08. Michael Jackson is divorcing Elvis Presley's daughter. 
5.08 can be used to make a true statement about a world WO' which contains only those 
entities whch exist in w70 of whom only those properties which hold in WO. hold, since 
Michael Jackson and Elvis Presley's daughter exist in WO and are married to each other. In 
contrast, again with respect to the current WO, the world in which Sherlock Holmes exists is a 
physically possible world in the second sense in that it does not flout any physical laws which 
pertain in WO, but is a physically impossible world in the first sense in that its properties are 
inconsistent with the properties of WO. The world WO"' in which Mary Poppins exists is a 
physically impossible world on both counts, since as well as its inconsistency with WO? it 
7always remembering that the more remote the earlier temporal counterpart is the less reliably we 
can determine what is and what is not inconsistent with it. 
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flouts several physical laws which pertain in WO, such as the physical laws which relate an 
organism's anatomy to its ability to fly while subject to the force of gravity. 
We can say that the narrower definition of a physically possible world picks out the set which 
contains the possible earlier temporal counterparts of wo in any W. The question remains 
whether the broader definition of a physically possible world picks out the set which contains 
all future temporal counterparts of WO for any W .  The answer to this question hinges on the 
reliability of physical laws. If we accept that the particular physical properties in the current 
WO are contingent and we accept that what we call physical laws are observations based on the 
evidence of the properties whch hold in WO, then we can conclude that the physical laws are 
reliable to the extent that our knowledge of the properties of WO is complete. However. since 
there are certain facts about WO (for example about parts of the universe outside our solar 
system) that we do not currently know, and that we know that we do not know8, it is not valid 
to argue that our epistemic states are reliable indicators of physical possibility. We conclude 
that the identity of W can not be narrowed down according to what we take to be the physical 
laws of WO. although we can be fairly sure that close future temporal counterparts of \vO will 
probably adhere to current physical laws. 
5.3 Possible and Impossible Worlds. 
Could ~ 7 e  say then that all we know is that W contains a set of successive future temporal 
counterparts of WO and that these are contained in the set of possible worlds. Can we, in fact, 
even say ths  much? Is the set of worlds equivalent to the set of logically possible worlds, and 
if not must W be contained in the smaller set? 
*Consider the discovery (reported in the press in on January 18, 1996) of planets which orbit the 
stars 70 Virginus and 47 Ursae Majoris whose moons may have atmospheres containing liquid water 
and other essential features for the development of life similar to that found on Earth. These planets 
are only the h r d  and fourth known planetary systems (including our own Sun's); we do not currently 
know If conditions are suitable for life to develop in these planetary systems, and we do not know 
how many, if any, other planetary systems there are in our own Galaxy. 
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We can define a logically possible world wottt with respect to the current WO. as a world which 
has no properties that contradict the laws of logic which obtain in WO. For example, by this 
definition, any world which has a pair of contradictory properties such as can be truly 
described by the statement (A & -A) is not a logically possible counterpart of WO in which the 
law of the excluded middle stipulates - (A & -A). 
As with physical laws, we must decide whether to view the division between logical possibility 
and logical impossibility as a real distinction (in the modal realistic sense). or as an artefact of 
our incomplete knowledge. That is, we must decide whether logical possibility is a property 
of everything that is, or whether there is a set of worlds whch have the property of being 
logically impossible; i.e. whether the set of all logically possible worlds is actually a sub-set of 
the set of all worlds. This view of possible worlds rests on the notion that logic is a function 
of human psychology. If it is, then the location of the boundary between what is "logically" 
possible and what is "logically" impossible is a contingent feature of our particular \vo and 
therefore cannot delimit W .  
Bradley and Swartz (1979), whose conception of a world is as an abstract construct, 
nevertheless claim that the boundary between possible and impossible worlds is real9. They 
argue that the limits to possibility are not a function of human psjchologjr since possible 
worlds are not constrained by (nor are they obliged to extend to) the limits of conceivability 
and argue vehemently against the opposite view which they label "psychologism" (Bradley and 
Swartz, 1979). We find their argument unconvincing. To support the claim that logical 
possibility is distinct from conceivability they appeal to the hstorical example of ancient 
mathematicians attempting to square the circle, a procedure which Bradley and Swartz point 
out "we now know, and can prove, . . . is wholly beyond the bounds of possibility." (ibid. 
p.3). The problem with this argument lies with the reliance on "proof'. "To prove'' in this 
context means to show that somethmg is the case to the satisfaction of ourselves as analysts 
according to the rules of logic. the production of proof that possibility and 
conceivability do not coincide does not show that possibility and conceivability cannot 
Therefore, 
91nterestingly, Lewis who holds that worlds actually exist argues that there cannot be such a thing 
as an inconsistent world, although he may mean by this that a world cannot be internally inconsistent 
even though it might seem inconsistent to us with respect to our logic. 
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coincide. In other words, humans are not able to achieve the appropriate perspective from 
which to evaluate the relation between logic and human psychology. 
We conclude that the &vision between what is logically possible and what is logically 
impossible is arbitrarily determined by the contingent features of human psychology. Clearly, 
this conclusion would cause no difficulty in a theory which held that possible worlds were 
abstract entities of our own devising anyway. It might appear, however, that it would be a 
considerable problem for an approach which embraces modal realism. since if possible worlds 
actually exist then they must exist independent of any human knowledge of or beliefs about 
them, and so the limits of human conceivability might well not coincide with the boundary 
between possible and impossible worlds. It may be the case that there are no worlds tvhich 
contradict the laws of logic which hold in w70, but it may equally be the case that there are 
worlds which from our point of view would be logically inconsistent; for example. worlds with 
mutually contradictory pairs of properties. 
In fact. our conclusion does not hamper our acceptance of worlds as existent entities. We can 
propose that an infinite number of worlds, which we would label logicall), impossible. actuall). 
exist in a modal realistic sense. However, since natural languages function according to the 
laws of logic as we know them (e.g. entailment relies on the rule of the excluded middle), the 
worlds which are logically impossible are worlds which we cannot use our languages. in their 
current states, to talk about. and hence these worlds are irrelevant from the point of view of 
linguistics at least. In fact. such a world might be classified as irrelevant in an even more 
fundamental way since any world in which modus ponens does not hold is one which humans 
would never be able to understand. There is no reason to assume however, that because a 
world is linguistically irrelevant or incomprehensible to us, it foliows that it is actually 
impossible. Lewis (1986) notes without any anxiety that worlds can outstrip our capacity to 
describe them, and while this is a strong argument against the adequac), of a "linguistic ersatz" 
approach it presents no problem for modal realism. 
Since we have no reliable way to distinguish between possible and impossible worlds we 
cannot assume that worlds which we currently believe to be logically impossible are not 
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contained in W. We cannot be sure that W does not contain distant future counterparts of WO 
which are indescribable with our current languages. Since all of our laws of logic as well as 
our physical laws are based on observation of the current WO. (and its earlier temporal 
counterparts) there is not and cannot be any evidence available to us that our current intuitions 
about levels of possibility are mistaken. What we can be sure of is that if we attempt to make 
statements about logically impossible worlds, these statements will be ones to which we 
cannot assign truth-values. On a practical level then, it does not matter that there may be 
future counterparts of the current WO which are indescribable bj- virtue of being logically 
impossible, since we have already accepted that, in general, we have do not have sufficient 
access to future counterparts of wo to assign truth-values to statements about them. 
We can conclude that there is only one set of successive temporal counterparts in each W, but 
that we do not know which particular W we are in. We can identif4i some close temporal 
counterparts in the past and we can infer properties of more remote temporal counterparts in 
the past since we know that they must be consistent with the current WO. We can predict some 
properties of close temporal counterparts in the future fairly reliably. given that adjacent 
counterparts differ from their immediate neighbours by small numbers of properties. 
However, we cannot set boundaries which constrain the very remote future temporal 
counterparts in any way at all since our division of the set of worlds according to possibility is 
epistemically based. There are no particular repercussions, for the location theory presented 
here, from our decision to view differences in world type as epistemically based. since because 
WO shifts according to the location of a discourse, the most possible world is always the world 
in which some discourse participant exists, and the only accessible temporal counterparts must 
be consistent with it. 
5.3.1 Underspecification. 
One important question relating to the bounds of logical possibility concerns underspecified 
or incomplete worlds. As discussed in section 2.3. of Chapter 2 Fodor (1979) appeals to the 
notion of an underspecified or incomplete world to account for truth-valuelessness. She 
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argues that a truth-valueless sentence is about some world where it really is the case that some 
property neither holds nor fails to holdlO. For instance, Fodor describes the world where the 
King of France exists as a "particularly thm fiction" which is not specified for any property 
save the existence in it of the King of France. She assumes without any discussion that 
fictional worlds in general are underspecified, merely giving a pair of example sentences to 
illustrate her point. However, these sentences do not justifv Fodork conclusion that fictional 
worlds are underspecified. She compares the sentences given here as 5.09 and 5.10. 
5.09. Winnie-the-Pooh likes Tuesdays. 
5.10. The King of France likes Tuesdays. 
Fodor proposes that we do not know the truth-value of 5.09 because the world of Winnie-the- 
Pooh is not specified for his liking Tuesdays, and that this constitutes proof that the world is 
incomplete. She argues further that we can generalise this explanation to account for the 
perceived truth-valuelessness of 5.10. However, the worlds evoked by these two sentences 
are quite clearly very different in terms of potential possibility with respect to the current WO. 
The world in which we locate the referent of the name Winnie-the-Pooh in 5.09, which we 
will call WO"' is of necessity not a physically possible world since, in several ways. it is 
inconsistent with what we take to be the physical laws of the real world1 l .  Some world WO" in 
which we locate the referent of the King of France, on the other hand, could be a physically 
possible world with respect to WO. Since WO'" is a physically impossible world our argument 
is that, based on physical facts about WO. we are less able to make inferences about wet" than 
inferences about any worlds WO'' or WO', which intervene between WO and wottt in terms of 
possibility. That is, we cannot. using what we know about our own cognitive states, make 
inferences about the extent of, or limits to, the cognitive states of talking teddy bears, which 
are as reliable as inferences we could make about the cogmtive states of individuals such as 
the King of France; who can exist in physically possible worlds and are presumably human. 
We are free to choose whether Winnie-the-Pooh is human-like with respect to Tuesdays, or 
l0  see also chapter 4, section 4.4.2. 
'For example. if the process of evolution by natural selection operates according to a physical law 
then the evolution of a teddy bear with the capacity to learn a human language is not a feature of any 
physically possible world. 
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teddy-bear-like with respect to Tuesdays. If we choose the former it must either be true or 
false of him (in every logically possible world) that he likes Tuesdays: if we choose the latter 
liking Tuesdays is not a property with respect to whch he has either a positive or a negative 
value. Neither decision forces us to admit that WO"' is underspecified or incomplete: just as 
the failure of Sherlock Holmes to exist in the world of Star Trek does not render the world of 
Star Trek incomplete, and the lack of the ability to photosynthesise either by C4 metabolism 
or by C3 metabolism on the part of humans in the current WO does not render this world 
incomplete. 
However. we cannot conch de, simply on the basis that th' s world does not have to br 
incomplete. that no world is incomplete. Clearly, a world which contains entities which do not 
exist in it, or properties which do not hold of it, is not a consistent world from the point of 
view of the logical laws of the current WO; but since we have been forced to accept that our 
logical laws may not define all worlds, we have to acknowledge that such incomplete worlds 
may exist. Furthermore, we might be tempted to say, that given the existence of 
underspecified worlds, we have a ready-made explanation for truth-valuelessness . If there are 
worlds such that any statement about them is truth-valueless and there are sentences which are 
intuitively truth-valuelessness, it might seem that associating the two would provide an 
adequate explanation. 
There are two objections to this proposal. The first was made in Chapter 4 section 4.3 where 
we argued that it is not necessary to attempt to associate truth-valueless sentences with 
underspecified worlds since we can readily account for their truth-valuelessness on the basis 
of the limited knowledge of the hearers who attempt to assign the truth-values. The second 
objection relies on an acceptance of the view of interpretation laid out in the chapter 6. There 
we argue that the interpretation of a referring expression can be seen as the process of locating 
its referent and that ths process is separate from and prior to the fixing of a truth-value to the 
sentence in which the referring expression occurs. If we accept this view of interpretation it 
is nonsensical to argue that the reference world is chosen on the basis that it will prevent the 
assignment of a truth-value. If the resulting truth-value were an influencing factor in the 
choice of reference world it would be more plausible that a hearer would choose a reference 
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world whch rendered the sentence true. If the eventual truth-value is not an influencing factor 
in the choice of reference world, then any proponent of the argument that truth-valueless 
sentences are about under-specified worlds would have to advance some other kind of 
justification for ths  choice. In the following chapter, we set out an explanation of the rules 
governing the choice of reference world whch ensure the very opposite; that an underspecified 
world is never chosen over any other potential reference world. 
5.4 Familiarity 
The preceding discussion of counterparts and temporal counterparts does not account for all 
of the putative different types of worlds which were presented in Table 3.3. in chapter 3 
section 3.1.4 where we also distinguished fictional and mythological worlds from other types 
of counterpart worlds. Such worlds are distinct from the rest of the set of possible worlds in 
a way which we can define in terms of familiariq. The distinction between familiar and 
unfamiliar worlds is clearly fundamentally different from distinctions on the basis of 
possibility or W membership. It was this implicit assumption (that possibility ranking is 
distinct from any fictionaUmythologica1 status) which allowed us to use fictional worlds as 
examples of worlds at varying levels of possibility. While we concluded that it may be the 
case that our divisions along a scale of possibility have no basis in reality, but are simply 
reflections of our epistemic state, a division of the set of worlds into familiar and unfamiliar 
sub-sets is necessarily epistemically based since the partition is different for each individual. 
Let us assume that a fictional world is the clearest example of a familiar. established world 
that is not WO and a world invoked by a counterfactual modal statement to be the best example 
of an unfamiliar world. The worlds in which we locate the referents of the subject NPs in 
5.1 1 and 5.12, for example, can be taken as representatives of worlds of these two types. 
5.1 1. 
5.12. 
Scarlett O'Hara was not beautiful. 
Chelsea Clinton's sister might be called Belgravia. 
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Although the amount of knowledge we have about these two worlds is different and our 
potential for assigning truth-values to statements about individuals in each of them is 
correspondingly different, there is no justification, if we accept that worlds exist in a modal 
realistic sense, for arguing that the worlds themselves are of fundamentally different types 
from each other. There is no property or set of properties for some world which can determine 
whether that world is a fictional world. Fictional worlds are simply those counterparts with 
which we are familiar from works of fiction. To illustrate what we mean by familiarity, let us 
consider sentences 5.13 and 5.14. 
5.13. 
5.14. 
Scarlet OlHara is a Southern Belle. 
Belgravia Clinton is a Bloomsbury bluestocking. 
5.13 can be interpreted as a true statement about an individual in a familiar. fictional world. 
the world invoked by Gone with the Wind, which we will call WO". while 5.14 can onljr be 
interpreted as a true statement if the subject NP is interpreted as referring to an entity in a 
different counterpart world which we will call ~ 0 ' " ~ ~ .  In terms of their inherent properties 
these two worlds have to be taken to be of exactly the same type. Both worlds are connected 
to the current WO by a number of counterpart links. That is. starting from the current WO, it is 
possible to change the value of one property to arrive at a one-place counterpart of WO and 
then to change a second property of this world to arrive at a two-place counterpart of WO and 
so on, until we arrive at a world in which either every proposition asserted in Gone w h  the 
Wznd is true, or it is true that a counterpart of President Clinton has another daughter u7ho is 
called Belgravia and who is a Bloomsbury bluestockmg. 
However, we want to be able to distinguish these two worlds to reflect the intuition that one, 
WO", is an established familiar world which we have accessed before and will presumably 
access again, and one, WO"', is accessed for the first time for the purpose of interpreting the 
current sentence and may never be accessed again. To do this we propose a final relation, 
I2Note that all we are saying here is that these worlds are potential reference worlds which will 
produce truth-values of true. We are not arguing that these sentences are perceived as true or 
predicting that these reference worlds would be chosen by a hearer in a discourse. The issue of how) 
reference worlds are chosen is the topic of the next chapter. 
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which we will call an epistemic link &, whch will define another layer of structure on the set 
of possible worlds by whch familiar worlds are distinguished from counterparts in general. 
An epistemic link & connects an individual i E A in WO to WO' if WO' is a familiar world with 
respect to i .  A familiar world for i ,  is a world WO' in which at least one a E A' has at least one 
property for which i knows the value. That is, WO' is a familiar world for I, if I has assigned a 
truth-value to some sentence which expresses a proposition about an entity in WO'. Because 
we propose that the location of referring expressions precedes the assignment of truth-values 
during interpretation, there must be some previous sentence which a hearer has assigned a 
truth-value to that establishes a world as familiar during the interpretation of a current 
sentence. This distinguishes the world WO" in which Scarlet O'Hara exists from a world WO'" 
in which Belgravia Clinton exists since we are familiar kvith the value of.fjArfher properties of 
~ 7 0 "  besides those which are specified in sentence 5.1313. Since only one assignment of a 
truth-value is necessary to establish a world as familiar, the set of familiar worlds contains 
many more worlds than the generally familiar worlds of fiction and m~$hologj*. The set of 
familiar worlds for some individual will contain, as well as these which are familiar worlds for 
many other individuals, counterparts invoked by private jokes which are onljr familiar worlds 
for a restricted number of individuals, and dream-worlds or fantasjr worlds which might be 
undistinguished counterpart worlds for every other individual. 
We u7ill not distinguish between the initial act which connects WO through some individual to 
some ~70 '  for the first time, from any subsequent act which establishes that WO' as a familiar 
world for other individuals. Thus, we are forced to assume that the author of some fiction has 
the same type of epistemic link with the fictional world as any reader of that fiction. This is 
slightly at odds with the view that an epistemic llnk is brought about by an act of truth-value 
assignment, since if a work of fiction is seen as a discourse, the author is the speaker and the 
reader is the hearer, and we have, up until now, characterised truth-value assignment as a 
process carried out by the hearer in a discourse. However, since there is no possibility of de 
131f we think of WO"' as a world exactly like WO except for the properties specified by the propositions 
expressed in 5.14 it might appear that we have, in fact, determined the value of further properties of 
that world, but it should be remembered that WO'" is a counterpart of WO and although properties of 
WO are copied into WO''' the sets of items and attributes of WO''' are not the same entities as the sets of 
items and attributes in WO. 
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re knowledge about fictional worlds, we can argue that, given a modal realistic view of 
worlds, both an author and a reader of a piece of fiction, when they assign truth-values in the 
fictional world, are choosing some world from among the set Qf existing worlds. The 
argument that an author creates a world, which a reader only views, is at odds with the 
hndamental idea of modal realism that all worlds actually exist. 
Figure 5.6. shows a partial diagram of the set of epistemic links in U. 
Figure 5.6. 
Epistemic links in Log. P 
In this diagram WO is the current world, W is the set of temporal counterparts of WO and WO- 
30 is the past temporal counterpart of WO 1964. W '  is the set of technologically possible 
counterparts of WO and in it w-100' is a world containing Sherlock Holmes and WO-100 is a 
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world containing Sherlock Holmes and his wife. W"' is the set of physically possible 
counterparts of WO and in it w-2011' is a world containing Col. Steve Austin. nr-20 is a world 
containing Col. Steve Austin and his twin daughters. W"" is thc set of logically possible 
counterparts of WO, and in it w + 2 5 0 ~ ~ ~ ~  is a world containing Mr Chekhov, and w+2jo is a 
world containing Mr Chekhov and his prize-winning guinea pig. There is an entity i which 
bears the name Gene Roddenberry in w-30, the temporal counterpart of WO which held in 
1964 and an entity, j which bears the name Norma Major in WO. 
If the single headed arrows in Fig. 5.6. are read as representations of epistemic links, then we 
can understand the following relations from the depicted links. 
There i s  an initial epistemic link b1 from i in w-30 to a world ~ + 2 j o ~ ~ ~ ~  in which an entity 
whch bears the name Mr Chekhov exists which (along with many other properties) identifies 
w+2501111 as the world of Star Trek. There is no such epistemic link between i and w+2jo. 
We can assume, on the strength of the cultural importance of Sherlock Holmes, that there is 
also an epistemic link between i in w-30. and ~'-1001, the world invoked in the stories of 
Arthur Conan Doyle, but no such link between i and "-100. We also assume that there is an 
epistemic link from j in WO to w-2011; i.e. we assume that Norma Major has assigned truth- 
values to statements about entities in the world invoked by The Six Million Dollar Man. In 
contrast, there is no possible epistemic link between i in "-30 and M'-20~~, since the initial 
epistemic link from an individual in W is from a temporal counterpart which is not accessible 
from w-30, that is from a future temporal counterpart. 
There is one final stipulation we must make concerning the structure of the set of possible 
worlds before moving on to a discussion of the location theory itself. As we noted above, any 
familiar world which is accessible to an individual in some other world by an epistemic link, 
is also accessible via a string of counterpart relations between the two worlds. Since an 
epistemic link is a direct link from some individual to another world and, in contrast, the n- 
place counterpart relation which connects two worlds is an indirect link via n-1 intervening 
counterparts, we can say that a familiar world such as w+2501111 is closer to WO than its close 
counterparts such as w+250, if we take epistemic links to be short-cuts to other worlds. 
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5.5. summary. 
In this chapter we have established a complex, structure-rich set of worlds arranged across 
several dimensions according to a principle of relative proximity. We proposed that given 
some world WO, a set of counterpart relations can be defined which connect all other worlds to 
WO, such that across an infinite number of dimensions the nearest world to WO is an almost 
identical copy of it which differs from it by the value of one property or minimal bundle of 
properties, the next nearest by two properties or minimal bundles of properties and so on, 
where a property of a world is the existence in it of some item or attribute. We discussed the 
possibility of defining a particular set of counterparts which are temporally consistent; having 
acknowledged the difficulh of stating the definition of such a set in a non-circular way, we 
opted to depend on the evidence of clear cases, to define the distinction between consistent and 
inconsistent sets of worlds. Finally, we proposed sets of epistemic links which hold between 
individuals and worlds with which these individuals are familiar; familiarity being defined as 
the relation a hearer has with a world in which he or she has assigned a t ru th -~a lue*~  
Fig. 5.7. represents a partial diagram of some of the counterparts of the current WO (labelled 
1996). 
14A hearer has assigned a truth-value "in" a world if there is an entity in that world and a statement 
which the hearer has interpreted as being about that entity, and the hearer has assigned a truth-value 
to that statement. 
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Figure 5.7. 
Three dimensions of the set of possible worlds. 
A contains worlds increasingly remote from WO nith respect to their ontology: in the nearest 
world, the counterpart of Chelsea Clinton has a sister; in the next nearest the counterpart of 
Chelsea Clinton has a sister and the counterpart of Michael Jackson has a son; and another 
more remote world contains counterparts of these two individuals and individuals which are 
the wives of a counterpart of the Pope. B represents a series of counterparts of LVO which are 
increasingly remote with respect to their possibility according to the properties of WO: a world 
where weekends on Mars are available is technologically impossible, a world where bilingual 
hamsters exists is physically impossible, and a world containing non-existent entities is 
logically impossible. C represents some of the temporal counterparts of WO. Note that those 
worlds which may be the future versions of WO are not distinguished from other types of 
counterparts. The dotted lines in fig. 5.7. represent epistemic links between some individual 
in 1996 and two worlds where the named entities exist. 
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In the following chapter we will employ this structured set of worlds in a discussion of 
problems surrounding the interpretation of referring expressions and the assignment of truth- 
values to utterances containing them. 
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Chapter 6. 
Interpretation Using Possible Worlds 
6.1. Interpretation 
The theory we propose is one whch applies to discourses rather than isolated sentences, 
embraces pragmatic as well as semantic aspects of meaning and takes account of the 
epistemic states and limits of discourse participants. In ths  framework we use the term 
"interpretation" to refer to a dynamic process by which the hearer in a discourse evaluates 
utterances of both referring expressions and sentences. The discussion of interpretation in this 
chapter depends on three assumptions which we will attempt briefly to justifil: we assume; a. 
that the interpretation of referring expressions is fundamentally different from the 
interpretation of statements about them; b. that the interpretation of referring expressions can 
be seen as the act of locating referents while the interpretation of statements can be equated 
with truth-value assignment; c. that truth-values are properties of utterances. 
6.1.1. Distinguishing the Interpretation of Referring Expressions from the 
Interpretation of Utterances. 
One important distinction between a location theory and a semantics which employs a formal 
model theory (such as DRT or Montague Grammar; Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Cann, 1993) is 
that instead of embedding whole sentences in worlds (or models), a location theory embeds 
individual referents in worlds. As a result we can analyse sentences as being about 
indwiduals, rather than about worlds. We are following Frege in this who maintains that 
sentences are not about worlds. He stated that "The referents of our worlds are what we talk 
about." (Geach and Black, 1980). It is this which allows us to analyse sentences with pairs 
of referring expressions as statements about individuals in two or more separate worlds, such 
as sentence 6.01 and 6.02, as well as sentences with pairs of referring expressions which co- 





The Tin Man and Dr Watson called on J.R. Ewing for tea. 
Oliver Sacks looks a lot like Santa Claus. 
Oliver Sacks looks nothing like Jeremy Paxman. 
By advocating a split between the interpretation of referring expressions and the interpretation 
of whole sentences, we can handle so-called presuppositional effects. Let us consider, 
sentence 6.04, for example: 
6.04 Somewhere a student is weeping. 
The interpretation component of DRT requires a hearer of 6.04 to find some individual and 
check that that individual is first, a student and second, weeping. In contrast. a location 
theory requires a hearer of 6.04 to find some individual that is a student and check that they 
are weeping. This distinction can buy us the possibility of arguing that where we find a 
referent has a different effect on the interpretation of a sentence than whether we find a 
p r o p e q .  
6.1.2. Modelling Interpretation. 
The second decision we must justifi. is our decision to equate the interpretation of whole 
utterances with the act of assigning truth-values.' It is widely accepted in the fields of 
semantics and pragmatics that communication is not primarily concerned with the transferring 
of knowledge of true statements from speaker to hearer, and that correspondingly truth-value 
assignment is not equivalent to interpretation. Lyons states that 'I. . . the transmission of 
descriptive mformation is not usually an end in itself." (Lyons, 1977: p725) and claims that ". 
. . the sender's desire to convince the receiver that such-and-such is true commonly derives 
from or is associated with some other purpose." (ibid.: 34) He proceeds to make a tentative 
suggestion that . . . it may be the case (and it commonly is) that what we actually say is 
'Clearly, we must also justify taking the interpretation of referring expressions to be an act of 
location. However, this cannot be done until the apparatus of the current theory is in place. The 
working of the location theory is the topic of much of the remainder of this chapter. 
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uninformative, in that the receiver knows (and we know that he knows) whatever fact it is that 
we are drawing to hls attention." (ibid.: 35). 
Sperber and Wilson (1 986) go even hrther towards de-emphasising truth-value assignment in 
the area of interpretation as a whole by suggesting that not only is truth or falsity not central 
to linguistic communication but that linguistic communication is not central to communication 
as a whole: "we believe that the kind of explicit communication that can be achieved by the 
use of language is not a typical but a limiting case." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: p55). 
Sperber and Wilson explain the recurrent interest in the role of truth in communication as an 
artefact of the limits of linguists, although it is not clear whether they mean to imply that 
linguists in general are lazy or simply unimaginative. 
"With assertions, often taken to be the most basic case, the informative 
intention is taken as the intention to induce in an audience the belief that a 
certain proposition is true. There is a very good reason for anyone who is 
concerned with the role of inference in communication to assume that what 
is communicated is propositional: it is relatively easjr to sa!' what 
propositions are and how inferences might operate over propositions. I' 
(Sperber & Wilson. 1986: p57) 
What then is our justification for concentrating, not only on the interpretation of declarative 
sentential linguistic acts of communication but restricting our attention to the reputedly small 
and unimportant part of interpretation that is truth-value assignment? We are not convinced 
that communicative acts which rely on the transmitting and decoding of factual statements are 
as rare as the quotations above suggest. This thesis, for instance, is an example of an 
extended act of communication which is entirely linguistic and is to a large extent, concerned 
with transmitting factual statements. Few linguists would claim that communication generally 
consists only of transmitting and assigning truth-values to assertions, but on the other hand 
few would deny that these procedures are not part of linguistic communication. We claim that 
interpretation using the system of implicatures introduced by Grice (1975) can only be 
initiated once it has been established by a hearer that an utterance is false, since it i s  this 
which allows the inference that the factual statement it expresses cannot be the information 
intended by the speaker to be recovered (Grice. 1975). Lyons also concludes that ' I .  . . it may 
be assumed, however, that the interpretation of non-informative utterances trades upon our 
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ability to interpret the same utterances in contexts in which they would be informative." 
(Lyons, 1977: 35). and Levinson includes "truth" as the first component of the 
communicative content of an utterance (Levinson, 1983). If the assumption is correct that 
truth-value assignment is an important part, although perhaps not the ultimate goal, of 
interpretation, then it is crucial to have a satisfactory explanation of the rules governing the 
process. 
6.1.3. The locus oftmth. 
The final assumption we must defend is that truth-values are properties associated with 
utterances. There are hvo other types of linguistic item which might be regarded as the 
bearers of truth-values; propositions and declarative sentences. The choice between the three 
options, is perhaps more a matter of terminology than anything more fundamental since. as we 
claim below, the proponents of the argument that truth-values are properties of propositions. 
and the proponents of the argument that truth-values are properties of sentences. generally 
acknowledge the role of utterances as well. 
There are two difficulties, although as we noted they may not be serious ones, which arise 
from taking a proposition to be the locus of a truth-value. First, propositions are notoriously 
difficult to define in a satisfactoqr way. Propositions have been variouslj. defined as, 
concepts, meanings, parts of meanings, and the sense of sentences: all definitions which 
themselves rest on ambiguous terms, or at least terms which are difficult to define. It is a 
contested point, besides, what krnd of things propositions are, whether psychological entities 
or abstract constructs (Lyons, 1977). The association of truth with propositions when 
propositions themselves have no universally accepted definition leads to the appearance of 
complete mutual incompatibility between different theories concerned with truth. For 
example, consider the following quotations from Cann (1 993) and Bradley & Swartz ( 1979): 
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"A proposition may be true or false." (Cann, 1993: 14) 
"Propositions are those things to which truth and falsity may be attributed." (Bradley 
& Swartz, 1979: 79) 
"Propositions may vary in their truth value from utterance occasion to utterance 
occasion" (Cann, 1993: 14) 
"We shall assume . . . that propositions are omni-temporally (and for that matter 
omni-spatially) true or false." (Bradley and Swartz, 1979: 107) 
The underlying cause of such apparent incompatibility is, we claim, bound up with the second 
problem with associating truth with propositions. which is that it is inarguable that truth or 
falsity is tied to utterance occasions; but because there is no accepted definition of a 
proposition, there is no accepted way to associate propositions with utterance occasions. This 
allows Bradley and Swartz to assume that identical utterances produced on two separate 
occasions with opposing truth-values must be associated with two different propositions, but 
it also a l l o ~  Cann to assume when identical utterances are produced on two separate 
occasions with two different truth-values, that they are associated with the same proposition, 
but that the proposition is associated with a different truth-value on each occasion. It is worth 
noting that Bradley & Swartz. who claim that truth-values (associated with propositions) are 
timeless. are forced as a result to distinguish between "truth" and "actual truth" and they 
concede that in deciding whether or not truth refers to actual truth "what matters is who uses it 
[i.e. the term frue]" (Bradley & Swartz. 1979). 
Some formal linguists working in Montague Grammar or other theories Lvhich employ 
predicate logic (e.g. DRT), associate truth and falsity with sentences (or formulae or 
grammatical strings) (Dowty. Wall and Peters, 1981). Again, it is not clear whether the 
association of truth with sentences in Montague Grammar constitutes a serious theoretical 
claim which is distinct from associating truth with propositions, or is simpl). a convenient use 
of terminology based on the assumption that sentences and propositions co-occur. In addition. 
since "most sentences in natural language are context-dependent in some way or other" 
(Allwood, Andersson & Dahl, 1977:)2 it appears that the sentence which is assigned a truth- 
value in Montague Grammar is understood to be a sentence with a context attached. 
21n fact, if tense is viewed as a type of deixis then all sentences are context dependent. 
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It appears then that both theories whch associate truth with sentences, and theories which 
associate truth with propositions, appeal to features of the context. We can conclude that if it 
is possible in the framework of a theory to associate truth with utterances (which unite 
sentences, propositions and contexts) then there is no fundamental objection to proposing this 
particular option. The theory of interpretation presented in this thesis takes a dynamic, 
discourse level approach in which the roles of speaker and hearer are differentiated; and truth- 
value assignment is understood as a process undertaken by specific hearers. Because of this 
the current framework is particularly well-suited to an analysis of truth as a feature of 
utterance$. 
6.2. Interpretation Using Possible Worlds. 
The central problem which we have identified in combining a modal realistic view of possible 
worlds and an analysis of the interpretation of linguistic expressions, is that, if we accept the 
claims of modal realism, we must accept that for any statement, there are worlds in which that 
statement is true and worlds in whch it is false, since the set of worlds contains every possible 
combination of entities. properties and relations. However, since not every statement uttered 
is perceived as true (or false), predicting truth-value assignment is equivalent to predicting the 
choice of reference world. We must now show that the proposed arrangement of worlds 
translates into some means by which the choice of reference world made during interpretation 
can be predicted. 
6.2.1. Accessing the Current World. 
The first proposal we make is that world choice is hctated in a very simple waj’ according to 
31t is perhaps unfortunate, given our claim that truth-values are properties of utterances. that the 
present written format forces us to talk about the truth-values of written tokens of sentences. We 
persevere with this however, since it is only if readers evaluate competing potential interpretations 
with respect to the real, current, context of this thesis that we can avoid the effects of any implicit 
filling-in of some other context whch may vary from reader to reader. and which might affect 
intuitive truth-value assignments in a potentially misleading way. 
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accessibility: and that the most accessible world is the nearest world. That is, hearers will try 
to locate referents for referring expressions in the nearest world along some dimension. Since 
discourses take place in worlds, we predict that hearers will try to locate referents in the Lvorld 
in which the discourse is taking place. If this idea is correct we would predict that 6.05 in the 
current WO, where the nearest world is the world in which this thesis is being written, will be 
interpreted as a reference to an entity in this world, and that 6.06 will be interpreted as being a 
statement about that entity. 6.06 will be assigned the truth-value true if it is considered to 
represent an accurate statement about that entity. 
6.05. Richard Branson. 
6.06. hchard Branson has done rather well for himself. 
To be sure that the choice of reference world for 6.05 and 6.06 is determined b>* accessibility 
alone and is not influenced by any pressure to interpret the sentence as true, we must 
determine what reference world is chosen in the interpretation of sentences which we perceive 
to be false and sentences which we perceive to be truth-valueless. If we consider sentences 
6.07 and 6.08, we can see that these too are perceived to be statements about an entity in the 
current WO. even though our intuition may not assign them the truth-value true. 
6.07. 
6.08. &chard Branson sleeps soundly 
hchard Branson is poor but proud. 
If the choice of reference world for 6.07 was influenced by some kind of pressure to interpret 
the sentence as true, it would be expected that 6.07 would be interpreted as a statement about 
an entity in a counterpart of WO in which the counterpart of hchard Branson was poor but 
proud. This does not appear to be the case. Instead we interpret 6.07 as a false statement 
about an entity in WO. Likewise, if the choice of reference world was governed to some extent 
by the pressure to assign some truth-value, no matter which one, then we would predict that a 
hearer of sentence 6.08 who &d not know whether or not hchard Branson in WO sleeps 
soundly, would interpret sentence 6.08 as a statement about an entity in a counterpart world. 
Again, the intuition about 6.08 does not support this analysis; it is perceived to be a statement 
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about an entity in WO to which we cannot assign a truth-value. On the strength of these three 
examples, we can state, as a rule of interpretation, that hearers will locate referents in WO. no 
matter what truth-value, if any, this yields. 
6.2.2. Accessing Familiar Worlds. 
Recall that we suggested that epistemic links between an individual in one world and some 
other world should be understood as short-cuts between worlds. This allows us to retain the 
characterisation of accessibility as equivalent to proximio, and to define some individual's set 
of familiar worlds as the nearest and hence the most accessible worlds after WO (the world in 
which the individual exists). On the strength of this we predict that 6.09 and 6.10 are 
interpreted as statements about two separate worlds, which are both very remote from WO in 




Scarlet O'Hara was not beautiful. 
Sherlock nestled in silence into his heavy coat. 
It should be noted that although 6.09 and 6.10 are identical to sentences which appear in Gone 
with the Wind and The Hound qf  the Baskewilles, it is not their resulting indisputable truth 
which influences the choice of reference world, since sentences 6.09a and 6.09b are 
interpreted as being about the same entity as 6.09, and 6.10a and 6.10b are interpreted as 
being about the same entity as 6.10 even though the a. sentences are perceived as false and the 
b. sentences cannot be assigned any truth-value. 
6.09a. Scarlet O'Hara was a Yankee carpetbagger. 
6.09b. Scarlet O'Hara never scratched her chcken pox. 
6.1Oa. Sherlock Holmes was kind but stupid. 
6. lob. Sherlock Holmes rarely changed his socks. 
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By accepting that an epistemic link is a short-cut we can continue to think of the world 
invoked by Gone with the Wind as nearer or more accessible to WO than some counterpart 
world which is identical to the WO except for the existence in it of Scarlet O'Hara. even though 
this counterpart has more properties identical to properties of WO than the world invoked by 
Gone with the Wind has4. 
6.2.3. Accessing Counterparts, 
6.2.3.1. Sign-posted Counterparts. 
The remaining worlds available as the locations of referents are those which we labelled 
counterpart worlds. We will make a distinction behveen two types of counterparts on the basis 
of the processes by which the]; are accessed. The first of these, we will call sign-posted 
counterparts which may be accessed when sy-tactic constructions act as sign-posts that 
indicate the need for shifts into counterpart worlds. The syntactic sign-posts which trigger 
shifts into counterpart worlds are modal constructions such as would and might and the 
counterfactual zf ... then construction. 6.11 - 6.13 are examples of sentences which are 
interpreted by locating the subject NPs in sign-posted counterparts. 
6.1 1. Camille Paglia's daughter would never play with Barbie dolls. 
6.12. 
6.13. 
Chelsea Clinton's sister might not be a Democrat. 
If the Pope's wife were a Catholic, then the Cardinals would be happy 
We propose that would, might and counterfactual zf ... then in 6.11 - 6.13 indicate the need 
for a shift into a minimal counterpart world of WO. A minimal counterpart world of w70. for 
6.12 for example, is a world identical to w70 except for the existence in it of an individual w7ho 
is the sister of the counterpart of Chelsea Clinton in WO. 
41f the propositions explicitly stipulated in Gone with the Wind were analysed as a minimal bundle of 
properties associated with the existence in any world of Scarlet O'Hara, then the familiar world 
would be a minimal counterpart of wo. However, this cannot be correct. If all the properties of 
worlds are copied into minimal counterparts, then it would not be possible to make modal 
statements. 
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The reference worlds employed in the interpretation of sentences 6.1 1 - 6.13 are counterparts 
on two counts since even without the syntactic signposts, the referents of the subject could not 
be located in familiar worlds. However, we propose that syntactic signposts alone can trigger 




The Princess of Wales would never wear a nose ring. 
The Rolling Stones might retire some day. 
If Ian Botham were ten years younger, England could win the next Test. 
We claim that syntactic signposts also facilitate moves into counterparts of other established 
worlds as well as WO. This is shown in examples 6.17- 6.19. 
6.17. If Scarlet OlHara had been a Yankee carpet-bagger she would never have 
been hungry or poor. 
If Sherlock Holmes was stupid, he might be happier and easier to live with. 
If Mr Spock's wife were a Klingon. their children would not be human. 
6.18. 
6.19. 
Again, we emphasise that the choice of reference world for the type of sentence currently 
under discussion is independent from the question of truth-value assignment. Some sentences 
interpreted using sign-posted counterparts are perceived to be true, e.g. 6.20, some are 




Chelsea Clinton's sister might not be a Democrat. 
Sherlock Holmes' brother could not have a birth-mark on his bottom. 
If the Pope's wife were a Catholic, the cardinals would be happy. 
The traditional role of possible worlds in modal logic has been to facilitate an account of the 
truth-values of modal and counterfactual statements (McCawley, 1981). The set of possible 
worlds as a whole has been invoked, along with such additional theoretical tools as Lewis's 
operation of local entailment (Lewis. 1973), and Nute's notion of a threshold of relevance. 
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(Nute, 1975), to account for the semantics of modals and counterfactuals in terms of 
quantification over sub-sets of worlds. It may appear that the use of possible worlds in the 
current theory, where they are employed individually as locations for referents, results in a net 
loss of explanatory power since we do not claim to be able to predict a truth-value for ever). 
modal sentence. 
We claim, instead, that the possibility of assigning a truth-value to a sentence interpreted 
using sign-posted counterparts rests, as in other cases, on the particular property or relation 
being predicated of the entity chosen as referent and the hearer's epistemic access to and 
consequent knowledge about the reference world. The reference worlds employed in the 
interpretation of 6.20 - 6.22 are unfamiliar worlds and the properties predicated of Chelsea 
Clinton's sister, Sherlock Holmes' brother, the Pope's wife, and the cardinals are contingent. 
Therefore the interpreter of 6.20 - 6.22 is unable to assign truth-values just as he or she is 
unable to assign truth-values to 6.23. 
6.23. The Princess of Wales' first nanny had green eyes. 
When we look closel). at expositions of the meaning of counterfactuals and modal statements 
which invoke quantification over possible worlds. we typically find only statements of their 
truth-conditions not predictions their truth-values. For example. McCawley ( 198 1 ) discusses 
the counterfactual sentence repeated here as 6.24. 
6.24. If Rosalyn had had an affair with Kennedy, Jimmy would have divorced 
her. 
McCawley (1 98 1) argues that for 6.24 to be true, supposing 
"...that there are three worlds in which Rosa lp  had an affair with Kennedy that 
are the same distance from the real world and are closer to the real world than any 
other worlds in which Rosalyn had an affair with Kennedy ... he must have 
divorced her in all three of those worlds.'' 
(McCawley, 198 1 : p322). 
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f i s  much is unexceptional. But we claim that for 6.24 to be perceived as a true statement on 
some occasion of utterance would require an impossible degree of access to other worlds in 
that we would have to be able to veri@ unknown properties of the minimal counterpart in 
which Rosalyn had an affair with Kennedy. 
In the discussion so far we have only considered counterfactual conditionals. It i s  our 
proposal that the interpretation of indicative conditionals do not necessarily trigger shifts to 
counterparts in order to locate referents. Sentence 6.25 for example is about entities located 
in the current WO. 
6.25. If Bill Clinton is incubating diphtheria, then Hilary is too. 
It is necessary to invoke possible worlds, in order to state the truth-conditions of 6.25. using 
modal logic, but it is not necessary to invoke an individual sign-posted counterpart of WO as 
the existential location for either of the required referents. Clearly however. it is often the 
case that at least the consequent clause of an indicative conditional, contains a modal verb and 
if so then this syntactic feature can trigger a shift to a sign-posted counterpart. For example: 
6.26. If Bill Clinton is incubating diphtheria. Hilary might die soon. 
If both clauses describe future states of affairs then again sign-posted counterparts will be 
employed as existential locations, but this location will be triggered by the modals not by the 
indicative construction. For example: 
6.27. If Bill Clinton loses the election, Hilary will start I 
again. 
sing her o ?I name 
We will now turn to a discussion of the processes involved in accessing temporal counterparts 
which share features of familiar worlds and sign-posted counterparts. 
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6.2.3.2. Temporal counterparts. 
In chapter 5, we discussed relationships between temporal counterparts in terms of 
consistency. Another feature of some of the temporal counterparts of a world WO, which we 
will focus on in the following discussion of how temporal counterparts are accessed. is that 
they may be familiar worlds for the individuals who exist in WO. For example. an individual 
may have direct experience of a temporal counterpart by virtue of having lived through it, or 
may have indirect experience of it by virtue of written hstories. oral legends. archaeological 
discoveries etc. We propose that familiar temporal counterparts are accessed in exactlq, the 
same direct way as other types of familiar worlds. For example. the referents of the subject 
NPs of sentences 6.28 and 6.29 are both located via direct epistemic links to familiar worlds. 
6.28. 
6.29. 
Queen Elizabeth I was very fond of Sir Walter Raleigh for a while. 
Gandalf the Grejr was very fond of Bilbo Baggins. 
The view that the set of temporal counterparts of the current WO contains sub-sets of familiar 
worlds for individuals is made possible by our decision to restrict the application of & links 
which hold between WO and other worlds to earlier versions of WO. Future versions of WO. we 
claim, cannot be linked with WO via R, and hence it is not possible for individuals in WO to 
have epistemic llnks with these worlds. 
All sentences which are interpreted as statements about familiar entities in temporal 
counterparts have an additional feature, however, whch is not associated with sentences 
about entities in other types of familiar worlds. This is that the tense of the verb indicates the 
temporal link between the reference world and the world in which the discourse takes place. 
We can thnk of tense as another type of syntactic signpost. We propose that the direction of 
the syntactic signpost into the temporal counterpart and the established location of the familiar 
entity must be compatible, if a sentence is to be interpreted as a non-anomalous statement 
about an entity in a temporal counterpart. 
For example, the subset of temporal counterparts of WO which contain the entity Queen 
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Victoria are familiar worlds for many individuals in the current WO. An!. instance of the 
referring expression Queen Victoria, is therefore interpreted using one of these familiar 
worlds. If a syntactic signpost. in a sentence containing the referring expression Queen 
Victoria, also points into an earlier temporal counterpart then there is no difficulty. Thus, we 
predict that sentence 6.30 will be interpreted as a statement about an entity in an earlier 
temporal counterpart of WO and that the reference world is chosen via an epistemic link. The 
past tense form of the verb merely confirms the location of the reference world with respect to 
WO. 
6.30. Queen Victoria had eight children. 
In contrast, sentence 6.3 1 is anomalous in the current contexq. 
6.3 1 . ?Queen Victoria has eight children. 
The name Queen Victoria takes us to an earlier temporal counterpart of WO via an epistemic 
link, but the present tense form of the verb does not confirm this choice. We claim that the 
reference world is chosen on the basis of the referring expression and that in this case the 
syntactic signpost cannot force a re-analysis, since no referent is available in the current 
worldS. 
The opposite effect can be observed in sentence 6.32, where there is a referent for the definite 
in the current world, but the tense of the verb, which is a syntactic signpost into an earlier 
counterpart, forces a re-analysis. 
6.32. The Prince of Wales, a tragic figure, died young. 
McCawley (1981) discusses the following pair of sentences which on his theory should be true but 
are perceived as anomalous (McCawley, 1981: 3 16): 
??ifLondon were in England, the Queen of England would live in London. 
??if Nixon had resigned in 1974, Ford would have become president. 
It may be that the anomaly lies in the fact that there are referents available in WO and yet syntactic 
signposts point us towards counterparts. 
page 176 
We claim that the re-analysis is due to the availability of a referent for the Prince of Wales 
among the earlier temporal counterparts of WO and cannot be explained as the result of 
pressure to produce a reading which can be interpreted as true, or even one which can be 
assigned a truth-value. If the Prince of Wales is taken to refer in k v o  the sentence must be 
interpreted as false. We predict that even for hearers who are unable to assign a truth-value 
to 6.32, if it is taken to refer in an earlier counterpart, will locate the referent there, and that 
only hearers who did not know that "Prince of Wales" is a hereditary title rather than a name 
would interpret 6.32 as a false statement about an entity in the current "oh. 
We can show that re-analysis triggered by a syntactic signpost can occur when the original 
location of a referent is an earlier temporal counterpart, if there is an available referent in the 
current WO. Because a referring expression is generally interpreted as referring to an entity in 
WO if one is available anyway, we must set up a context to block this location process, in 
order to see that a syntactic signpost can also trigger location in the current world. Consider 
sentence 6.3 3 : 
6.33. The Madness of George I11 is set in the time of Parliament's first attempt to 
impose a regent)'. Many MPs on both sides of the house sal' they enjoyed it. 
We claim that, given the priming context, many MPs on both sides of the house is first 
interpreted by locating its referents in 1788. The present tense form say does not confirm this 
location and so the indefinite is re-analysed as a reference to a sub-set of the set of MPs in WO. 
Again, we cannot argue that truth-value assignment is a factor in this choice as the second 
sentence (disregarding its tense) is equally plausible on either reading; i.e. as a statement that 
many Tory and Whig MPs enjoyed the Regency Bill or as a statement that many Tor). and 
Labour MPs enjoyed the play. We conclude that the interpretation of the indefinite is not 
affected by the hearer's ability or inability to assign a truth-value on either reading. 
By proposing that referents are located in ws rather than in Ws we have avoided any 
%ee chapter 7 section 7.2.2.  for a discussion of the distinction between the Prince of Wales as a 
name and a referring expression 
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discussion of the implications of the perdurance through time of real-world entities or of the 
different interpretation processes associated with different verb tqpes; e.g. "instantaneous" 
events such as drop a cup and states such as be asleep. These are complex issues and some 
of the potential problems they pose will be dealt with in chapter 7. However, since some of 
the difficulty in this area arises from our lack of epistemic access to any future versions of WO 
the same problems do not arise when we consider the operation of syntactic signposts with 
respect to familiar worlds other than WO. 
There are several factors which might influence the interpretation of syntactic signposts with 
respect to these worlds. Up until now when we have discussed fictional entities we have 
referred to their existence in counterparts of wo; that is other temporally instantaneous worlds. 
However, since fictions and myths are not references to instantaneous events but describe 
sequences of events which take place in intervals of time, it is more accurate to take referring 
expressions such as Scarlet O'Hara and Mr Spock to refer to entities which exist in the way 
real world individuals exist in WO: that is to assume that these fictional individuals are made 
up of temporal stages which occupy a series of temporal counterparts of some W. 
For fictional Ws which are set in counterparts of the real world, whether physically possible 
or not. we can distinguish those which are set in counterpart pasts, such as Gone with the 
Wind from those which are set in counterpart htures such as Star Trek. Figure 6.1 shows a 
plausible diagram of relative time-spans in three W's. 
page 178 
Figure 6.1 
Relative time spans for three W's 
W' Star Trek 
$i/ W" Gone with the Wind 
I 
It might be that syntactic signposts reflect the position of the time-span of the portion of some 
W which is described in a fiction in relation to our oun WO. If this were the case then we 
would expect to find past tense associated with Gone with the Wind and future modals 
associated with Star Trek. 
There is another possible interpretation of tense signposts in sentences about fictional worlds:. 
Since a familiar world is one which a hearer has accessed (and assigned truth-values in) 
previously, it might be that the syntactic temporal signposts reflect the direction in time from 
the current WO to the temporal counterpart of WO from which the familiar world was first 
accessed. If ths were the case then we would expect both Star Trek and Gone with the Wind 
to be associated with past tense. 
The thrd  possibility is that temporal signposts in sentences whose referents are located in 
other Ws, point from one w in that W to another. That is, they might require the hearer of 
some sentence to shift to a WO in the fictional W, in the same way as i s  necessary to allow 
them to interpret deictic expressions in fictions. If this were the case then we would expect 
both past tense and future modals associated with Star Trek and Gone with the Wrnd. 
page 179 
We do not intend to discuss the question of temporal reference in fictional worlds in great 
detail. However, let us consider brief example sentences which can be interpreted in both 
types of fictional world with syntactic signposts into the past and the future and with present 
tense verb forms. The various 
combinations of past or future fictions with temporal reference to events, and states of affairs 
in relevant W s  and ws are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
We will also consider a range of events and states. 
Table 6.1 
Past Fictions, temporal reference and states of affairs in possible worlds or sub-sets of 
possible worlds. 
events states of affairs in states of affairs in sub-set 
W of w 
Past Scarlet O'Hara made Scarlet O'Hara was a Scarlet O'Hara was married 
signpost a dress from curtains Southern Belle to Charles Kenned). 
present Scarlet O'Hara drops Scarlet O'Hara is a Scarlet O'Hara is married to 
signpost a cup Southern Belle Charles Kennedy 
future Scarlet O'Hara will Scarlet O'Hara will Scarlet O'Hara w71l marry 
signpost siap Rhett be a Southern Belle Charles Kennedy 
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Table 6.2 
Future Fictions, temporal reference and states of affairs in possible worlds or sub-sets of 
possible worlds. 
events states of affairs in W states of affairs in sub-set 
of w 
Past Mr Chekhov killed Mr Chekhov was the Captain Kirk was held 
signpost a Klingon helmsman of the prisoner on a frozen moon 
Enterprise 
present Mr Spock is re- Mr Chekhov is the Captain Kirk is not the 
signpost born helmsman of the commander of the 
Enterprise Enterprise 
future Mr Chekhov will Mr Chekhov will be the Captain Kirk will be held 
signpost lull a Klingon helmsman of the prisoner on a frozen moon. 
Enterprise 
The main observation to be made with respect to the sentences in tables 6.1 and 6.2 is that the 
pattern of acceptability of sentences with past and future signposts is the same whether the 
fictional W lies in the counterpart past or the counterpart future of WO. No matter whether the 
sentence describes an event, a state which holds throughout the entire time-interval of W 
described in the fiction, or a state which holds in some sub-set of W, signposts into the past 
are acceptable and signposts into the future less SO. We conclude that WO generally continues 
to be associated with the world the hearer of these sentences exists in and that the past 
sqntactic signposts point the hearer into a world familiar to them from their own past. The 
future syntactic signposts on the other hand require the hearer to shift the identity of WO of the 
W they exist in and into a WO' in the fictional W. 
. 
The use of the present tense with references to fictional entities appears to be consistent with 
references to entities in fictional Ws (i.e. in sentences which predicate of entities properties 
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which hold of them in all ws in the W in which they exist), and with references to entities in 
particular ws (i.e. in sentences which describe events whch take place in one w of W7). In 
contrast, sentences which describe states of affairs whose duration is someLvhere in between 
are somewhat strange with a verb in the present tense when the sentence is presented out of 
context. We conclude that to access a sub-set of W indicated with a present tense verb form it 
is necessary to shft the identity of WO, to some WO' which lies withm the time-span of the 
fictional W which is described by the predicate. 
We have now discussed the processes involved in accessing the current world, familiar worlds 
and various types of sign-posted counterparts. However, there are sentences kvhose referents 
cannot be located in any of these types of reference worlds. For example: 
6.34. The King of France is bald. 
The location of the referent of the subject NP of 6.34 is an example of the final type of world 
we will consider. 
6.2.3.3. Last-resort Counterparts. 
If no referent is can be located for some referring expression in WO, or any familiar world, or 
by following a syntactic signpost, we propose that hearers interpret that referring expression 
as a reference to an entity in what we will call a last-resort counterpart. We will call the 
process by which these worlds are arrived at step-b-v-step sh(frs to distinguish them from the 
short-cuts and sign-posted shifts. Sentences 6.3 5-6.3 7 contain examples of referring 




Camille Paglia's daughter has read The Brothers Kararnazov 
Chelsea Clinton's sister painted her toe-nails magenta. 
The Pope's wife celebrated Hanukkah quietly at home. 
7that is in a sub-set of ws small enough to be indivisible or small enough for sub-dividing them to be 
unnecessary) 
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We assume that the reference worlds chosen in the interpretation of such sentences are 
minimal counterparts8: the reference worlds in 6.3 5-6.3 7 being minimal counterparts of the 
current WO. 
Again, we propose that shfts into last-resort counterparts of familiar worlds other than the 
real world are undertaken in precisely the same kind of circumstances. For example. last- 
resort counterparts are chosen as the existential locations of the referents 6.38 and 6.39, since 
no referents can be located any other way. 
6.38. 
6.39. 
Scarlet OlHarals fourth husband is a Yankee carpet-bagger 
Sherlock Holmes' sister is kind but stupid. 
We can observe that all three sentences in 6.35-6.37 and the pair of sentences 6.38 and 6.39 
are perceived as truth-valueless in the current context. We claim that truth-valuelessness is a 
general feature of sentences containing only one referring expression, if that expression is 
interpreted by locating its referent in a last-resort counterpart world. 
Clearly. we must defend ths proposal. It might seem that it is contradictory to claim on the 
one hand that a particular world. used as a last-resort counterpart, is a very close counterpart 
of WO, differing by perhaps only one property. but on the other hand that we cannot assign a 
truth-value to so much as one statement about that world. However, if we try to make a 
statement about one of the properties that a minimal counterpart of WO shares with WO then 
the utterance is interpreted as being about some entih, not in the counterpart, but in WO itself. 
For example, it is the case in a minimal counterpart where Chelsea Clinton's sister exists that 
Washington is the capital of the USA, but sentence 6.40 is not perceived as a true statement 
about an entity in that world but about an entity in WO. 
6.40. Washington is the capital of the USA. 
8some implications for this assumption will be set out in section 6.4 in the discussion of cross-world 
relations 
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It might seem that a sentence such as 6.4 1. is a counter-example to this claim 
6.4 1. In the world in which Chelsea Clinton's sister exists, Washington is the 
capital of the USA. 
However, thls is not the case since the speaker of sentence 6.41 explicitljr imposes the choice 
of reference world on the hearer. and the normal rules for choosing a reference world could 
not apply no matter what they were. The interpretation of 6.41 is in this way similar to the 
interpretation of sentences in storytelling discourse situations which do not conform to the 
general rules for interpretation, since every sentence is perceived as true9. 
It is interesting to observe that indicative conditionals which do not contain syntactic signposts 
can be interpreted by locating the referents of their referring expressions in last resort 
counterparts. For example: 
6.42. If Camille Paglia's daughter is a Democrat, then Chelsea Clinton's brother is 
a Republican. 
The important question to be addressed in an analysis of the interpretation of 6.42 is whether 
the referents of Camille Paglia's daughter and Chelsea Clinton's brother are located in the 
same counterpart world. Before we turn to a discussion of this issue and the consequent 
problems of cross-world relations, we will set out in full the order and application of the rules 
for locating referents for some simple cases. 
91t is interesting that the suspension of the usual rules does not last indefinitely even in the context of 
story- telling. It would be extremely bizarre to react to an utterance of a. with an utterance of b.. 
a. 
b. No he wasn't. 
Once upon a time there was a Gng.  The King was getting rather thin on top. 
However, it is not in the least strange that some reader might reject, for example, the actions 
predicated of Inspector Morse in the latest Colin Dexter novel, on the grounds that they are out of 
character. It appears that once a world is firmly established we begin to evaluate statements about it 
in a different way from that which we use when it is initially introduced. 
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6.3. Rules for Locating Referents: A Surnmary of Simple Cases 
We claim that the interpretation of a referring expression can be modelled as a process of 
locating a referent in some possible world. We also claim that the perceived truth-value for 
any sentence can be predicted on the basis of the choice of reference world and the level of 
epistemic access that the person assigning the truth-value has to that world. We propose that 
there are two constraints which apply to the location of referents: 
C1. Begin the search in WO. 
Since discourses take place in worlds, WO at the outset of every discourse is the world the 
discourse participants exist 
C2. Do not continue to search once a referent has been located and all syntactic 
sign-posts have been followed. 
This constraint can be understood as an instruction to a hearer to locate a referent in WO or in 
a familiar world, or in a minimal counterpart of wo or a familiar world; i.e. that the reference 
world is chosen on the basis that the required entity exists there, whether or not the property 
which is predicated of that entity holds in the world or not. It is t h s  constraint which ensures 
that every sentence is not interpreted as triviall). true; the operation of this constraint is what 
allows us to predict that sentence 6.43, for example, is perceived as truth-valueless. 
6.43. The King of France is bald. 
The difference between story-telling discourse situations and normal contexts of interpretation 
can be defined as the suspension in storytelling discourses of both of these constraints. 
Within these constraints, we propose that the location of referents occurs according to three 
l0  We alluded to the possibility of changes in the identity of wo during the discussion of syntactic 
signposts in fictional sentences in section 6.3.2.2. and will return to this question and propose rules 
governing changes in the identity in section 6.4. 
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ordered rules 
R1. Use short-cuts. 
This rule instructs a hearer to use the short-cuts associated with epistemic links to access 
established familiar worlds as locations for referents. 
R2. Follow all signposts 
This rule instructs a hearer to access minimal counterparts if a syntactic signpost points into a 
modal or counterfactual world and to access temporal counterparts which lie in the direction 
indicated by temporal signposts. 
R3. Locate a referent for every referring expression 
This rule instructs a hearer to continue to apply the rules in order according to the first 
constraint until a referent is found. 
We do not claim that these three rules all operate in every discourse situation. It is the 
suspension of all of these rules which characterises the interpretation of sentences given as 
evidence in court. 
Let us examine the application of these rules to a group of sentences interpreted by a reader x 
in the current WO in the current context. 
6.44. Noel Edmonds is surprisingly popular. 
According to C1, x begins the search in the current world. A referent is available there and 
C2 ensures that the search therefore stops. 
6.45. Inspector Morse is lamentably irascible. 
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Again C1 stipulates that the search begins in the current world. No referent is available there. 
and so x searches among his or her set of familiar worlds and locates a referent in a familiar 
world we can call Wim according to R2. C2 then ensures that the location process stops. 
6.46. Inspector Morse might feel better if he drank less. 
In the interpretation of this sentence. the referent of the name is located as for the referent in 
sentence 6.45. However. according to R2. the modal might acts a signpost into a minimal 
counterpart of wim, and x locates the referent in wim' which is an exact counterpart of \Vim 
except that in wim'. the counterpart of Inspector Morse. Inspector Morse'. drinks less than 
Inspector Morse in ~ i m .  
6.47. Noel Edmonds might look better with a heavier beard. 
The interpretation of the name in this; sentence begins in \VO according to C 1. where a referent 
is located. The modal might then takes x out of WO into a minimal counterpart. ~2.0'. in which 
the counterpart of Noel Edmonds. Noel Edmonds', has a heavier beard than Noel Edmonds in 
"'0. 
6.48. Chelsea Clinton's sister might look good with a heavy beard. 
Searching in w70 according to C1 yields no referent for the definite Chelsea Clinton's sister 
and x cannot locate a referent in a familiar world b!, applying R1. However, b) applying R3. 
which is triggered by the modal. x is taken to a minimal counterpart of WO. WO'. in which an 
individual exists who is the sister of the counterpart in WO' of Chelsea Clinton in \VO. and who 
has a heavy beard. 
6.49. Chelsea Clinton's sister is lamentably popular 
The search for the referent of Chelsea Clinton's sister in 6.49, begins in WO according to C 1 .  
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No referent can be located by applying R1. since the definite does not pick out an entity in 
any of x's familiar worlds, or R2, since there are no temporal or modal sjntactic signposts into 
counterparts. R3, however, ensures that a referent is located, and the only possible location is 
among the set of last-resort counterparts, via a step-by-step shift. C1 ensures that the 
counterpart chosen is a minimal counterpart of WO. 
Having summarised the application of the constraints and rules of the location theory to some 
simple examples we will now consider the application of the theory to examples involving 
cross-world relations. 
6.4. Cross-world relations. 
The problems surrounding the location of referents in possible worlds become more interesting 
when we consider sentences containing more than one referring expression. for example, 
6.50. 
6.5 1.  
A Dutchwoman danced with the King of France. 
The King of France danced with a Dutchwoman. 
We reviewed the arguments concerning the constraints on cross-world relations put forward 
by Fodor (1979) in section 2.3 of chapter 2. She addresses the questions in this area at some 
length, making some interesting proposals, but cannot account for the pair of sentences above 
using her set of competing pragmatic principles. 
The question we must address here. is whether, with respect to sentence 6.5 1, having located a 
referent for the King of France in a last-resort minimal counterpart of WO, WO', we also try to 
locate the referent of a Dutchwoman in "0'. or whether we try to interpret a Dutchwoman as 
a reference to an entity in WO. Clearly, if we attempt to locate a referent for the indefinite in 
WO we will succeed, since there are Dutchwomen in WO. We can also be sure that if we 
attempt to locate a referent for a Dutchwoman in WO', we will be able to find one there. since 
WO' i s  a minimal counterpart of WO. Given that C2 will ensure that the search ends whenever 
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a referent is located, the location of the referent for the indefinite is determined bjr where we 
look first. 
Although we have no very reliable direct intuitions about the location of referents we can 
deduce the location of the referent of a Dutchwoman by consulting our intuitions about the 
resulting truth-value of the sentence. In thls case, if we locate a Dutchwoman in WO', then it is 
to be predicted that we will be unable to assign a truth-value to the sentence since it might be 
either true or false that the King of France in WO' danced with a member of the set of 
Dutchwomen in WO'. If, on the other hand, we locate a referent for a Dutchwoman in WO we 
predict that the sentence will be perceived to be false. since dance with expresses what Fodor 
called a same-world relation. 
To decide whch world we look in first, having shifted to WO' to locate the referent of the 
subject NP, we must decide whether this world becomes the current world for the duration of 
the interpretation of the utterance (or possibij. some larger chunk of discourse) or whether we 
"reset" at the original current world, the one in which the discourse takes place, to carry out 
the location procedure for the second NP. 
We can suggest that during the interpretation of a sentence the identity of WO shifts. To 
reflect this we can redefine "the current world'' as "the last world accessed". The 
interpretation procedures for 6.50 and 6.5 1 would be carried out in the following way. 
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SUBJECT NP 








Locate a referent in WO in accordance with C1 
Begin the search in WO according to C 1. 
Attempt to apply R2. 
Locate the King of France in a last-resort minimum 
counterpart of wo, WO' b>* applying R3. 
Assign a truth-value offalse using knowledge of the lexical 
selectional restrictions of dance with and the relative 






SUBJECT NP Begin the search in WO according to C 1.  
Search the set of familiar worlds in accordance with R1. 
Attempt to apply R2. 
Locate the King of France in a last-resort minimum 
counterpart of "0. WO' bjr applying R3. 
Locate a Dutchwoman in "0' according to C 1.  OBJECT NP 1. 
PREDICATE Attempt to assign a truth-value by consulting knowledge of 
the properties of WO' 
A central claim of the current thesis has been that the apparently exceptional status of the real 
world, in the interpretation of sentences, can be explained as a result of the fact that our 
discourses take place in this world and therefore the real world is often WO. We will now 
consider a pair of sentences involving cross-world relations whose referring expressions do 
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not pick out entities in the real world. We will show that the interpretation of these sentences 
conforms to the same rules as the interpretation of sentences 6.50 and 6.5 1 above. 
6.52. 
6.53. 
A Klingon had a dream about a Baker Street Irregular. 
A Baker Street Irregular had a dream about a Klingon. 
Recall that on Fodor's account based on opaqueness, two analyses are possible, neither of 
which is correct. If the expressions A Klingon and a Baker Street Irregular are taken to 
refer to non-existent entities (since their referents do not exist in the real kvorld) then it is 
predicted that 6.52 and 6.53 will be truth-valueless, since failed referring expressions cannot 
occur as the subjects of asymmetric predicates. If, on the other hand, A Klingon and a Baker 
Street Irregular are assumed to pick out existent entities in fictional worlds then it is 
predicted that 6.52 and 6.53 are truth-valueless as a result of underspecification of fictional 
worlds. The truth-values suggested by intuition, that 6.52 is either true or false, but 6.53 is 
false, could only be produced if it were argued that Klingons exist but Baker Street Irregulars 
do not. Our account on the other hand correctly predicts the truth-values perceived. To shoi4 
this we will examine the interpretation processes for each in detail 
Consider the partial diagram of epistemically linked worlds in Figure. 6.2 
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Figure 6.2 
Possible Epistemic links between the worlds of Star Trek and Sherlock Holmes 
ST = the world invoked blr Star Trek 
SH = the world invoked by the fiction of Arthur Conan Dolrle 
i = a member of the set of Klingons 
J = Gene Roddenbeq 
k = Arthur Conan Doyle 
I = a member of the set of Baker Street Irregulars. 
The assumption appears to be well-motivated that to dream about an entity. it is necessary to 
have an epistemic link into the world where that entity exists. 
In the interpretation of 6.52 in 1996, the application of C1 yields no referent for A Klingon in 
WO. R1, however can be used to locate a set of Klingons in a familiar world wst and the 
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referent of a Klingon can be interpreted as a member of that set. The nest stage in the 
interpretation procedure is to locate a referent for a Baker Street Irregular. Whether we 
take the current world to be WO or wst C 1 cannot yield a referent. We then applj. R1. If we 
try to apply R1 to i ts  familiar worlds, we cannot arrive at an answer. It may be that some 
world which contains a referent is one of i's familiar worlds, but we do not know, since we do 
not know which worlds are connected to i via epistemic links. On this interpretation we do not 
know whether the sentence is true or false. If we apply R1 to our own familiar worlds we 
locate the set of Baker Street Irregulars in wsh. We locate the referent of a Baker Street 
Irregular in this set. We know that there might be an epistemic link from i in wst to wsh 
since we know that wsh is epistemically accessible from wst. We know this because we know 
the initial epistemic link bkSH is from 1902, a counterpart of which is epistemicallj. 
available to individuals in wst since it is an earlier temporal counterpart. Although we know 
that an epistemic link is possible we do not know whether such an epistemic link actually 
exists. Therefore we do not know whether the sentence is true or false 
In contrast, in the interpretation of 6.53 the application of R1, after the failure to locate a 
referent in w70 in accordance with C: 1, yields a referent for a Baker Street Irregular in wsh 
R1 yields no referent for a Klingon in either WO or wsh. We then attempt to apply R2 to 
locate a referent for a Klingon in a world epistemically linked to 1 in wsh. In this case, we 
know7 that wst cannot be epistemically linked to 1 in wsh, since the initral epistemic link into 
wst is out of 1964, and counterparts of 1964 are not epistemically available to individuals in 
wsh since they are-ficture temporal counterparts of this world. We can conclude. that sentence 
6.53 is false, since it is not possible for an individual to have a dream about a second 
individual whch is not epistemically available to him or her. l 
'On the reading where we search the familiar worlds of other-worldly entities, it is j u s t  possible to 
get the reading that in the world where Sherlock Holmes and the Baker Street Irregulars exists 
someone creates an epistemic link to the world of Star Trek (and by a massive coincidence Gene 
Roddenberry follows the same path in 1964). This "possibility" is indigestible enough to suggest that 
the other alternative is the correct one; i.e. that we search our own familiar worlds. 
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6.5.  Summary. 
In this chapter, we showed how the relation of relative proximity between worlds which 
results from the structure we proposed in chapter 5 translates into an ordering of worlds in 
terms of relative accessibility. We decided to establish the world in which a discourse takes 
place as the nearest and hence most accessible potential reference world for the referring 
expressions in the utterances of that discourse. From this basis, we proposed that the set of 
epistemic links which connects an individual in one world to other worlds should be seen as a 
system of short-cuts and this allowed us to define the familiar worlds for some individual as 
the next nearest and hence the next most accessible set of locations for referents. We divided 
the remainder of the set of worlds, which were defined as counterparts, in terms of their 
conditions of use as locations for referents; distinguishing between counterparts which are 
employed in accordance with modal or temporal syntactic signposts. and counterparts which 
are employed as a last resort in the attempt to locate referents. 
Having discussed the possible methods for locating referents, we then set out to predict how 
referents are located in actual discourse situations. by setting out an ordered set of constraints 
and rules which govern the choice of reference world during interpretation. We showed that 
the rules correctly predict the existential locations for a range of referring expressions in 
simple sentences and that the resulting patterns of truth-value assignments and truth- 
valuelessness accord with our intuitions. We then moved on to look in detail at more 
interesting cases involving pairs of expressions which could be analysed as having referents in 
different worlds. We found that certain sentences which had been exceptional under previous 
theories could be accounted for by the rules for locating referents we proposed. 
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Chapter 7 .  
Problems and Implications. 
7.1 .  Introduction. 
In tlus final chapter we will examine the potential problems encountered by adopting the 
location theory of reference presented in this thesis. These problems are of various types and 
degrees of seriousness. 
First u7e will examine two individual types of NPs, deictic pronouns and names, which do not 
appear to follow the general rules for interpretation which we have proposed to account for 
the entire set of NP types. It will be shown in sections 7.2.1. and 7.2.2. that these apparent 
counter-examples can be accounted for by appealing to their specific locations on the EF 
scale. 
Second, we will turn our attention to a discussion of a potentially undesirable consequence of 
adopting the view that nominal expressions in so-called opaque contexts can be analysed as 
piclung out referents rather than intensions: this stance leaves us in need of an explanation for 
the failure of the Law of Substitution in these contexts. A detailed solution to this problem is 
outside the scope of the present work but we make an initial suggestion for an analysis which 
appears promising in section 7.3. 
Lastly, we take close and critical look at the structures we proposed to define sets of temporal 
counterparts1. We acknowledge that the theory entails some quite radical departures from 
the existing, accepted ideas about temporal reference in other theories (Cann, 1993. Kamp and 
Reyle, 1993). Since the structure of the set of possible worlds which we have presented was 
developed with the central aim of accounting for nominals, it is likely that some far-reaching 
modifications might be necessary to enable the theory accurately to handle a range of 
predicate types. 
lsee Chapter 5 ,  section 5.2. 
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7.2. Problem Cases. 
Fodor identified the following two related problems: (1) that deictic pronouns appear to 
trigger obligatory real world reference (e.g. in sentence 7.1.) and; (2) that it is difficult to 
account for which other referring expressions behave like deictic pronouns u.ith respect to 
world shifting constraints (e.g.. sentence 7.2.) and which allow free shifting between worlds 
(e.g.. sentence 7.3 .). 
7.1. My mother sat next to Hercule Poirot on a flight between Paris and 
London. 
The Chippendales danced at the garden party in St Mary Mead. 
A Chippendale chair was stolen during the garden party at St M a y  Mead. 
7.2. 
7.3. 
Having proposed that the set of determiners be ordered on a scale of existential strength. it 
would provide additional support for the usefulness of t h s  scale, if we could show that it is 
possible to identifv some point on the scale as the precise location of the boundary between 
entities whose referents are fixed in the real world and entities which can refer in other worlds. 
In the following two sections, we offer an explanation which does account for both of these 
problem areas in terms of the scale of EF. A partial representation of the scale we proposed is 
given again in Fig. 7.1 : 
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Figure 7.1. 











We proposed that the effect of the strong EF associated with expressions at the upper end of 
this scale is to trigger the analysis of such expressions as references to entities whose 
existence is pre-established. We defined such pre-established entities. mith respect to some 
discourse participant, as entities whose existence and identity is established for that individual 
prior to the utterance of the current reference to them. We are now in a position to restate this 
requirement of pre-established existence in terms of possible worlds. We can say that 
expressions with the strongest existential force will be interpreted by a hearer as references to 
entities which are located in pre-established worlds; and this in turn can be seen as a 
consequence of the general requirement to locate referents in the nearest available world. The 
nearest world is either WO, the world in which the discourse takes place, or a member of the 
set of familiar worlds with which the hearer has epistemic links. What remains to be decided 
is how far down the scale this effect reaches. 
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7.2.1. Pronouns 
The first place on the scale of existential strength, occupied by pronouns, appears to constrain 
world-shfting extremely tightly. We can show that pronouns are always interpreted in one of 
two ways neither of which involves any shifting of reference world . For example: 
7.4 The King of France cut his toe-nails. 
If 7.4 is a discourse initial utterance, then the only possible reading is one on which his is 
coindexed with the King of France, i.e. a reading where the referent of the pronoun exists in 
the world last accessed. The pairs of sentences in 7.5 and 7.6 indicate that no such 
consideration as Fodor's Real World Principle2 either overrides or applies with equal weight 
as the rule for interpreting the referents of pronouns in the last world to have been accessed. 
7.5a. Mrs Thatcher ironed Dermis's; trousers. The King of Francej cut hisj 
toe-nails. 
Mrs Thatcher ironed Dermis's; trousers. The King of Francej cut his, 
toe-nails. 
The Queen of France ironed the King's; trousers. Dennis Thatcherj cut hisj 
toe-nails. 





If a RWP did operate and took precedence over the rule we propose then only the co- 
indexings represented in 7.5b and 7.6a should be possible. If an equally weighted RWP 
operated then both variants in 7.5 but only 7.6a should be possible. If neither constraint 
applied then all four co-indexings should be possible. The fact that only 7.5a and 7.6a are 
available readings indicates that the rule for locating the referents of pronouns constrains the 
choice of reference world to the last world accessed. 
2see Chapter 2. section 2.3.4. 
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In cases where this type of interpretation is not available for a pronoun, the requirement still 
holds that referents are located in the nearest world. For deictic pronouns, the nearest world. 
in almost every case, is the world in which the speaker exists, WO, and deictic first person 
pronouns will therefore almost always be interpreted as references to the speaker in the world 
in which the discourse takes place. For example, sentences such as 7.7 and 7.8 will, we 
claim, always be interpreted as false statements about entities in separate worlds from each 
other, no matter in what order the two expressions occur; 
7.7a 
7.7b 
My mother went to school with the King of France. 
The King of France went to school with my mother. 
7.8a 
7.8b 
I went to school with Chelsea Clinton's sister. 
Chelsea Clinton' sister went to school with me. 
The referents of me or my mother in the b versions cannot be located in the last-resort 
counterparts accessed to interpret the King of France and Chelsea Clinton's sister, even 
though these worlds have just been accessed. The reason for this is that the referents must be 
located in the nearest world in which they exist; i.e. the world in which the discourse takes 
place, the current world. However. even when the nearest world in which the referent exists 
is not the current world, as is the case in sentence 7.9, the referent cannot be located in the last 
accessed counterpart and the sentence is perceived as false. 
7.9. Sherlock Holmes' wife went to school with my great-grandmother 
The explanation for this constraint is that the referent of Sherlock Holmes' wife must be 
located in a last resort-counterpart, since none is available in any familiar world . There is no 
referent for my great-grandmother available in the current world. However, the nearest 
world where such a referent is available is a temporal counterpart of the current world which 
is among my set of familiar worlds. That this world is nearer than the world where we located 
Sherlock Holmes' wife is a result of viewing epistemic links as short-cuts. Even though the 
page 199 
world where Sherlock Holmes wife exists has been accessed it is not a familiar world since it 
has not been accessedprior to this utterance. 
There is a further class of apparent exceptions which give additional strength to an analysis in 
terms of close, familiar worlds rather than a Real World Principle, since they provide more 
evidence that we can use deictic items in other worlds under circumstances which ensure that 
these other worlds are familiar according to the definition of familiarih given in section 5.4, 
Chapter 5. First, consider 7.10 which is a quotation by an actress discussing a role in a film; 
i.e. a fictional world in which she exists, and in which the values of properties holding of her 
are explicitly specified. 
7.10 She'si an interesting character - that i s  to say 1; got killed after ten minutes 
but Isp spent seven of them in Tom Cruise's arms3. 
Since the speaker cannot have been killed, the first I must be coindexed with she, but since 
Tom Cruise is not a inhabitant of the fictional world where the character exists. the second I 
must refer deictically to the speaker. In contrast 7.11, in which a familiar world is not 
available. is simply false, since the first person deictic pronoun cannot. according to the 
restriction we are proposing, refer to an entitj. in an unsignposted counterpart. 
7.1 1. I had an interesting war - that is to say I got killed after ten months, but 1 
spent seven of them in a beautiful spot in the Mediterranean. 
We claim that if there is a potential choice, in interpreting an expression of weaker existential 
force, between a non-existential reading which does not contravene the restrictions on familiar 
world reference of deictic pronouns, and an existential reading whch does contravene these 
restrictions, the non-existential reading is preferred. This contrasts with the general case 
where existential readings are preferred to non-existential readings. For example, the QNP 
every child of mine in sentence 7.12, in a context in which the speaker has no children, can 
either be interpreted existentially in a counterpart world in whch the speaker has children, or 
3The Times 9/12/95 
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non-existentially in WO. We take the acceptability of 7.12a and the unacceptability of 7.12b. 





Every child of mine can play the violin. 
although my ears have suffered less than Ginnie's have since her two started 
learning. 
It's rather painful at the moment. but they are getting better. 
In contrast, in 7.13 the preferred interpretation for everything in sight is existential. as 
indicated by the fact that 7.13b, rather than 7.13a, is the preferred continuation of the two. 
7.13 I drank everydung in sight. 
7.13a. - thankfully for my liver the place is not licensed. 
7.13b. - which might have tipped me over the Government's nen. safe dailSr level. 
We claim that temporal deictic items also have an effect on the acceptability of references to 
entities in other worlds. If we take tense to be the least deictic type of temporal construction 
and temporal adverbials, whch place reference times very close to utterance times, as the 
most deictic type, we can see that there is a corresponding cline of likelihood that we will 
interpret referring expressions as references to entities in other worlds. For example, we claim 
that sentences 7.14 - 7.17 are increasingly likely to be interpreted as false, indicating that the 





The King of France danced with a Dutchwoman. 
The King of France danced with a Dutchwoman last year. 
The King of France danced with a Dutchwoman last night. 
The k n g  of France danced with a Dutchwoman an hour ago. 
We conclude that at the strongest existential point on the scale, deictic pronouns (and other 
deictic elements) must refer in the nearest world to the speaker, which is almost always the 
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world in whch the discourse is taking place and otherwise is a familiar world or a signposted 
counterpart. 
7.2.2.  Names 
After a detailed discussion in section 3.1 of Chapter 3 we concluded that all occurrences of 
names should be analysed as having the strength of EF which calls for their interpretation as 
references to pre-established entities. We suggested that the utterance of any of the versions 
of 7.18 (by a speaker to an unfamiliar hearer), which might be thought of as a counterexample 
to this claim, is onlv possible given the assumption that individuals tjpically (or at least 
stereotypically) have partners, children, fhends and a network of acquaintances, and that each 
of these has a name. 
7.18 I didn't sleep last night - because N o m a  is away and I was cold. 
because Murdo is teething. 
because Petra kept phoning from Japan. 
With regard to the freedom of choice for the reference world of a name. we claim that they are 
even more tightly restricted than pronouns. Although we agree with Kripke's analysis of 
names as rigid designators, which therefore pick out the same individuals (or counterparts of 
the same individuals) in all worlds, (Kripke. 1972) we argue that names are always 
interpreted as referring in the nearest world, which will always be a familiar world. There is 
no incoherence in this view since we have already accepted that although counterparts of 
entities exist in an infinite number of possible worlds, referring expressions are typically 
interpreted as references to a small number of possible counterparts in a very few of these 
worlds. 
We predict that a combination of a pair of names which pick out entities in different familiar 
worlds with a predicate whch requires physical co-existence will always result in a truth- 






Barbara Cartland spat at Lieutenant Uhuru. 
Lieutenant Uhuru spat at Barbara Cartland. 
Lieutenant Uhuru spat at Scarlet O'Hara. 
Scarlet OlHara spat at Lieutenant Uhuru. 
Asymmetric predicates combined with named entities in different worlds will function in the 
same way as the predicates discussed in section 6.4 in Chapter 6 in such sentences as 7.23. 
7.23. A Klingon dreamed about a Hobbit. 
That is, sentence 7.24 w7ill be perceived as truth-valueless, which indicates that it is potentially 
true, while sentence 7.25 will be perceived as false. 
7.24. 
7.25. 
Mr Chekhov dreamed about Sherlock Holmes. 
Sherlock Holmes dreamed about Mr Chekhov. 
Even names which are explicitly introduced to identi@ individuals in sign-posted counterparts 
can never force names which do refer to entities in familiar worlds to shift worlds. This i s  




Chelsea Clinton's brother might be called Hampstead Clinton. 
and Hampstead Clinton is Chelsea Clinton's brother. 
and Hampstead Clinton danced with Sue-Ellen Ewing. 
We predict on the basis of this observation that the only possible truth-value for sentence 7.29 
is-false since Paris must be taken as a reference to an entity in the current ~70.  
7.29. The King of France lives in Paris. 
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Recall that Fodor uses this sentence as an example ofpermissible world-shifts of entities. We 
do not agree with her evaluation, but concede that a marginal reading of this sentence as 
potentially true is possible, if it is interpreted as a (slightly weird) generic with the expression 
the King of France being interpreted as a generic reference to the entire set of Kings of 
France, or a stereotypical representative of all Kmgs of France. On this reading it is 
irrelevant that the current temporal counterpart of our W does not contain one of these Kings 
of France to live in our counterpart of Paris. Note that sentence 7.29 is much more acceptable 
as a true statement than 7.30. 
7.30 The King of France holidays in Honolulu. 
It is not plausible to claim that this difference in our intuitions about sentences 7.29 and 7.30 
exists because the referent of Honolulu is generally less likek to be located in a counterpart 
world than the referent of Paris. We prefer to argue that 7.30 is more likely to be interpreted 
as potentially true than 7.29 because it is a more reliable stereotype that Kings of France live 
in Paris than that EGngs of France hclliday in Honolulu4. This is borne out by a comparison of 
7.3 1 (with a forced generic interpretation of the subject NP) and 7.32 (in which the subject 
NP can only be given a specific reading). 
7.3 1.  
7.32. 
The King of France typically lives in Paris. 
The King of France lives in Paris now that his wife is dead. 
The intuition is that 7.3 1 is much more acceptable as a true statement than 7.32. 
To summarise, a dividing line must be drawn between expressions which are existentially 
strong enough to force the location of their referents in the nearest (and hence familiar) worlds 
and expressions which follow the general rules for world shifting laid out in the location 
theory. Our proposal is that this line should be drawn at a point on the scale below names and 
4McCawley noted the availability of this kind of generic reading for sentences such as 6.18. see 
Chapter 6 section 6.2.3.1. 
6.18. If London is  in England, the Queen of England lives in London 
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pronouns and above the remainder of the expressions which we analysed as being associated 
with pre-established EF; that is the entire class of definites and generics. 
To show that this is the correct analysis. let us consider those expressions, such as the Dalai 
Lama, which can be interpreted either as names. i.e. as rigid designators. or as definite 
descriptions. functions as a name which picks out an 
individual (the 14th incarnation) in the current WO in 7.33 and picks out counterparts of that 
individual in signposted counterpart worlds in 7.34 and 7.35. 




The Dalai Lama has a kind face. 
The Dalai Lama might never have become a monk. 
If the Dalai Lama had been a girl. he would have been barred from religious 
life. 
In contrast, the Dalai Lama in 7.37 and 7.38, functions as a definite description and picks out 
a generic or stereotypical referent. 
7.37. 
7.38. 
The Dalai Lama has not such had a kind face every time. 
If the Dalai Lama was not a monk, Tibetan Buddhism might be a veq' 
different kind of religion. 
Because of this ambiguity. we claim that if 7.39 is to be interpreted as a potentially true 
sentence, i.e. for the Dalai Lama to be interpreted as referring to an entity in the same 
counterpart world where we locate the referent of the King of France, the Dalai Lama 
cannot refer to a counterpart of the current 14th incarnation who exists in WO. If the Dalai 
Lama refers to the 14th incarnation then sentence 7.39 is interpreted as false. 
7.39. The King of France shook hands with the Dalai Lama. 
Likewise, if sentence 7.40 is to be interpreted as potentially true, then the President's 
daughter does not refer to a counterpart of Chelsea Clinton. 
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7.40. The King of France danced with the President's daughter. 
We conclude that in the absence of any context which suspends the normal rules for 
interpreting referring expressions 5 ,  or any syntactic signposts into counterparts, these 
expressions when they are interpreted as the names of individuals in WO. cannot be interpreted 
by locating their referents in last-resort counterparts, On the other hand when they are 
interpreted as referring expressions their referents can be located in the last-resort 
counterparts, accessed previously, if suitable referents are available there. 
7.3. More Opaqueness: The IntensionalExtensional Distinction and the 
Failure of Leibniz's Law. 
Besides the cancelling of presuppositional effects which we discussed in section 4.3.1 of 
Chapter 4, there is a second argument which is used to support the notion that referring 
expressions do not denote their extensions in opaque contexts and that is that in these contexts 
Leibniz's Law, the law of substitution. fails. This law states that if some expression is 
substituted for another semantically equivalent expression in a statement, the truth-value of 
that statement is unchanged. For example, if 7.41 is paraphrased as 7.42. Leibniz's Law 
dictates that it continues to be true in the current context. 
7.4 1. 
7.42. 
Prince Philip charmed the ambassador. 
The Duke of Edinburgh charmed the ambassador 
However, in opaque contexts, e.g. following verbs such as believe, dream about, want, and 
think, the law of substitution appears to fail. For example, it is possible to read 7.43 as false 
and 7.44 as true in the same context. 
7.43 Camille wants to meet the Duchess of York . 
h c h  as explicit story-telling like Long ago and far away. . . 
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7.44 Camille doesn't want to meet Fergie. 
That is, it may be true that Camille, who does not know what individual the Duchess of York 
picks out, either mistakenly thlnks the Duchess of Kent; is the Duchess of York and wants to 
meet her,, or simply wants to meet the Duchess of York whoever she may be because, say, 
she once had a pony called The Duchess of York (i.e. a de dicto reading). Alternatively it may 
be the case that Camille saw the individual who is the Duchess of York and wants to meet that 
individual (i.e. the de re reading). 
It may be true in exactly the same context, that Camille does not know kvhat individual Fergie 
picks out, but thinks Fergie is a royal corgi and does not want to meet her because she is 
scared of dogs, or thinks the name Fergie sounds like the name of someone unpleasant and 
does not want to meet her whoever she may be (i.e. a de dicto reading). It can only be 
possible for Camille to have seen the individual we can identifi as Fergie and not Lvant to meet 
that individual (on a de re reading) if she believes that the individual she does not want to meet 
is a different individual from the individual she does want to meet as described by 7.43 on the 
de re reading. 
One answer to the problem of Camilles's conflicting beliefddesires is to anallrse the definite or 
name on the de dicto reading as denoting its intension, regardless of the (contingent) identity 
of the extension, and to analqse the same expression on the de re reading as denoting its 
extension. This kind of analysis is clearly incompatible with our claim that the interpretation 
procedure for a referring expression such as a definite or a name is the procedure of locating 
its referent; i.e. its extension. 
The puzzles thrown up by opaque contexts and the failure of Leibniz's Law are bound up with 
the fact that no matter how many ways there are of referring to an entity, it is always the same 
entity. The advantage of our theory is that we distinguish thefact that referring expressions 
must pick out their referents, and that statements must have truth-values, from the possibility 
that not all indwiduals can locate the referents of names and other referring expressions, or 
decide upon these truth-values. That is, we r e c o p s e  the effect that epistemic limits can have 
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on acts of interpretation and truth-value assignment. For this reason, the fact that Camille 
might have restricted knowledge of, or mistaken beliefs about, the connection between either 
of the two expressions Fergie and the Duchess of York and an individual in the world, is 
separate from, and does not inhibit the ability of. the hearer of 7.43 or 7.44 to pick out the 
referent of either of these expressions during the interpretation of sentence 7.43 or 7.44. We 
recognise the difference between Camille having conflicting desires or beliefs and Camille (or 
anyone else) knowing that she has conflicting desires or beliefs. 
There is a firther benefit of adopting Leibniz's Law for a certain type of semantic theory; 
those theories on which all expressions without referents are taken to denote the same entity, 
the empty set (e.g. Montague Grammar, DOUQ et al., 198 1; Cam, 1993). According to such 
theories, the two sentences 7.45 and 7.46 are equivalent (and false) if the indefinite 
descriptions in object position are interpreted extensionally. 
7.45 
7.46 
Norman had a dream about a unicorn. 
Norman had a dream about a phoenix. 
If, on the other hand, the two indefinites in 7.45 and 7.46 are taken to denote their intensions 
then each sentence can be assigned a distinct truth-value. This is an important advantage of 
an intensional analysis over an extensional analysis if the extensions of these expressions are 
assumed to be the empty set. 
From the point of view of location theory, however, nothing is gained by attempting to 
interpret such expressions as denoting their intensions. The problem of extensional 
equivalence simply does not arise if the extensional referents of these indefinites are taken to 
be entities (unicorns and phoenixes) which exist in non-real counterpart worlds and which are 
identified using the rules of the location theory. The assignment of truth-values to 7.45 and 
7.46 depends on the current reader's ability to identifL the referent of Norman. Assuming that 
Norman can be located in the current world, the assignment of either truth-value is possible 
(so long as the reader has the necessary epistemic access to information about Norman) since 
dream about describes a cross-world relation. We assume that, in fact. these sentences are 
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left truth-valueless by the current reader but this in itself indicates that the!. are potentially 
true. If this were not the case, the sentences would be assigned the truth-value false as is 
sentence 7.47. 
7.47. Elizabeth I had a nightmare about Windows 95 
Clearly, further investigation is required into the wider implications of abandoning the 
intensional/extensional distinction, but we consider the current analysis encouraging enough to 
regard this a worthwhile exercise. 
7.4. Potential Problems with Temporal Counterparts. 
Finally, we must consider two types of potential problems that can be foreseen for a location 
theory of interpretation based on the view of the set of possible worlds set out in Chapter 5. 
These problem areas are the result of first, the split between the interpretation of referring 
expressions and the interpretation of sentences and second, the realistic view we take of the 
constraints placed on interpretation by the epistemic limits of the interpreter. 
The model we have proposed for the interpretation of utterances of sentences is a procedural 
one with two distinct stages ordered one after the other: first, the location of referents and 
second, the fixing of truth-values. It is a central claim of the theory that the location of 
referents takes place prior to the evaluation of the truth or falsity of the properties being 
predicated of them in the sentences in which the references to them occufi. The problem this 
view causes is that nothing about the referring expressions in a sentence gives any clue to the 
hearer of that sentence whether the referents must be located in instantaneous worlds without 
temporal parts -single ws - or in worlds which persist through some interval of time - sub-sets 
of Ws containing strings of temporally related ws. For example, the interpretation of sentence 
6Chapter 6, section 6.1.1. 
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7.48 requires the existence of a referent in only a single w, while the interpretation of 7.49 
requires the existence of a referent in a set of ws over an extended interval of time. 
7.48. Diana looked bashful. 
7.49. Diana is gradually amassing power and public sympathy 
Since it is possible to interpret the name Diana as a reference to an example of the type of 
entity, a human individual, which perdures through time (Lewis 1986), there may be no 
insurmountable technical problems to prevent an interpretation procedure in which a referent 
is located first in one individual w, as a result of the interpretation of the nominal expression. 
and then the range of reference worlds is expanded during the interpretation of the utterance as 
whole. Very much more research is required before a coherent answer is likely to emerge. 
We would need to look in detail at the data which is handled by those theories such as 
Montague Grammar and DRT which do seriously address the problems of temporal 
reference, before we could evaluate the scale and seriousness of the problem for the current 
theory. 
The final potential problem we will consider is the extent to which a hearer's limited epistemic 
access to counterpart worlds constrains his or her ability to assign truth-values. We count it 
as an empirical strength of the theory that it predicts that hearers are largely unable to assign 
truth-values to factual statements about entities located in last-resort counterparts and we 
have discussed truth-value assignment in relation to counterfactuals and modals at some 
length in section 6.2.3 of Chapter 6. Here we will consider briefly how limited access to 
temporal counterparts might constrain the assignment of truth-values to sentences containing 
verbs of any of the distinct types identified by Vendler: states and actions (activities, 
accomplishments and achievements) e.g. 7.50 - 7.53 (Vendler, 1967). 
7.50. Joan is an actress of distinction. STATE. 
7.5 1. Joan puts on her mascara. ACTIVITY. 
7.52. Joan won her case. ACHIEVEMENT. 
7.53. Joan is writing a book. ACCOMPLISHMENT. 
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We claim that the reference worlds for some utterance are chosen on the basis of their relative 
accessibility or closeness to the world in which the hearer of the utterance exists. We also 
claim that familiar worlds, those worlds with which hearers have epistemic links can be 
defined as more accessible than other counterparts7. We argued that for some ivorld WO at 
time t earlier temporal counterparts of WO, i.e. WO' at time t-1 etc., can be counted among the 
familiar worlds of individuals who exist at WO, but that later counterparts of LVO. i.e. WO' at 
time t+l etc., cannot be defined as familiar worlds of these individuals. In fact. we argued 
that the later temporal counterparts of any WO are indistinguishable from other general 
counterparts of w70 from the point of view of the individuals at WO. 
An interpretation of 7.53. which contains an accomplishment verb, in a Montague Semantic 
framework. would state that the proposition expressed in 7.53 is true with respect to some 
index at time t if Joan begins writing a book at some time t-n and finishes writing a book at 
time t+n. In the terms of the location theory, however, this means of assigning a truth-value 
to sentence 7.53 is impossible, since a hearer of 7.53 cannot have the necessary epistemic 
access to a future temporal counterpart of WO at any time t+n which will allow him or her to 
establish the completion at that time of the accomplishment described by the verb We must 
provide another means by which a hearer of 7.53 can assign the truth-value true (or false) to 
this sentence. This may not prove to be a serious problem; an initially promising approach is 
to argue that if a hearer can establish the beginning point of this accomplishment in an earlier 
temporal counterpart of WO and is unable to identif\i any intervening temporal counterpart 
between this point and WO he or she can conclude that the period during which the writing 
event takes place does include WO and hence the sentence can be interpreted as true. This is a 
radical departure from the view of the interpretation of this sentence taken by Montague 
Grammar and DRT and much additional research is necessary into the implications of limited 
epistemic access for the interpretation of different event types before a serious comparative 
evaluation of the approaches can be attempted. 
7Chapter 5, section 5.4, 
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7.5. General Conclusion. 
The problem we set out to address in this thesis was how to account for the pattern of 
perceived truth-values for a range of sentences which use a variety of types of nominal 
expressions to pick out various types of entity. 
It was clear that although numerous semantic and pragmatic presuppositional theories 
purported to address precisely this area the problems involved were at the same time too 
closely bound up with truth and falsity to be handled by pragmatic theories in terms of 
appropriateness or felicity, yet too much influenced by factors external to the linguistic system 
to be accounted for in terms of inherent truth-values for sentences. 
By developing a theory which takes account of the epistemic states of speakers and hearers in 
discourse situations, and views truth-value assignment as a pragmatic process. separate from 
any statement of truth-conditions, we hoped to predict perceived truth-valuelessness for 
sentences without tampering with the bi-valent logical account of their semantics. 
To do this we reviewed the efficacy of existing approaches to the existential features of 
linguistic expressions which claim that existential import is a binary phenomenon. We 
proposed instead that nominal expressions should be placed on a scale of existential strength 
allowing us to express the distinction between definites and indefinites in terms of existential 
force and to reflect the intuition that some NP types, traditionally held to be non-existential, 
could have existential interpretations. In this way we were able to analyse a wider range of 
nominals and nominal uses as expressions for which referents must be located. 
To provide a framework for the required range of types of existence associated with entities 
we set out to construct a model of existential locations using the notion of an infinite set of 
possible worlds. We employed a realistic view of the nature of possible worlds on which all 
worlds are seen as actually existing entities, all though other worlds are assumed to be 
temporally, spatially and causally unconnected to the world in which we exist. By adopting 
this stance, we are forced to countenance the existence of every possible world and the 
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consequent truth somewhere of every sentence. To constrain the use of possible worlds in 
interpretation in such a way as to reflect the actual truth-values which are assigned. \\e 
imposed a structure on the set of worlds which ordered worlds in terms of their accessibility. 
the organising principle of the structure being that the level of accessibility of some world to 
individuals in another is governed by the degree of proximity between the two worlds. 
The final goal of the thesis was to show that the combination of the scalar view of existential 
force and the rich structure of relations between worlds allowed us to reflect perceived truth- 
values. We examined a variety of sentences and demonstrated that their interpretations could 
be explained in terms of the worlds selected as the locations for the referents of their 
constituent nominal expressions. Given the fairly complex view of the relations between 
worlds, we were able to state very simply the rules which appear to govern the choice of 
reference world during interpretation. We showed that these simple rules were able to account 
for the perceived truth-value assignments of a wider range of sentences than could be handled 
by previous theories. 
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